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Pathological Counterinsurgency critically examines the relationship
between elections and counterinsurgency success in third party
campaigns supported by the United States. From Vietnam to El
Salvador to Iraq and Afghanistan, many policymakers and academics
believed that democratization would drive increased legitimacy and
improved performance in governments waging a counterinsurgency
campaign. Elections were expected to help overcome existing
deficiencies, thus allowing governments supported by the United
States to win the "hearts and minds" of its populace, undermining
the appeal of insurgency. However, in each of these cases,
campaigning in and winning elections did not increase the
legitimacy of the counterinsurgent government or alter conditions
of entrenched rent seeking and weak institutions that made states
allied to the United States vulnerable to insurgency. Ultimately,
elections played a limited role in creating the conditions needed
for counterinsurgency success. Instead, decisions of key actors in
government and elites to prioritize either short term personal and
political advantage or respect for political institutions held a
central role in counterinsurgency success or failure. In each of
the four cases in this study, elected governments pursued policies
that benefited members of the government and elites at the expense
of boarder legitimacy and improved performance. Expectations that
democratization could serve as a key instrument of change led to
unwarranted optimism about the likely of success and ultimately to
flawed strategy. The United States continued to support regimes
that continued to lack the legitimacy and government performance
needed for victory in counterinsurgency.
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