This book explores the relationship between the law and pervasive and persistent reasonable disagreement about justice. It reveals the central moral function and creative force of reasonable disagreement in and about the law and shows why and how lawyers and legal philosophers should take reasonable conflict more seriously. Even though the law should be regarded as the primary mode of settlement of our moral conflicts, it can, and should, also be the object and the forum of further moral conflicts. There is more to the rule of law than convergence and determinacy and it is important therefore to question the importance of agreement in law and politics. By addressing in detail issues pertaining to the nature and sources of disagreement, its extent and significance, as well as the procedural, institutional and substantive responses to disagreement in the law and their legitimacy, this book suggests the value of a comprehensive approach to thinking about conflict, which until recently has been analysed in a compartmentalized way. It aims to provide a fully-fledged political morality of conflict by drawing on the analysis of topical jurisprudential questions in the new light of disagreement. Developing such a global theory of disagreement in the law should be read in the context of the broader effort of reconstructing a complete account of democratic law-making in pluralistic societies. The book will be of value not only to legal philosophers and constitutional theorists, but also to political and democratic theorists, as well as to all those interested in public decision-making in conditions of conflict

There is no issue more central to a legal order than responsibility, and yet the dearth of contemporary theorizing on international responsibility law is worrying for the state of international law. The volume brings philosophers of the law of responsibility into dialogue with international responsibility law specialists. Its tripartite structure corresponds to the three main theoretical challenges in the contemporary practice of international responsibility law: the public and private nature of the international responsibility of public institutions; its collective and individual dimensions; and the place of fault therein. In each part, two international lawyers and two philosophers of responsibility law address the most pressing questions in the theory of international responsibility law. The volume closes with a comparative 'world tour' of the responsibility of public institutions in four different legal cultures and regions, identifying stepping-stones and stumbling blocks on the path towards a common law of international responsibility.

The obligations stemming from international law are still predominantly considered, despite important normative and descriptive critiques, as being 'based' on (State) consent. To that extent, international law differs from domestic law where consent to the law has long been considered irrelevant to law-making, whether as a criterion of validity or as a ground of legitimacy. In addition to a renewed historical and philosophical interest in (State) consent to international law, including from a democratic theory perspective, the issue has also recently regained in importance in practice. Various specialists of international law and the philosophy of international law have been invited to explore the different questions this raises in what is the first edited volume on consent to international law in English language. The collection addresses three groups of issues: the notions and roles of consent in contemporary international law; its objects and types; and its subjects and institutions.

Drawing on political, legal, national, post-national, as well as American and European perspectives, this collection of essays offers a diverse and balanced discussion of the current arguments concerning deliberative democracy. Its contributions' focus on discontent, provide a critical assessment of the benefits of deliberation and also respond to the strongest criticisms of the idea of democratic deliberation. The essays consider the three basic questions of why, how and where to deliberate democratically. This book will be of value not only to political and democratic theorists, but also to legal philosophers and constitutional theorists, and all those interested in the legitimacy of decision-making in national and post-national pluralistic polities.

Interest in republicanism as a political theory has burgeoned in recent years, but its implications for the understanding of law have remained largely unexplored. Legal Republicanism is the first book to offer a comprehensive, critical survey of the potential for creating republican accounts of fundamental issues in law and legal theory.
Bringing together contributors with backgrounds in political and legal philosophy, the essays in the volume assess republicanism's historical traditions, conceptual coherence, and normative proposals. The collection offers a valuable insight into new debates taking place in republican political and legal theory. It also analyzes potential republican approaches to concrete issues arising in areas of law such as criminal, constitutional and international law. Finally, the book includes comparisons between republican legal traditions and how they react to contemporary challenges. The book will be of value to political and democratic theorists, to legal philosophers and constitutional theorists, and all those interested in the legitimacy of decision-making in national and international settings.

International law has recently emerged as the subject-matter of an exciting new field of philosophical investigation. The Philosophy of International Law contains 29 cutting-edge essays by leading philosophers and international lawyers, all published here in English for the first time, that address the central philosophical questions about international law.
The volume's overarching theme is the moral and political values that should guide the assessment and development of international law and institutions. Some of the essays tackle general topics such as the sources and legitimacy of international law, the nature of international legal adjudication, whether international law can or should aspire to be 'democratic', and the significance of state sovereignty. The other contributions address philosophical problems arising in specific domains of international law, such as human rights law, international economic law, international criminal law, international environmental law, and the laws of war.
This volume is the most up-to-date and comprehensive treatment of the philosophy of international law in existence. It is also distinguished by its 'dialogical' methodology: there are two essays on each topic, with the second author engaging with the arguments of the first. It is an invaluable resource for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the nature and value of international law.

International law has recently emerged as the subject-matter of an exciting new field of philosophical investigation. The Philosophy of International Law contains 29 cutting-edge essays by leading philosophers and international lawyers, all published here in English for the first time, that address the central philosophical questions about international law.
The volume's overarching theme is the moral and political values that should guide the assessment and development of international law and institutions. Some of the essays tackle general topics such as the sources and legitimacy of international law, the nature of international legal adjudication, whether international law can or should aspire to be 'democratic', and the significance of state sovereignty. The other contributions address philosophical problems arising in specific domains of international law, such as human rights law, international economic law, international criminal law, international environmental law, and the laws of war.
This volume is the most up-to-date and comprehensive treatment of the philosophy of international law in existence. It is also distinguished by its 'dialogical' methodology: there are two essays on each topic, with the second author engaging with the arguments of the first. It is an invaluable resource for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the nature and value of international law.

The question of the sources of international law inevitably raises some well-known scholarly controversies: where do the rules of international law come from? And more precisely: through which processes are they made, how are they ascertained, and where does the international legal order begin and end? This is the static question of the pedigree of international legal rules and the boundaries of the international legal order. Second, what are the processes through which these rules are made? This is the dynamic question of the making of these rules and of the exercise of public authority in international law. The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law is the very first comprehensive work of its kind devoted to the question of the sources of international law. It provides an accessible and systematic overview of the key issues and debates around the sources of international law. It also offers an authoritative theoretical guide for anyone studying or working within but also outside international law wishing to understand one of its most foundational questions. This Handbook features original essays by leading international law scholars and theorists from a range of traditions, nationalities and perspectives, reflecting the richness and diversity of scholarship in this area.