This volume identifies and compares 'fiscal squeezes' (major efforts to cut public spending and/or raise taxes) in the UK over a century from 1900 to 2015. The authors examine how different the politics of fiscal squeeze and austerity is today from what it was a century ago, how (if at all) fiscal squeezes reshaped the state and the provision of public services, and how political credit and blame played out after austerity episodes. The analysis is both quantitative and qualitative, starting with reported financial outcomes from historical statistics and then going behind those numbers to explore the political choices and processes in play. This analysis identifies some patterns that have not been explained or even recognized in earlier works on retrenchment and austerity. For example, it identifies a long term shift from what it terms a 'surgery without anaesthetics' approach (deep but short-lived episodes of spending restraint or tax increases) in the earlier part of the period towards a 'boiling frogs' approach (episodes in which the pain is spread out over a longer period) in more recent decades. It also identifies a curious reduction of revenue-led squeezes in more recent decades, and a puzzle over why blame-avoidance logic only led to outsourcing painful decisions over squeeze in a minority of cases. Furthermore, the volume's distinctive approach to classifying types of fiscal squeezes and qualitatively assessing their intensity seeks to solve the puzzle as to why voter'punishment' of governments that impose austerity policies seems to be so erratic.

The politics of cutting public spending or raising taxes (or both) has dominated politics in many democracies in recent years. A new era of conflict has developed, with old political alignments being tested and new battles emerging over whose expectations are to be disappointed and who should be blamed for fiscal squeeze. Do parties who cut spending always go down to defeat in elections? Are there 'best practice' cases that every government should follow when it has to cut spending or raise taxes to balance its public finances? Such issues have mainly been analysed from an economic or financial perspective and in the context of recent cases. By contrast, this book focuses on the politics of fiscal squeeze and takes a longer view. It combines quantitative and qualitative analysis to examine cases ranging from the fiscal squeeze in the United States in the 1830s/40s (when half of the states then in the Union defaulted) to the squeeze following the 2001 Argentinian default. It assesses who were the winners and losers, who got the blame and what were the longer-term effects on politics and government. It argues that 'how to do it' approaches to fiscal squeeze in democracies, based on apparently successful cases, often fail to take into account profound differences in circumstances.