|
Showing 1 - 11 of
11 matches in All Departments
The things we do today may make life worse for future generations.
But why should we care what happens to people who won't be born
until after all of us are gone? Some philosophers have treated this
as a question about our moral responsibilities, and have argued
that we have duties of beneficence to promote the well-being of our
descendants. Rather than focusing exclusively on issues of moral
responsibility, Samuel Scheffler considers the broader question of
why and how future generations matter to us. Although we lack a
developed set of ideas about the value of human continuity, we are
more invested in the fate of our descendants than we may realize.
Implicit in our existing values and attachments are a variety of
powerful reasons for wanting the chain of human generations to
persist into the indefinite future under conditions conducive to
human flourishing. This has implications for the way we think about
problems like climate change. And it means that some of our
strongest reasons for caring about the future of humanity depend
not on our moral duty to promote the good but rather on our
existing evaluative attachments and on our conservative disposition
to preserve and sustain the things that we value. This form of
conservatism supports rather than inhibits a concern for future
generations, and it is an important component of the complex stance
we take toward the temporal dimension of our lives.
Suppose you knew that, though you yourself would live your life to
its natural end, the earth and all its inhabitants would be
destroyed thirty days after your death. To what extent would you
remain committed to your current projects and plans? Would
scientists still search for a cure for cancer? Would couples still
want children? In Death and the Afterlife, philosopher Samuel
Scheffler poses this thought experiment in order to show that the
continued life of the human race after our deaths-the "afterlife"
of the title-matters to us to an astonishing and previously
neglected degree. Indeed, Scheffler shows that, in certain
important respects, the future existence of people who are as yet
unborn matters more to us than our own continued existence and the
continued existence of those we love. Without the expectation that
humanity has a future, many of the things that now matter to us
would cease to do so. By contrast, the prospect of our own deaths
does little to undermine our confidence in the value of our
activities. Despite the terror we may feel when contemplating our
deaths, the prospect of humanity's imminent extinction would pose a
far greater threat to our ability to lead lives of wholehearted
engagement. Scheffler further demonstrates that, although we are
not unreasonable to fear death, personal immortality, like the
imminent extinction of humanity, would also undermine our
confidence in the values we hold dear. His arresting conclusion is
that, in order for us to lead value-laden lives, what is necessary
is that we ourselves should die and that others should live. Death
and the Afterlife concludes with commentary by four distinguished
philosophers-Harry Frankfurt, Niko Kolodny, Seana Shiffrin, and
Susan Wolf-who discuss Scheffler's ideas with insight and
imagination. Scheffler adds a final reply.
The things we do today may make life worse for future generations.
But why should we care what happens to people who won't be born
until after all of us are gone? Some philosophers have treated this
as a question about our moral responsibilities, and have argued
that we have duties of beneficence to promote the well-being of our
descendants. Rather than focusing exclusively on issues of moral
responsibility, Samuel Scheffler considers the broader question of
why and how future generations matter to us. Although we lack a
developed set of ideas about the value of human continuity, we are
more invested in the fate of our descendants than we may realize.
Implicit in our existing values and attachments are a variety of
powerful reasons for wanting the chain of human generations to
persist into the indefinite future under conditions conducive to
human flourishing. This has implications for the way we think about
problems like climate change. And it means that some of our
strongest reasons for caring about the future of humanity depend
not on our moral duty to promote the good but rather on our
existing evaluative attachments and on our conservative disposition
to preserve and sustain the things that we value. This form of
conservatism supports rather than inhibits a concern for future
generations, and it is an important component of the complex stance
we take toward the temporal dimension of our lives.
