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Metaethics occupies a central place in analytical philosophy, and
the last forty years has seen an upsurge of interest in questions
about the nature and practice of morality. This collection presents
original and ground-breaking research on metaethical issues from
some of the very best of a new generation of philosophers working
in this field.
The book brings together for the first time John Addington Symonds'
key writings on homosexuality, and the entire correspondence
between Symonds and Havelock Ellis on the project of Sexual
Inversion. The source edition contains a critical introduction to
the sources.
Across history, the ideas and practices of male identity have
varied much between time and place: masculinity proves to be a
slippery concept, not available to all men, sometimes even applied
to women. This book analyses the dynamics of "masculinity" as both
an ideology and lived experience -- how men have tried, and failed,
to be "Real Men."
This book is part of a new generation of historical research that
challenges prevailing arguments for the medical and legal
construction of male homosexual identities in late nineteenth and
early twentieth-century Britain. British society could not tolerate
the discussion necessary to form medical or legal concepts of 'the
homosexual'. The development of masculinity as a social status is
examined, for its influence in shaping societal attitudes towards
sex and sexuality between men and fostering resistance to any kind
of recognition of these phenomena. Imperatives to bolster
masculinity as a social status precluded public recognition of the
existence of sex and sexuality between men, even in terms that were
hostile and pejorative.
Suffering, in one form or another, is present in all of our lives.
But why do we suffer? On one reading, this is a question about the
causes of physical and emotional suffering. On another, it is a
question about whether suffering has a point or purpose or value.
In this ground-breaking book, Michael Brady argues that suffering
is vital for the development of virtue, and hence for us to live
happy or flourishing lives. After presenting a distinctive account
of suffering and a novel interpretation of its core element -
unpleasantness - Brady focuses on three claims that are central to
his picture. The first is that forms of suffering, like pain and
remorse, can themselves constitute virtuous responses. The second
is that suffering is essential for four important classes of
virtue: virtues of strength, such as fortitude and courage; virtues
of vulnerability, such as adaptability and humility; moral virtues,
such as compassion; and the practical and epistemic excellences
that make up wisdom. His third and final claim is that suffering is
vital for the social virtues of justice, love, and trust, and hence
for the flourishing of social groups.
Metaethics occupies a central place in analytical philosophy, and
the last forty years has seen an upsurge of interest in questions
about the nature and practice of morality. This collection presents
original and ground-breaking research on metaethical issues from
some of the very best of a new generation of philosophers working
in this field.
Michael S. Brady presents a fresh perspective on how to understand
the difference that emotions can make to our lives. It is a
commonplace that emotions can give us information about the world:
we are told, for instance, that sometimes it is a good idea to
'listen to our heart' when trying to figure out what to believe. In
particular, many people think that emotions can give us information
about value: fear can inform us about danger, guilt about moral
wrongs, pride about achievement. But how are we to understand the
positive contribution that emotions can make to our beliefs in
general, and to our beliefs about value in particular? And what are
the conditions in which emotions make such a contribution?
Emotional Insight aims to answer these questions. In doing so it
illuminates a central tenet of common-sense thinking, contributes
to an on-going debate in the philosophy of emotion, and illustrates
something important about the nature of emotion itself. For a
central claim of the book is that we should reject the idea that
emotional experiences give us information in the same way that
perceptual experiences do. The book rejects, in other words, the
Perceptual Model of emotion. Instead, the epistemological story
that the book tells will be grounded in a novel and distinctive
account of what emotions are and what emotions do. On this account,
emotions help to serve our epistemic needs by capturing our
attention, and by facilitating a reassessment or reappraisal of the
evaluative information that emotions themselves provide. As a
result, emotions can promote understanding of and insight into
ourselves and our evaluative landscape.
Social epistemology has been flourishing in recent years, expanding
and making connections with political philosophy, virtue
epistemology, philosophy of science, and feminist philosophy. The
philosophy of the social world too is flourishing, with burgeoning
work in the metaphysics of the social world, collective
responsibility, group action, and group belief. The new
philosophical vista now more clearly presenting itself is
collective epistemology-the epistemology of groups and
institutions. Groups engage in epistemic activity all the
time-whether it be the active collective inquiry of scientific
research groups or crime detection units, or the evidential
deliberations of tribunals and juries, or the informational efforts
of the voting population in general-and yet in philosophy there is
still relatively little epistemology of groups to help explore
these epistemic practices and their various dimensions of social
and philosophical significance. The aim of this book is to address
this lack, by presenting original essays in the field of collective
epistemology, exploring these regions of epistemic practice and
their significance for Epistemology, Political Philosophy, Ethics,
and the Philosophy of Science.
Across history, the ideas and practices of male identity have
varied much between time and place: masculinity proves to be a
slippery concept, not available to all men, sometimes even applied
to women. This book analyses the dynamics of 'masculinity' as both
an ideology and lived experience - how men have tried, and failed,
to be 'Real Men'.
The book brings together for the first time John Addington Symonds'
key writings on homosexuality, and the entire correspondence
between Symonds and Havelock Ellis on the project of Sexual
Inversion. The source edition contains a critical introduction to
the sources.
Across history, the ideas and practices of male identity have
varied much between time and place: masculinity proves to be a
slippery concept, not available to all men, sometimes even applied
to women. This book analyses the dynamics of 'masculinity' as both
an ideology and lived experience - how men have tried, and failed,
to be 'Real Men'.
Michael S. Brady presents a fresh perspective on how to understand
the difference that emotions can make to our lives. It is a
commonplace that emotions can give us information about the world:
we are told, for instance, that sometimes it is a good idea to
'listen to our heart' when trying to figure out what to believe. In
particular, many people think that emotions can give us information
about value: fear can inform us about danger, guilt about moral
wrongs, pride about achievement. But how are we to understand the
positive contribution that emotions can make to our beliefs in
general, and to our beliefs about value in particular? And what are
the conditions in which emotions make such a contribution?
Emotional Insight aims to answer these questions. In doing so it
illuminates a central tenet of common-sense thinking, contributes
to an on-going debate in the philosophy of emotion, and illustrates
something important about the nature of emotion itself. For a
central claim of the book is that we should reject the idea that
emotional experiences give us information in the same way that
perceptual experiences do. The book rejects, in other words, the
Perceptual Model of emotion. Instead, the epistemological story
that the book tells will be grounded in a novel and distinctive
account of what emotions are and what emotions do. On this account,
emotions help to serve our epistemic needs by capturing our
attention, and by facilitating a reassessment or reappraisal of the
evaluative information that emotions themselves provide. As a
result, emotions can promote understanding of and insight into
ourselves and our evaluative landscape.
In Three Volumes. Volume 1, Introduction, Tables Of Annual
Estimates Of Saving, 1897 To 1949; Volume 2, Nature And Derivation
Of Annual Estimates Of Savings, 1897 To 1949; Volume 3, Special
Studies, By Raymond W. Goldsmith, Dorothy S. Brady, And Horst
Mendershausen.
In Three Volumes. Volume 1, Introduction, Tables Of Annual
Estimates Of Saving, 1897 To 1949; Volume 2, Nature And Derivation
Of Annual Estimates Of Savings, 1897 To 1949; Volume 3, Special
Studies, By Raymond W. Goldsmith, Dorothy S. Brady, And Horst
Mendershausen.
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