The South Caucasus has established itself as a corridor for transporting energy from Azerbaijan to Georgia, Turkey, and on to Europe, symbolized by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. This new infrastructure has created an east-west "Eurasian bridge" in which transnational extra-regional actors, especially the European Union and international financial institutions, have played a critical role. This book offers an original exploration of integration in the energy and transport sectors amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, and the capacity of this to fundamentally change relations between these countries. In the period studied, from the mid-1990s to 2008, integration in energy and transport did not result in broader political, security, and sociocultural integration in any significant way. The author sets his analysis in a theoretical framework, drawing on theories of integration, but also grounds it in the detailed, empirical knowledge that is the measure of true expertise.

This 1990 publication puts forward the view that superpower competition in the Third World has always carried with it the likelihood of acute crises and that this likelihood may be reduced through a variety of tacit understandings or explicit agreements between Washington and Moscow. As the central study from the Ford Foundation/Southampton University project on North/South security relations, the text brings together specialists from a variety of backgrounds to identify the roots of the competitive relationship in the 1970s and 1980s and then consider a range of specific regional conflicts in which both superpowers have been involved. Although superpower collaboration had increased, the long-term character and intentions of Soviet and American involvement in the Third World remained uncertain. In these circumstances it was particularly timely to reappraise past experience and assess the future prospects for crisis prevention in politically turbulent and potentially dangerous areas.

In a survey of Soviet attitudes toward the large group of Third World countries outside the primary alliances, generally referred to as the non-aligned states, the book assesses the policy implications of Soviet views on neutrality, non-alignment, the Non-Aligned Movement, neutralization, and alignment in the Third World. A primary intention is to consider how far Soviet leaders have accepted the independent foreign policy aspirations of non-aligned states and to explain the purposes behind Soviet encouragement for the status or strategy of non-alignment in the 1970s and 1980s. The study questions whether Soviet leaders are able or willing to accept non-alignment or neutrality as an intermediate status between the Eastern and Western blocs in international affairs. The Soviet view of the collective agenda of the non-aligned states on international security issues is analyzed, and the topical question of how the USSR understands military alignment and the primary North/South military relationship is examined.

Over the last thirty years Soviet leaders have sought to coordinate Soviet foreign policy in a variety of ways with the policies pursued by the large group of Third World countries lying outside the Eastern and Western alliance systems, the non-aligned states. This study is the first to investigate the overall Soviet conception of non-alignment in the Third World and to assess Soviet policy in relation to this issue. The author argues that official Soviet encouragement for the policy of non-alignment and Soviet support for the programme of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s and 1970s have been part of a broad Soviet strategy aimed at weakening and ultimately supplanting Western military and political ties with Third World states. Soviet officials have been reluctant, therefore, to view neutrality, nuetralism or non-alignment as concepts or policies which denote an intermediate status between the blocs. This study assesses the implications of such perceptions for Soviet policy and considers how far Soviet leaders have accepted the independent foreign policy aspirations of non-aligned states.

Russia has been embroiled in bitter disputes with major Western powers over high-profile military interventions - over Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003), Georgia (2008), and even Libya (2011) which had a UN Security Council mandate. Moscow and the West reached much more agreement over the Gulf War (1990) and intervention in Afghanistan (2001), but these cases are exceptional. This interdisciplinary study explores the persistent differences between Russian and Western leaders about most Western-led military campaigns and about Russia's own use of force in the CIS region. What does this tell us about emerging norms on the use of force in humanitarian crises? How and why has there been such controversy over the legal justifications for these military operations? Has greater consensus been possible over force in global counterterrorism? What do all these controversies tell us about international rule-making? More specifically, how can we understand Russian political and diplomatic responses during international crises around major interventions? This book argues that Russia has been influential in these debates on norms and law as a permanent United Nations Security Council member and as a major military power. Moscow's approach to these questions has reflected distinctive and quite entrenched attitudes to international order and sovereignty, as well as a preoccupation with its own status. The book draws deeply on Russian sources to show how these attitudes are expressed among the Russian leadership and the political elite. This raises challenging questions about the ability of Russia and Western states to cooperate in emerging crises, in Syria, Iran, or elsewhere and about Russia's role in international society.

After the turmoil following the collapse of Soviet power, post-Communist Russia has emerged as an assertively independent force in international affairs. Meanwhile, an intense debate has been underway in Moscow about Russia's national interests and foreign policy priorities. Domestic political conflicts and the close ties with former Soviet partner states have made internal factors particularly particularly important in shaping Russian foreign policy. Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy is the first systematic analysis of the domestic political forces which condition the international behaviour of the new Russian state. Four leading specialists examine in turn the areas of foreign policy thinking and debate, how policy is made, the public politics of foreign policy and the role of the military. They explore the changing domestic alignments associated with recent shifts in Russian foreign policy, focusing on the roles played by institutions such as the Security Council and the legislature, by military groupings and by emerging economic interests. The authors throw new light on the domestic foundations of Moscow's more assertive and sef-reliant stance. This book is intended fo