This collection of essays by noted philosopher Samuel Scheffler
combines discussion of abstract questions in moral and political
theory with attention to the normative dimension of current social
and political controversies. In addition to chapters on more
abstract issues such as the nature of human valuing, the role of
partiality in ethics, and the significance of the distinction
between doing and allowing, the volume also includes essays on
immigration, terrorism, toleration, political equality, and the
normative significance of tradition. Uniting the essays is a shared
preoccupation with questions about human value and values. The
volume opens with an essay that considers the general question of
what it is to value something - as opposed, say, to wanting it,
wanting to want it, or thinking that it is valuable. Other essays
explore particular values, such as equality, whose meaning and
content are contested. Still others consider the tensions that
arise, both within and among individuals, in consequence of the
diversity of human values. One of the overarching aims of the book
is to illuminate the different ways in which liberal political
theory attempts to resolve conflicts of both of these kinds.
Reason and Value collects 15 new papers by leading contemporary
philosophers on themes from the work of Joseph Raz. Raz has made
major contributions in a wide range of areas, including
jurisprudence, political philosophy, and the theory of practical
reason; but all of his work displays a deep engagement with central
themes in moral philosophy. The subtlety and power of Raz's
reflections on ethical topics make his writings a fertile source
for anyone working in this area. Especially significant are his
explorations of the connections between practical reason and the
theory of value, which constitute a sustained and penetrating
treatment of a set of issues at the very center of moral philosophy
as it is practiced today. The contributors to the volume
acknowledge the importance of Raz's contributions by engaging
critically with his positions and offering independent perspectives
on the topics that he has addressed. The volume aims both to honour
Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and to
contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his
work for the subject. Contributors: Michael E. Bratman, John
Broome, Ruth Chang, Jonathan Dancy, Harry Frankfurt, Ulrike Heuer,
Philip Pettit, Peter Railton, Donald H. Regan, T. M. Scanlon,
Samuel Scheffler, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Michael Smith, Michael
Stocker, Michael Thompson, R. Jay Wallace.
In contemporary philosophy, substantive moral theories are
typically classified as either consequentialist or deontological.
Standard consequentialist theories insist, roughly, that agents
must always act so as to produce the best available outcomes
overall. Standard deontological theories, by contrast, maintain
that there are some circumstances where one is permitted but not
required to produce the best overall results, and still other
circumstances in which one is positively forbidden to do so.
Classical utilitarianism is the most familiar consequentialist
view, but it is widely regarded as an inadequate account of
morality. Although Samuel Scheffler agrees with this assessment, he
also believes that consequentialism seems initially plausible, and
that there is a persistent air of paradox surrounding typical
deontological views. In this book, therefore, he undertakes to
reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He argues that it is
possible to provide a rationale for the view that agents need not
always produce the best possible overall outcomes, and this
motivates one departure from consequentialism; but he shows that it
is surprisingly difficult to provide a satisfactory rationale for
the view that there are times when agents must not produce the best
possible overall outcomes. He goes on to argue for a hitherto
neglected type of moral conception, according to which agents are
always permitted, but not always required, to produce the best
outcomes.
We normally take it for granted that other people will live on
after we ourselves have died. Even if we do not believe in a
personal afterlife in which we survive our own deaths, we assume
that there will be a "collective afterlife" in which humanity
survives long after we are gone. Samuel Scheffler maintains that
this assumption plays a surprising - indeed astonishing - role in
our lives. In certain important respects, the future existence of
people who are as yet unborn matters more to us than our own
continued existence and the continued existence of those we love.
