in a scientific way, and takes the patient and his family into his confidence. Thus he learns something from the sufferer, and at the same time instructs the invalid to the best of his power. He does not give his prescriptions until he has won the patient's support, and when he has done so, he steadilY aims at producing complete restoration to health by persuading the sufferer in to compliance (Laws 4. 720 b-e, [28]). This passage shows the perennial nature of the problems of treating the patient as a person. It shows as well the historical'depth of philosophical interest in medicine. The history of philosophy includes more reflections upon medical ethics than the casual reader might suspect. Many of these reflections are pertinent to contemporary issues such as abortion and population control. Plato, for example, recommends abortion in cases of incest (Republic 5. 461c); and Aristotle argues for letting seriously deformed children die, while forbidding infanticide as a means of popUlation control, suggesting instead the use of early abortions. 'As to the exposure in rearing of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live, but that on the ground of an excess in the number of children . . . let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun; what mayor may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation' (Politics VII, 16,335 b20-26, [4]).

Although the investigation and regulation of the faculties of the human mind appear to be the proper and sole concern of philosophers, you see that they are in some part nevertheless so little foreign to the medical forum that while someone may deny that they are proper to the physician he cannot deny that physicians have the obliga tion to philosophize. Jerome Gaub, De regimine mentis, IV, 10 ( 10], p. 40) The Second Trans-Disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine, whose principal theme was 'Philosophical Dimensions of the Neuro-Medical Sciences, ' convened at the University of Connecticut Health Center at the invitation of Robert U. Massey, Dean of the School of Medicine, during May 15, 16, and 17, 1975. The Proceedings constitute this volume. At this Symposium we intended to realize sentiments which Sir John Eccles ex pressed as director of a Study Week of the Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, CiWl del Vaticano, in the fall of 1964: "Certainly when one comes to a study] . . . devoted to brain and mind it is not possible to exclude relations with philosophy" ( 5], p. viii). During that study week in 1964, a group of distinguished biomedical and behavioral scientists met under the director ship of Sir John C. Eccles to relate psychology to what Sir John called 'the Neurosciences. ' The purpose of that study week was to treat issues con cerning the functions of the brain and, in particular, to concentrate upon the relations between brain functions and consciousness."

Over a period of a year, the symposium on clinical judgment has taken shape as a volume devoted to the analysis of how knowledge claims are framed in medicine and how choices of treatment are made. We hope it will afford the reader, whether layman, physician or philosopher, a useful perspective on the process of knowing what occurs in medicine; and that the results of the dis cussions at the Fifth Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine will lead to a better understanding of how philosophy and medicine can usefully challenge each other. As the interchange between physicians, philosophers, nurses and psychologists recorded in the major papers, the commentaries and the round table discussion shows, these issues are truly interdisciplinary. In particular, they have shown that members of the health care professions have much to learn about themselves from philosophers as well as much of interest to engage philosophers. By making the structure of medical reasoning more apparent to its users, philosophers can show health care practitioners how better to master clinical judgment and how better to focus it towards the goods and values medicine wishes to pursue. Becoming clearer about the process of knowing can in short teach us how to know better and how to learn more efficiently. The result can be more than (though it surely would be enough ) a powerful intellectual insight into a major cultural endeavor, medicine."

This volume, which has developed from the Fourteenth Trans Disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine, September 5-8, 1982, at Tel Aviv University, Israel, contains the contributions of a group of distinguished scholars who together examine the ethical issues raised by the advance of biomedical science and technology. We are, of course, still at the beginning of a revolution in our understanding of human biology; scientific medicine and clinical research are scarcely one hundred years old. Both the sciences and the technology of medicine until ten or fifteen years ago had the feeling of the 19th century about them; we sense that they belonged to an older time; that era is ending. The next twenty-five to fifty years of investigative work belong to neurobiology, genetics, and reproductive biology. The technologies of information processing and imaging will make diagnosis and treatment almost incomprehensible by my generation of physicians. Our science and technology will become so powerful that we shall require all of the art and wisdom we can muster to be sure that they remain dedicated, as Francis Bacon hoped four centuries ago, "to the uses of life." It is well that, as philosophers and physicians, we grapple with the issues now when they are relatively simple, and while the pace of change is relatively slow. We require a strategy for the future; that strategy must be worked out by scientists, philosophers, physicians, lawyers, theologians, and, I should like to add, artists and poets."

