The Cossacks who wore German uniforms saw their service not as treason to the motherland, but as an episode in the revolution of 1917, part of an ongoing struggle against Moscow and against Communism. A Wehrmacht needing men and an SS hungry for power reinterpreted or ignored Hitler's racist ideology to form entire divisions of Cossack volunteers. German offices developed relationships to "their" Cossacks similar to those in the French and British colonial armies. The Cossacks responded by fighting effectively and reliably on the Russian Front and in the Balkans. Their reward was forced repatriation into Stalin's Gulag at the hands of the Western powers in 1945.

The Cossacks who wore German uniforms saw their service not as treason to the motherland, but as an episode in the revolution of 1917, part of an ongoing struggle against Moscow and against Communism. Their reward was forced repatriation into Stalin's Gulag at the hands of Western powers in 1945.

Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany-and before that nation came into existence, Prussia- produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Even the casual observers should have noted that, despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. This Letort Paper, authored by Dr. Samuel J. Newland, explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure, which led to Germany's defeat in these wars, should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.

The authors begin with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then move to the origins of "Germany first" in American war planning. They then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following this background contained in the initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was was carried out. The authors conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation's military forces. However during the campaign's execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparison, the authors include an appendix covering German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s.

Since the end of World War II, there has been a stream of publications about the War in Europe, but despite the volume of literature, interest in the topic remains high. Given the significance of this conflict and the interest in this campaign, the Strategic Studies Institute offers a fresh look at the campaign in Europe. This publication begins with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then moves to the origins of "Germany first"in American war planning. The authors then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following the background provided in these initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was was carried out.

The authors begin with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then move to the origins of "Germany first" in American war planning. They then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following this background contained in the initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was was carried out. The authors conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation's military forces. However during the campaign's execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparison, the authors include an appendix covering German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s.