This book is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-68. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a "Pound-Defense" deal with the US. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labor Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain.

This book, based on recently declassified documents in Britain and the USA, is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-68. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a 'Pound-Defence' deal with the USA. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labour Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain.

'The most significant issue that Dockrill addresses is that of how Japan views the war in retrospect, a question which not only tells us a lot about how events were seen in Japan in 1941 but is also, a matter still of importance in contemporary East Asian politics.' Antony Best, London School of Economics This multi-authored work, edited by Saki Dockrill, is an original, unique, and controversial interpretation of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific. Dr Dockrill, the author of Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, has skilfully converted the proceedings of an international conference held in London into a stimulating and readable account of the Pacific War. This is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the subject.

'The most significant issue that Dockrill addresses is that of how Japan views the war in retrospect, a question which not only tells us a lot about how events were seen in Japan in 1941 but is also, a matter still of importance in contemporary East Asian politics.' Antony Best, London School of Economics This multi-authored work, edited by Saki Dockrill, is an original, unique, and controversial interpretation of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific. Dr Dockrill, the author of Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, has skilfully converted the proceedings of an international conference held in London into a stimulating and readable account of the Pacific War. This is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the subject.

Between 1989 and 1991 the world witnessed a number of dramatic and traumatic changes: the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, the end of the superpower nuclear arms race, the demise of East-West rivalries in the Third World and, finally, the break-up of the Soviet Union. The final stages of the Cold War were impossible to accurately predict, and many of the questions posed by those events remain unanswered today. This book investigates the evolutionary and sudden end of the Cold War in three major areas: Europe, superpower relations, and the Third World. Extracting essential lessons from recent past, The End of the Cold War Era provides the reader with a clearer understanding of today's and tomorrow's world.

This book is a major new interpretation of the Cold War and how it shaped the course of history. It looks into why the Cold War did not become more heated, and how it was finally overcome. Loth examines the containment of the Cold War, détente, the development of cooperative security, and the changes in the Soviet bloc. He offers new information taken from Eastern and Western archives, and for the first time draws a precise picture of how the Cold War was overcome.

The integration of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) became one of the most important and contentious problems of post-war security. Increasing Cold War tensions during and after 1949 had led Britain to consider the need to rearm West Germany. Yet fears of a resurgent Germany existed both in Britain and on the continent. The timing and manner of German incorporation was crucial and became the subject of lengthy negotiations. Using extensive archival material, Saki Dockrill stresses how the government was forced to react to the constantly changing positions adopted by the USA, France and Germany itself and addresses three main issues: What made Britain accept the need for a German contribution to the defence of Western Europe? Why was Britain reluctant to encourage any hasty American and French proposals? And why did Britain eventually put forward proposals that successfully resolved the crisis? This was the first book-length analysis of the formulation of Britain's strategy for rearming West Germany and will be of interest to specialists and students of international politics, with special reference to post-war diplomatic history, NATO and European security.