The growth of knowledge and its effects on the practice of medicine have been issues of philosophical and ethical interest for several decades and will remain so for many years to come. The outline of the present volume was conceived nearly three years ago. In 1987, a conference on this theme was held in Maastricht, the Netherlands, on the occasion of the founding of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care (ESPMH). Most of the chapters of this book are derived from papers presented at that meeting, and for the purpose of editing the book Stuart Spicker, Ph. D. , joined two founding members of ESPMH, Henk ten Have and Gerrit Kimsma. The three of them successfully brought together a number of interesting contribu tions to the theme, and ESPMH is grateful and proud to have initiated the production of this volume. The Society intends that annual meetings be held in different European countries on a rotating basis and to publish volumes related to these meetings whenever feasible. In 1988, the second conference was held in Aarhus, Denmark on "Values in Medical Decision Making and Resource Allocation in Health Care". In 1989, a meeting was held in Czestochowa, Poland, on "European Traditions in Philosophy of Medicine. From Brentano to Bieganski". It is hoped that these conferences and the books to be derived from them, will initiate a new European tradition, lasting well into the 21 st century! P. J.

The concept 'health' is ambiguous [18,9, 11]. The concept 'mental health' is even more so. 'Health' compasses senses of well-being, wholeness, and sound ness that mean more than the simple freedom from illness - a fact appreci ated in the World Health Organization's definition of health as more than the absence of disease or infirmity [7]. The wide range of viewpoints of the con tributors to this volume attests to the scope of issues placed under the rubric 'mental health. ' These papers, presented at the Fourth Symposium on Philos ophy and Medicine, were written and discussed within a broad context of interests concerning mental health. Moreover, in their diversity these papers point to the many descriptive, evaluative, and, in fact, performative functions of statements concerning mental health. Before introducing the substance of these papers in any detail, I want to indicate the profound commerce between philosophical and psychological ideas in theories of mental health and disease. This will be done in part by a consideration of some conceptual developments in the history of psychiatry, as well as through an analysis of some of the functions of the notions of mental illness and health. 'Mental health' lays a special stress on the wholeness of human intuition, emotion, thought, and action.

The spectacular development of medical knowledge over the last two centuries has brought intrusive advances in the capabilities of medical technology. These advances have been remarkable over the last century, but especially over the last few decades, culminating in such high technology interventions as heart transplants and renal dialysis. These increases in medical powers have attracted societal interest in acquiring more such knowledge. They have also spawned concerns regarding the use of human subjects in research and regarding the byproducts of basic research as in the recent recombinant DNA debate. As a consequence of the development of new biomedical knowledge, physicians and biomedical scientists have been placed in positions of new power and responsibility. The emergence of this group of powerful and knowledgeable experts has occasioned debates regarding the accountability of physicians and biomedical scientists. But beyond that, the very investment of resources in the acquisition of new knowledge has been questioned. Societies must decide whether finite resources would not be better invested at this juncture, or in general, in the alleviation of the problems of hunger or in raising general health standards through interventions which are less dependent on the intensive use of high technology. To put issues in this fashion touches on philosophical notions concerning the claims of distributive justice and the ownership of biomedical knowledge.

