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Extreme polarization in American politics—and especially in the
U.S. Congress—is perhaps the most confounding political
phenomenon of our time. This book binds together polarization in
Congress and polarization in the electorate within an
ever-expanding feedback loop. This loop is powered by the
discipline exerted by the respective political parties on their
Congressional members and district candidates and endorsed by the
voters in each Congressional district who must choose between the
alternatives offered. These alternatives are just as extreme in
competitive as in lop-sided districts. Tight national party
discipline produces party delegations in Congress that are widely
separated from one another but each ideologically narrowly
distributed. As district constituencies become more polarized and
are egged on by activists, parties are further motivated to move
past a threshold and appeal to their respective bases rather than
to voters in the ideological center. America has indeed acquired
parties with clear platforms—once thought to be a desirable
goal—but these parties are now feuding camps. What resolution
might there be? Just as the progressive movement slowly replaced
the Gilded Age, might a new reform effort replace the current
squabble? Or could an asymmetry develop in the partisan constraints
that would lead to ascendancy of the center, or might a new and
over-riding issue generate a cross-cutting dimension, opening the
door to a new politics? Only the future will tell.
This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a
word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified
theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses
both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter
discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition
governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as
office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for
alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France,
and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These
polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major
parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the
more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come
close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these
vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy
positions of their supporters.
Professors Merrill and Grofman develop a unified model that incorporates voter motivations and assesses its empirical predictions--for both voter choice and candidate strategy--in the United States, Norway, and France. The analyses show that a combination of proximity, direction, discounting, and party ID are compatible with the mildly but not extremely divergent policies that are characteristic of many two-party and multiparty electorates. All of these motivations are necessary to understand the linkage between candidate issue positions and voter preferences.
This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a
word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified
theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses
both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter
discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition
governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as
office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for
alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France,
and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These
polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major
parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the
more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come
close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these
vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy
positions of their supporters.
Professors Merrill and Grofman develop a unified model that incorporates voter motivations and assesses its empirical predictions--for both voter choice and candidate strategy--in the United States, Norway, and France. The analyses show that a combination of proximity, direction, discounting, and party ID are compatible with the mildly but not extremely divergent policies that are characteristic of many two-party and multiparty electorates. All of these motivations are necessary to understand the linkage between candidate issue positions and voter preferences.
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