Without the expectation that humanity has a future, many of the
things that now matter to us would cease to do so. By contrast, the
prospect of our own deaths does little to undermine our confidence
in the value of our activities. Despite the terror we may feel when
contemplating our deaths, then, the prospect of humanity's imminent
extinction would pose a far greater threat to our ability to lead
value-laden lives: lives structured by wholehearted engagement in
valued activities and pursuits. This conclusion complicates
widespread assumptions about human egoism and individualism. And it
has striking implications for the way we think about climate
change, nuclear proliferation, and other urgent threats to
humanity's survival. Scheffler adds that, although we are not
unreasonable to fear death, personal immortality, like the imminent
extinction of humanity, would also undermine our confidence in the
values we hold dear. His arresting conclusion is that, in order for
us to lead value-laden lives, what is necessary is that we
ourselves should die and that others should live. Scheffler's
position is discussed with insight and imagination by four
distinguished commentators - Harry Frankfurt, Niko Kolodny, Seana
Shiffrin, and Susan Wolf - and Scheffler adds a final reply. "This
is some of the most interesting and best-written philosophy I have
read in a long time. Scheffler's book is utterly original in its
fundamental conception, brilliant in its analysis and argument, and
concise and at times beautiful in its formulation." Stephen
Darwall, Yale University "[Scheffler's] discussion of the issues
with which he has concerned himself is fresh and original.
Moreover, so far as I am aware, those issues are themselves pretty
much original with him. He seems really to have raised, within a
rigorously philosophical context, some new questions. At least, so
far as I know, no one before has attempted to deal with those
questions so systematically. So it appears that he has effectively
opened up a new and promising field of philosophical inquiry. Not
bad going, in a discipline to which many of the very best minds
have already devoted themselves for close to three thousand years."
-Harry Frankfurt, Princeton University, from 'How the Afterlife
Matters' (in this volume)" "A truly wonderful and very important
book." - Derek Parfit, Emeritus Fellow, All Souls College,
University of Oxford
Reason and Value collects 15 new papers by leading contemporary
philosophers on themes from the work of Joseph Raz. Raz has made
major contributions in a wide range of areas, including
jurisprudence, political philosophy, and the theory of practical
reason; but all of his work displays a deep engagement with central
themes in moral philosophy. The subtlety and power of Raz's
reflections on ethical topics make his writings a fertile source
for anyone working in this area. Especially significant are his
explorations of the connections between practical reason and the
theory of value, which constitute a sustained and penetrating
treatment of a set of issues at the very center of moral philosophy
as it is practiced today. The contributors to the volume
acknowledge the importance of Raz's contributions by engaging
critically with his positions and offering independent perspectives
on the topics that he has addressed. The volume aims both to honour
Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and to
contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his
work for the subject.
This book is a collection of eleven essays by one of the most interesting moral philosophers currently writing. It examines challenges to liberal thought posed by the changing circumstances of the modern world such as the conflicting tendencies toward global integration, and greater ethnic and communal identification. The author considers whether liberal principles of justice can accommodate social and global interdependencies while reaffirming the importance of individual responsibility and acknowledging the significance of people's diverse personal and communal allegiances.
This is a new edition of Samuel Scheffler's widely acclaimed first book, which established him as one of today's leading moral philosophers. Scheffler's reconsideration of the case against consequentialism has been highly influential, and he has now taken the opportunity to supplement the original work with three susbtantial subsequently published essays in which he responds to criticism of the book and further develops various of its themes and arguments.
Some people believe that the demands of morality coincide with the
requirements of an enlightened self-interest. Others believe that
morality is diametrically opposed to considerations of
self-interest. This book argues that there is another position,
intermediate between these extremes, which makes better sense of
the totality of our moral thought and practice. Scheffler
elaborates this position via an examination of morality's content,
scope, authority, and deliberative role. Although conflicts between
morality and self-interest do arise, according to this position,
nevertheless morality is fundamentally a reasonable and humane
phenomenon. Moreover, the psychological bases of effective moral
motivation have sources deep within the self, and morally motivated
individuals try to shape their own interests so as to avoid
conflict with morality. Since human practices and institutions help
to determine the prevalence of these motives, and since in this and
other ways they influence the degree to which conflicts between
morality and self-interest actually occur, the extent of such
conflict is not fixed or immutable, and is in part a social and
political issue.
|
You may like...
Poor Things
Emma Stone, Mark Ruffalo, …
DVD
R449
R329
Discovery Miles 3 290
Loot
Nadine Gordimer
Paperback
(2)
R398
R330
Discovery Miles 3 300
|