This volume is a contribution to the continuing interaction between law and medicine. Problems arising from this interaction have been addressed, in part, by previous volumes in this series. In fact, one such problem constitutes the central focus of Volume 5, Mental Illness: Law and Public Policy 1]. The present volume joins other volumes in this series in offering an exploration and critical analysis of concepts and values underlying health care. In this volume, however, we look as well at some of the general questions occasioned by the law's relation with medicine. We do so out of a conviction that medi cine and the law must be understood as the human creations they are, reflect ing important, wide-ranging, but often unaddressed aspects of the nature of the human condition. It is only by such philosophical analysis of the nature of the conceptual foundations of the health care professions and of the legal profession that we will be able to judge whether these professions do indeed serve our best interests. Such philosophical explorations are required for the public policy decisions that will be pressed upon us through the increasing complexity of health care and of the law's response to new and changing circumstances. As a consequence, this volume attends as much to issues in public policy as in the law. The law is, after all, the creature of human deci sions concerning prudent public policy and basic human rights and goods."

This volume, which has developed from the Fourteenth Trans Disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine, September 5-8, 1982, at Tel Aviv University, Israel, contains the contributions of a group of distinguished scholars who together examine the ethical issues raised by the advance of biomedical science and technology. We are, of course, still at the beginning of a revolution in our understanding of human biology; scientific medicine and clinical research are scarcely one hundred years old. Both the sciences and the technology of medicine until ten or fifteen years ago had the feeling of the 19th century about them; we sense that they belonged to an older time; that era is ending. The next twenty-five to fifty years of investigative work belong to neurobiology, genetics, and reproductive biology. The technologies of information processing and imaging will make diagnosis and treatment almost incomprehensible by my generation of physicians. Our science and technology will become so powerful that we shall require all of the art and wisdom we can muster to be sure that they remain dedicated, as Francis Bacon hoped four centuries ago, "to the uses of life." It is well that, as philosophers and physicians, we grapple with the issues now when they are relatively simple, and while the pace of change is relatively slow. We require a strategy for the future; that strategy must be worked out by scientists, philosophers, physicians, lawyers, theologians, and, I should like to add, artists and poets."

Although the investigation and regulation of the faculties of the human mind appear to be the proper and sole concern of philosophers, you see that they are in some part nevertheless so little foreign to the medical forum that while someone may deny that they are proper to the physician he cannot deny that physicians have the obliga tion to philosophize. Jerome Gaub, De regimine mentis, IV, 10 ( 10], p. 40) The Second Trans-Disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine, whose principal theme was 'Philosophical Dimensions of the Neuro-Medical Sciences, ' convened at the University of Connecticut Health Center at the invitation of Robert U. Massey, Dean of the School of Medicine, during May 15, 16, and 17, 1975. The Proceedings constitute this volume. At this Symposium we intended to realize sentiments which Sir John Eccles ex pressed as director of a Study Week of the Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, CiWl del Vaticano, in the fall of 1964: "Certainly when one comes to a study] . . . devoted to brain and mind it is not possible to exclude relations with philosophy" ( 5], p. viii). During that study week in 1964, a group of distinguished biomedical and behavioral scientists met under the director ship of Sir John C. Eccles to relate psychology to what Sir John called 'the Neurosciences. ' The purpose of that study week was to treat issues con cerning the functions of the brain and, in particular, to concentrate upon the relations between brain functions and consciousness."

The concept 'health' is ambiguous [18,9, 11]. The concept 'mental health' is even more so. 'Health' compasses senses of well-being, wholeness, and sound ness that mean more than the simple freedom from illness - a fact appreci ated in the World Health Organization's definition of health as more than the absence of disease or infirmity [7]. The wide range of viewpoints of the con tributors to this volume attests to the scope of issues placed under the rubric 'mental health. ' These papers, presented at the Fourth Symposium on Philos ophy and Medicine, were written and discussed within a broad context of interests concerning mental health. Moreover, in their diversity these papers point to the many descriptive, evaluative, and, in fact, performative functions of statements concerning mental health. Before introducing the substance of these papers in any detail, I want to indicate the profound commerce between philosophical and psychological ideas in theories of mental health and disease. This will be done in part by a consideration of some conceptual developments in the history of psychiatry, as well as through an analysis of some of the functions of the notions of mental illness and health. 'Mental health' lays a special stress on the wholeness of human intuition, emotion, thought, and action.

