To better understand the PLA's ability to employ its developing capabilities in a variety of potential scenarios, this year's workshop examined how the PLA learns by doing, specifically through its exercises and noncombat operations at home and overseas, and through key logistical and theoretical developments. Key findings are: 1) recent PLAN exercises and operations point to an increasing interest in developing expeditionary naval capabilities and a presence in distant seas, suggesting that a move beyond the current "near seas" focus is both possible and an extension of existing efforts; 2) PLA ground force exercises-rather than aiming to intimidate others by demonstrating the ability to project power beyond China's borders-focus on moving military power within China, both to defend China's borders and perhaps as a prelude to military restructuring in which smaller but more mobile formations could replace larger and more static ones; 3) through its participation in international military exercises as well as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions, the PLA is gaining greater capabilities to deploy outside of China's borders for a a variety of missions; and, 4) PLA operations are increasingly supported by a modern, civilian-integrated military logistics network, though a lack of overseas bases continues to limit the effectiveness of this network as it pertains to overseas power projection capabilities.

The U.S. Army War College and the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) are two organizations with which I have a strong connection. I was in the class of 1976 at Carlisle and I currently serve on the Board of NBR where I am closely aligned with the Strategic Asia Program. As such, I was quite pleased when the NBR joined the continuing efforts of the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute to study developments in China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) as cosponsors of the 19th PLA Carlisle Conference from October 6-8, 2006. Right-Sizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military is the ninth volume in this series published by the Strategic Studies Institute and represents the collective scholarly efforts of those who contributed to the 2006 conference. The book addresses how the leadership of China and the PLA view what size of PLA best meets China's requirements.

This volume addresses how the leadership of China and the PLA view what size of PLA best meets China's requirements. Among other things, this analytical process makes important new contributions on the question of PLA transparency, long an issue among PLA watchers. A great deal of emphasis has been put on understanding not only how, but also why a military modernizes itself. Some of the determining factors are national policies and strategy, doctrine, organizational structure, missions, and service cultures. While this list is not exhaustive, it does begin to paint a picture of just how broad and deep military interests run. It is important when we look at the structure and strategy for growth within the Chinese military that we see the world as China sees it. We need to see a world in which the "Taiwan issue" as well as that of North Korea and others are not viewed as short-term concerns, but fit into how China sees itself in a long-term leadership role in the region and in the world.

I am pleased that, for the second year in a row, the U.S. Army War College and The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) teamed up to convene the annual PLA colloquium. Over the years, this event has successfully increased understanding of China's military and the multiple aspects of its ongoing modernization effort. Last year was no exception. On September 28, 2007, under the joint leadership of the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute and NBR's Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies, approximately 70 leading experts on the People's Liberation Army (PLA) convened at Carlisle Barracks, PA, for a 2-day discussion on the Chinese military's human infrastructure. Presentations and discussions at the conference focused on identifying trends in recruitment, education, training, personnel management, and demographics within the PLA.

The annual Conference on the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) took place at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on October 22-24, 2010.1 The topic for this year's conference was the "PLA's lessons from Other People's Wars." Participants at the conference sought to discern what lessons the PLA has been learning from the strategic and operational experiences of the armed forces of other countries during the past 3 decades. Why did observers of the PLA want to study what Chinese military analysts might learned about non-Chinese wars? The answer is twofold. First, the PLA has not fought an actual war since 1979. Yet, during the last 3 decades, fundamental changes have taken place on the battlefield and in the conduct of war. Since the PLA has not fought since 1979, it had no experience in the changing face of war, and thus could not follow Mao Zedong's admonition to "learn by doing"; instead, it must look abroad for ways to discern the new pattern of warfare in the evolving information age. Studying Chinese military analysts' observations of non-Chinese wars therefore provides us a glimpse of what the PLA takes from others' experience to improve its capability and to prepare itself for dealing with China's national security issues, such as Taiwan, the South and East China Sea disputes, and internal unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, to name the most obvious ones. Second, Chinese military analysts have noticeably more freedom in assessing and commenting on the strength and weakness as well as the success and fail-ures of other countries' wars. Indeed, for political reasons, Chinese military analysts have to emphasize the heroics and triumphs of the PLA's war experience and downplay setbacks and failures.2 While there is certainly recognition of the daunting challenges-in Korea, for example, accounts readily acknowledge that the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) were totally unprepared logistically and devastated by airpower-there are limits to the levels of candor. To date, there is no critical analysis of the PLA's claimed success or dismissed failure in the Sino-Vietnamese Border War of 1979 by Chinese military analysts (however, there are a few studies done by scholars outside of China3). Studying Chinese military analysts' observation of other people's wars, therefore, provide us key hints as to what Chinese military analysts consider important aspects of current and future military operational success and failure.

The chapters presented in this volume have demonstrated first, Chinese and PLA leaders have a strong sense of mission and concern for China's security and well-being. Second, the PLA is committed to the transformation in military affairs with Chinese characteristics. Third, the PLA is eager to learn from the U.S. military to expand and improve its operational capabilities. Finally, the PLA has made progress in its transformation and operational capabilities. For a long time, American leaders have been surprised with the PLA's advances. This volume (and many of the previous volumes from past PLA conferences) show that these advances did not come out of the blue. Although much of the learning and many of the improvements are still far from what is desired (from Chinese expectations and American critiques), and some of the learning has even created contradictions for the PLA, these persistent and diligent learning practices will eventually bring the PLA to a higher level of proficiency in its capabilities. The emergence of a much more sophisticated PLA in the coming years should not be a surprise.

The chapters presented in this volume have demonstrated first, Chinese and PLA leaders have a strong sense of mission and concern for China's security and well-being. Second, the PLA is committed to the transformation in military affairs with Chinese characteristics. Third, the PLA is eager to learn from the U.S. military to expand and improve its operational capabilities. Finally, the PLA has made progress in its transformation and operational capabilities. For a long time, American leaders have been surprised with the PLA's advances. This volume (and many of the previous volumes from past PLA conferences) show that these advances did not come out of the blue. Although much of the learning and many of the improvements are still far from what is desired (from Chinese expectations and American critiques), and some of the learning has even created contradictions for the PLA, these persistent and diligent learning practices will eventually bring the PLA to a higher level of proficiency in its capabilities. The emergence of a much more sophisticated PLA in the coming years should not be a surprise.