Contrary to the long-cherished opinion of John Locke's infatuation with natural law, there is abundant proof that the amount of intellectual energy Locke devoted to his philosophical views was nowhere as narrow as the attempt to justify a natural law outlook. John Locke's Moral Revolution critiques two traditional approaches to John Locke's philosophy. The first approach interprets John Locke as committed to justifying his early his early Christian / Aristotelian views of the law of nature. The second approach sees Locke attempting to manage a cluster of inconsistent moral views. In this new work, author Samuel Zinaich, Jr. argues that Locke attempts to establish a solid underpinning for religious, moral, and political ideas upon the philosophy of corpuscularism.

In legal jurisprudence, the phenomenon of "hard cases" presents itself as a dilemma between the legal positivists and the natural law realists. Of the former, without the metaphysical underpinnings of an objective legal or moral standard, the legal positivists cannot supply convincing arguments to supplant the sovereign as the origin and authority of law. The natural law realists face the problem of justifying the natural law. Against both views, S. Zinaich Jr. defends a middle position, Analytical Legal Naturalism (ALN). It represents an analytic norm, both necessarily true and known a posteriori. Against the legal positivists, it supplies an objective legal standard by removing--at least for hard cases--the necessity of the will of a sovereign authority. Against the natural law realists, ALN provides a nonmoral standard which, because of its analyticity and necessity, avoids the need for metaethical speculation. Finally, ALN provides a standard that not only supplies the universalizable punch to avoid political subjectivism, but does so in a conventional manner. Thus, ALN does not require a moral or modal reality as truth-making characteristics. Rather, it makes what is legally valuable or disvaluable dependent upon empirically verifiable facts that are legally relevant.

In legal jurisprudence, the phenomenon of "hard cases" presents itself as a dilemma between the legal positivists and the natural law realists. Of the former, without the metaphysical underpinnings of an objective legal or moral standard, the legal positivists cannot supply convincing arguments to supplant the sovereign as the origin and authority of law. The natural law realists face the problem of justifying the natural law. Against both views, S. Zinaich Jr. defends a middle position, Analytical Legal Naturalism (ALN). It represents an analytic norm, both necessarily true and known a posteriori. Against the legal positivists, it supplies an objective legal standard by removing--at least for hard cases--the necessity of the will of a sovereign authority. Against the natural law realists, ALN provides a nonmoral standard which, because of its analyticity and necessity, avoids the need for metaethical speculation. Finally, ALN provides a standard that not only supplies the universalizable punch to avoid political subjectivism, but does so in a conventional manner. Thus, ALN does not require a moral or modal reality as truth-making characteristics. Rather, it makes what is legally valuable or disvaluable dependent upon empirically verifiable facts that are legally relevant.

Contrary to the long-cherished opinion of John Locke's infatuation with natural law, there is abundant proof that the amount of intellectual energy Locke devoted to his philosophical views was nowhere as narrow as the attempt to justify a natural law outlook. John Locke's Moral Revolution critiques two traditional approaches to John Locke's philosophy. The first approach interprets John Locke as committed to justifying his early his early Christian / Aristotelian views of the law of nature. The second approach sees Locke attempting to manage a cluster of inconsistent moral views. In this new work, author Samuel Zinaich, Jr. argues that Locke attempts to establish a solid underpinning for religious, moral, and political ideas upon the philosophy of corpuscularism.