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From the foreword: "As our nation and our Navy shift their focus
away from the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have so
dominated our internal conversations for more than a decade and
pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, it is most appropriate that
this study, You Cannot Surge Trust, should make its appearance. The
assembled authors, under the assured editorial hand of Sandra
Doyle, bring forward a series of episodes that demonstrate the
evolving and increasingly important nature of maritime coalition
operations around the world. Beginning with a look at maritime
interception operations in the Arabian Gulf during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this work moves forward through the
post-Cold War era to include recent operations in the Middle East
and central Asia. Written from a multinational point of view, the
analysis suggests that nations, even superpowers, are increasingly
dependent upon each other for support during major combat
operations and that only by frequent consultation, exercises,
cooperation in technology development, and understanding of force
structure capabilities will future maritime coalitions be
successful. This study also advances a larger argument regarding
the relevance of naval and maritime history in defense policy
development. The challenges faced by coalition forces during the
1991 to 2005 period are not so different from what confronted those
who sailed before. The crews of Continental Navy ships during the
American Revolution had difficulty keeping up with French ships
owing to differences in the size of the respective fleets and
individual ship design. During World Wars I and II the U.S. and
Royal navies consistently had to overcome problems inherent in
differences in classification and communications. Lastly, in the
increasingly geopolitical complexities of modern warfare,
illustrated by our experiences operating alongside allies in Korea
and Vietnam, history reveals that the different rules of engagement
under which nations exercise their forces can cause conflicts
within a partnership-even as the partners prosecute a conflict.
Each of these issues has been raised before, each is examined
within You Cannot Surge Trust, and each will raise its head again
in some future hostility."
In this study, naval historians from Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States explore how their navies created an
effective multinational, or "combined," framework of
interoperability while under national rules of engagement. The
authors address cases including maritime operations during the
First Gulf War (1990-1991) and later (2001-2003) as part of
Operation Enduring Freedom; off the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in Operation Sharp Guard (1991-1996); and in East Timor during
Operation Stabilise (1999-2000). This multinational naval force's
success in each crisis depended not just on shared doctrine,
training, tactics, and technology, but on the trust its sailors
built in combined operations over time.
From the foreword: "As our nation and our Navy shift their focus
away from the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have so
dominated our internal conversations for more than a decade and
pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, it is most appropriate that
this study, You Cannot Surge Trust, should make its appearance. The
assembled authors, under the assured editorial hand of Sandra
Doyle, bring forward a series of episodes that demonstrate the
evolving and increasingly important nature of maritime coalition
operations around the world. Beginning with a look at maritime
interception operations in the Arabian Gulf during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this work moves forward through the
post-Cold War era to include recent operations in the Middle East
and central Asia. Written from a multinational point of view, the
analysis suggests that nations, even superpowers, are increasingly
dependent upon each other for support during major combat
operations and that only by frequent consultation, exercises,
cooperation in technology development, and understanding of force
structure capabilities will future maritime coalitions be
successful. This study also advances a larger argument regarding
the relevance of naval and maritime history in defense policy
development. The challenges faced by coalition forces during the
1991 to 2005 period are not so different from what confronted those
who sailed before. The crews of Continental Navy ships during the
American Revolution had difficulty keeping up with French ships
owing to differences in the size of the respective fleets and
individual ship design. During World Wars I and II the U.S. and
Royal navies consistently had to overcome problems inherent in
differences in classification and communications. Lastly, in the
increasingly geopolitical complexities of modern warfare,
illustrated by our experiences operating alongside allies in Korea
and Vietnam, history reveals that the different rules of engagement
under which nations exercise their forces can cause conflicts
within a partnership-even as the partners prosecute a conflict.
Each of these issues has been raised before, each is examined
within You Cannot Surge Trust, and each will raise its head again
in some future hostility."
Navy Medicine in Vietnam begins and ends with a humanitarian
operation-the first, in 1954, after the French were defeated, when
refugees fled to South Vietnam to escape from the communist regime
in the North; and the second, in 1975, after the fall of Saigon and
the final stage of America's exit that entailed a massive
helicopter evacuation of American staff and selected Vietnamese and
their families from South Vietnam. In both cases the Navy provided
medical support to avert the spread of disease and tend to basic
medical needs. Between those dates, 1954 and 1975, Navy medical
personnel responded to the buildup and intensifying combat
operations by taking a multipronged approach in treating
casualties. Helicopter medical evacuations, triaging, and a system
of moving casualties from short-term to long-term care meant higher
rates of survival and targeted care. Poignant recollections of the
medical personnel serving in Vietnam, recorded by author Jan
Herman, historian of the Navy Medical Department, are a reminder of
the great sacrifices these men and women made for their country and
their patients.
This book focuses on the three prongs of the naval trident that
President Nixon wielded during the final years of the Vietnam War:
naval air power, naval bombardment, and mine warfare. For much of
this period, Navy aircraft sought to hamper the flow of supplies
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos-a huge investment in air power
resources that ultimately proved fruitless. After North Vietnam's
invasion of the South in 1972, however, Navy tactical aviation, as
well as naval bombardment, proved critical not only in blunting the
offensive but also in persuading North Vietnam to arrive at a peace
agreement in Paris in 1973. For the first time in the war, the Navy
was also authorized to close Haiphong Harbor and North Vietnam's
other ports with naval mines-an operation that still stands out as
a textbook example of how mine warfare can inflict a major economic
and psychological blow on the enemy with minimal casualties for
either side. Thus, naval power was indispensible to ending
America's longest war.
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