This volume is a contribution to the continuing interaction between law and medicine. Problems arising from this interaction have been addressed, in part, by previous volumes in this series. In fact, one such problem constitutes the central focus of Volume 5, Mental Illness: Law and Public Policy 1]. The present volume joins other volumes in this series in offering an exploration and critical analysis of concepts and values underlying health care. In this volume, however, we look as well at some of the general questions occasioned by the law's relation with medicine. We do so out of a conviction that medi cine and the law must be understood as the human creations they are, reflect ing important, wide-ranging, but often unaddressed aspects of the nature of the human condition. It is only by such philosophical analysis of the nature of the conceptual foundations of the health care professions and of the legal profession that we will be able to judge whether these professions do indeed serve our best interests. Such philosophical explorations are required for the public policy decisions that will be pressed upon us through the increasing complexity of health care and of the law's response to new and changing circumstances. As a consequence, this volume attends as much to issues in public policy as in the law. The law is, after all, the creature of human deci sions concerning prudent public policy and basic human rights and goods."

This volume inaugurates a series concerning philosophy and medicine. There are few, if any, areas of social concern so pervasive as medicine and yet as underexamined by philosophy. But the claim to precedence of the Proceedings of the First Trans-Disciplinary Symposium on Philos ophy and Medicine must be qualified. Claims to be "first" are notorious in the history of scientific as well as humanistic investigation and the claim that the First Trans-Disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine has no precedent is not meant to be put in bald form. The editors clearly do not maintain that philosophers and physicians have not heretofore discussed matters of mutual concern, nor that individual philosophers and physicians have never taken up problems and concepts in medicine which are themselves at the boundary or interface of these two disciplines - concepts like "matter," "disease," "psyche. " Surely there have been books published on the logic and philosophy of medi 1 cine. But the formalization of issues and concepts in medicine has not received, at least in this century, sustained interest by professional phi losophers. Groups of philosophers have not engaged medicine in order to explicate its philosophical presuppositions and to sort out the various concepts which appear in medicine. The scope of such an effort takes the philosopher beyond problems and issues which today are subsumed under the rubric "medical ethics."

in a scientific way, and takes the patient and his family into his confidence. Thus he learns something from the sufferer, and at the same time instructs the invalid to the best of his power. He does not give his prescriptions until he has won the patient's support, and when he has done so, he steadilY aims at producing complete restoration to health by persuading the sufferer in to compliance (Laws 4. 720 b-e, [28]). This passage shows the perennial nature of the problems of treating the patient as a person. It shows as well the historical'depth of philosophical interest in medicine. The history of philosophy includes more reflections upon medical ethics than the casual reader might suspect. Many of these reflections are pertinent to contemporary issues such as abortion and population control. Plato, for example, recommends abortion in cases of incest (Republic 5. 461c); and Aristotle argues for letting seriously deformed children die, while forbidding infanticide as a means of popUlation control, suggesting instead the use of early abortions. 'As to the exposure in rearing of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live, but that on the ground of an excess in the number of children . . . let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun; what mayor may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation' (Politics VII, 16,335 b20-26, [4]).

This Festschrift is presented to Professor Hans Jonas on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday, as affirmation of the contributors' respect and admiration. As a volume in the series 'Philosophy and Medicine' the contributions not only reflect certain interests and pursuits of the scholar to whom it is dedi cated, but also serve to bring to convergence the interests of the contributors in the history of humanity and medicine, the theory of organism, medicine in the service of the patient's autonomy, and the metaphysical, i.e., phenome nological foundations of medicine. Notwithstanding the nature of such personal gifts as the authors' contributions (which, with the exception of the late Hannah Arendt's, appear here for the first time), the essays also transcend the personal and serve to elaborate specific themes and theses disclosed in the numerous writings of Hans Jonas. The editor owes a personal debt of gratitude to many, including Hannah Arendt, who offered their assistance during the preparation of the volume."

