This book focuses on the activities of the scientific staff of the British National Institute of Oceanography during the Cold War. Revealing how issues such as intelligence gathering, environmental surveillance, the identification of 'enemy science', along with administrative practice informed and influenced the Institute's Cold War program. In turn, this program helped shape decisions taken by Government, military and the civil service towards science in post-war Britain. This was not simply a case of government ministers choosing to patronize particular scientists, but a relationship between politics and science that profoundly impacted on the future of ocean science in Britain.

The purpose of this study is to determine the suitability of using an evolutionary acquisition strategy in joint acquisition programs for command and control systems. The policies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and of the Joint Logistics Commanders support the use of an evolutionary acquisition strategy in acquiring command and control systems. At the same time, these policies note that the unique circumstances of individual programs should be considered. This study examines the unique circumstances of joint acquisition programs and relates these circumstances to the evolutionary acquisition of command and control systems. This study has two conclusions. First, the Packard Commission's criterion -- an informed trade-off between user requirements, on the one hand, and schedule and-cost on the other -- is (of several sets of criteria presented) the only one upon which to base a decision on the research question. Second, on the research question itself -- the suitability of using an evolutionary acquisition strategy in joint acquisition programs for command and control systems -- based on the Packard Commission's criterion, the conclusion is: No, an evolutionary acquisition strategy is not suitable to use in joint acquisition programs for command and control systems. This study has two recommendations. First, the policies relative to evolutionary acquisition and the policies relative to joint acquisition must consider the effects of each. That is, any evolutionary acquisition policy must consider the unique challenges faced by a joint acquisition program; and the corollary -- any joint acquisition policy affecting command and control systems must consider the special attributes of these systems. Second, since the rules for an evolutionary approach do not accommodate the day-to-day realities of program management, further study must focus on how to make the accommodation happen.