This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations to address current shortfalls. The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Campaigns conducted over half a century ago - Malaya, Aden, and Kenya among them - remain primary sources on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats, this though both the character of those threats and the conflict environment are significantly different than was the case in those earlier years. This book addresses the resulting inconsistencies by offering insights, analysis, and recommendations drawn from campaigns more applicable to counter-insurgency today. Eight post-colonial conflicts; to include Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Iraq; provide the basis for analysis. All are examples in which counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Recommendations resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs to serve as the impetus for essential change. Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.

This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations to address current shortfalls. The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Campaigns conducted over half a century ago - Malaya, Aden, and Kenya among them - remain primary sources on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats, this though both the character of those threats and the conflict environment are significantly different than was the case in those earlier years. This book addresses the resulting inconsistencies by offering insights, analysis, and recommendations drawn from campaigns more applicable to counter-insurgency today. Eight post-colonial conflicts; to include Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Iraq; provide the basis for analysis. All are examples in which counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Recommendations resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs to serve as the impetus for essential change. Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.

The closing of the July-August 2006 Second Lebanon War left the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) an introspective organization. Once an example looked to by much of the world for lessons on martial prowess, the nation's military-indeed, the country at large-found its performance against the Hezbollah enemy a far more punishing and less effective experience than expected. Some of that outcome was attributable to the foe's preparations. Yet there were also self admitted deficiencies in the areas of leadership, intelligence, inter arms cooperation, decisiveness, and other areas that political and military leaders alike recognized had to be addressed. It was more than a matter of pride. In a region none too friendly, reestablishing the reputation of the IDF was felt to be a deterrent against further assaults. Twenty eight months later, the IDF attacked into Gaza after rocket attacks on Israel originating there spiked late in 2008. It was an attack made after a number of adjustments over the two plus years since the Second Lebanon War. Operation Cast Lead, the designation for the undertaking, demonstrated renewed confidence blended with improved tactics, leadership, and joint cooperation. This document reviews those adjustments, analyzes their effectiveness, and considers Israel's performance in Gaza more generally. The report concludes with 12 recommendations pertinent to future U.S. operations in what has emerged as an era of persistent conflict. This document will be of interest to individuals in the government, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and the commercial and academic sectors whose responsibilities include the study, planning, policy, doctrine, training, support, or conduct of insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, or other forms of stability operations in both the immediate future and longer term.

Describes the known precipitants of combat stress reaction, its battlefield treatment, and the preventive steps commanders can take to limit its extent and severity. Combat stress casualties can severely reduce unit strength, and these types of losses may be accentuated during operations in cities. Commanders and NCOs need to have the skills to treat and prevent stress casualties and understand their implications for urban operations. The authors review the known precipitants of combat stress reaction, its battlefield treatment, and the preventive steps commanders can take to limit its extent and severity.

Describes the operational challenges posed by the urban environment and proposes several recommendations to surmount them. In every operation, the functions of command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and communications are all fundamental to success. But in cities, the dense population, many manmade structures, and other challenges act to severely impede these functions in several ways. This monograph contemplates the nature of those challenges and proposes several recommendations to surmount them in both the short and longer terms.

Gives an overview of the formidable tasks facing US Army combat service support (CSS) in urban operations and recommends ways for the CSS community to prepare itself to meet them. The inevitability of US armed forces future involvement in urban contingencies worldwide demands that those responsible for arming, manning, sustaining, and otherwise supporting these operations prepare for the challenges inherent in such undertakings. This report gives an overview of these formidable tasks and recommends ways for the US Army combat service support (CSS) community to prepare itself to meet them.

This study recommends that the LAPD adopts a concept of police professionalism that incorporates corporateness, responsibility and expertise to guide the its training, to include training: the use of force; search and seizure; arrest procedures; community policing; and diversity awareness.

Current U.S. forces have little experience with urban warfare. This report identifies shortfalls in urban combat ground reconnaissance and assists in the creation of urban reconnaissance tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Marine Corps. The authors discuss four challenges: the constant adaptation demanded by the environment, the complexity of ground reconnaissance, the demands of urban operations on military personnel, and the demands of these operations on equipment and technology. The analysts' purpose is to narrow the gap between these challenges and the solutions immediately at hand.

This work is based on a conference whose objectives were to: explain the significance of urban areas in current and future military operations; and discuss methods and means of seizing, stabilizing, or controlling such areas in the 21st century, for example.

Today's strategic environment implies an obligation to preserve innocent life when possible and to rebuild that which war destroys. Urban areas are the keys to nations; people make nations just, as Thucydides wrote, men make cities. This study aimed to reveal lessons that will better enable military and civilian alike to meet national policy objectives by more effectively conducting urban combat and restoration.

This study proposes a new way of viewing urban operations, among the most complex challenges facing America's armed forces. Viewing urban operations in light of relevant densities, regardless of whether combat, stability, or support missions predominate, offers a viable means of approaching an otherwise most imposing puzzle. Doing so provides a vehicle to better understand how to conceptualize issues of pertinence, the tasks and missions that will address those issues, and the specific ways of employing elements of national power in the service of strategic objectives. Following an overview of density's potential influence on military operations, the author proposes and discusses five approaches to dealing with its challenges: Matching density with density, effectively reducing densities, maintaining selected densities, addressing density asymmetrically, and capitalizing on urban densities. He concludes with an analysis of density and its implications for information operations conducted in built-up areas.