The spectacular development of medical knowledge over the last two centuries has brought intrusive advances in the capabilities of medical technology. These advances have been remarkable over the last century, but especially over the last few decades, culminating in such high technology interventions as heart transplants and renal dialysis. These increases in medical powers have attracted societal interest in acquiring more such knowledge. They have also spawned concerns regarding the use of human subjects in research and regarding the byproducts of basic research as in the recent recombinant DNA debate. As a consequence of the development of new biomedical knowledge, physicians and biomedical scientists have been placed in positions of new power and responsibility. The emergence of this group of powerful and knowledgeable experts has occasioned debates regarding the accountability of physicians and biomedical scientists. But beyond that, the very investment of resources in the acquisition of new knowledge has been questioned. Societies must decide whether finite resources would not be better invested at this juncture, or in general, in the alleviation of the problems of hunger or in raising general health standards through interventions which are less dependent on the intensive use of high technology. To put issues in this fashion touches on philosophical notions concerning the claims of distributive justice and the ownership of biomedical knowledge.

Over a period of a year, the symposium on clinical judgment has taken shape as a volume devoted to the analysis of how knowledge claims are framed in medicine and how choices of treatment are made. We hope it will afford the reader, whether layman, physician or philosopher, a useful perspective on the process of knowing what occurs in medicine; and that the results of the dis cussions at the Fifth Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine will lead to a better understanding of how philosophy and medicine can usefully challenge each other. As the interchange between physicians, philosophers, nurses and psychologists recorded in the major papers, the commentaries and the round table discussion shows, these issues are truly interdisciplinary. In particular, they have shown that members of the health care professions have much to learn about themselves from philosophers as well as much of interest to engage philosophers. By making the structure of medical reasoning more apparent to its users, philosophers can show health care practitioners how better to master clinical judgment and how better to focus it towards the goods and values medicine wishes to pursue. Becoming clearer about the process of knowing can in short teach us how to know better and how to learn more efficiently. The result can be more than (though it surely would be enough ) a powerful intellectual insight into a major cultural endeavor, medicine."

The growth of knowledge and its effects on the practice of medicine have been issues of philosophical and ethical interest for several decades and will remain so for many years to come. The outline of the present volume was conceived nearly three years ago. In 1987, a conference on this theme was held in Maastricht, the Netherlands, on the occasion of the founding of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care (ESPMH). Most of the chapters of this book are derived from papers presented at that meeting, and for the purpose of editing the book Stuart Spicker, Ph. D. , joined two founding members of ESPMH, Henk ten Have and Gerrit Kimsma. The three of them successfully brought together a number of interesting contribu tions to the theme, and ESPMH is grateful and proud to have initiated the production of this volume. The Society intends that annual meetings be held in different European countries on a rotating basis and to publish volumes related to these meetings whenever feasible. In 1988, the second conference was held in Aarhus, Denmark on "Values in Medical Decision Making and Resource Allocation in Health Care". In 1989, a meeting was held in Czestochowa, Poland, on "European Traditions in Philosophy of Medicine. From Brentano to Bieganski". It is hoped that these conferences and the books to be derived from them, will initiate a new European tradition, lasting well into the 21 st century! P. J.

There is both a timeliness and a transcendent 'rightness' in the fact that scholars, clinicians, and health professionals are beginning to examine the ethics-based components of decision making in health care of the elderly. Ethics - as the discipline concerned with right or wrong conduct and moral duty - pervades hospital rooms, nursing home corridors, physicians' offices, and the halls of Congress as decisions are made that concern the allocation of health-related services to individuals and groups in need. In particular, care of older persons recently has received dispropor­ tionate attention in discussions of ethics and clinical care. Age alone, of course, should not generate special focus on ill individuals about whom concerns arise based on value conflicts tacitly involved in the delivery of health care. Having said that age is not the principal criterion for attention to ethics-based concerns in health care, it must be acknowl­ edged that old people have a high prevalence of conditions that provoke interest and put them in harm's way if value conflicts are not identified and seriously addressed. Issues that concern autonomy, the allocation of scarce resources, inter-generational competition and conflict, the withholding of treat­ ment in treatable disease, and substitute and proxy decision making for the cognitively impaired all have special relevance for older persons.