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This book offers a new interpretation of judicial review in England
and Wales as being concerned with the advancement of justice and
good governance, as opposed to being concerned primarily with ultra
vires or common law constitutionalism. It is developed both from
examining the functions and values that ought to be served by
judicial review, and from analysis of empirical 'social' facts
about judicial review primarily as experienced in the
Administrative Court. Based on ground-up case law analysis it
constructs a new taxonomy on the grounds of judicial review:
mistake, procedural impropriety, ordinary common law statutory
interpretation, discretionary impropriety, relevant/irrelevant
considerations, breach of an ECHR protected right or equality duty,
and constitutional allocation of powers, constitutional rights, or
other complex constitutional principles. It explains each of these
grounds, what academic and judicial support there might be for them
outside case law analysis, and their similarities and differences
when viewed against popular existing taxonomies. It concludes that
Administrative Court judges are engaged in ordinary common law
statutory interpretation in approximately half of all cases, and
that where discretionary judgement is involved on the part of the
initial decision-maker, judges do indeed consider their task to be
one of determining whether the challenged decision was justified by
reasoning of adequate quality. It finds that judges apply ordinary
common law principles of statutory interpretation with historical
pedigrees, including assessing the initial decision-maker's
reasoning with reference to statutory purpose, and sifting relevant
from irrelevant considerations, including moral considerations. The
result is a ground-breaking reassessment of the grounds of judicial
review in England and Wales and the practice of the Administrative
Court.
This book offers a new interpretation of judicial review in England
and Wales as being concerned with the advancement of justice and
good governance, as opposed to being concerned primarily with ultra
vires or common law constitutionalism. It is developed both from
examining the functions and values that ought to be served by
judicial review, and from analysis of empirical 'social' facts
about judicial review primarily as experienced in the
Administrative Court. Based on ground-up case law analysis it
constructs a new taxonomy on the grounds of judicial review:
mistake, procedural impropriety, ordinary common law statutory
interpretation, discretionary impropriety, relevant/irrelevant
considerations, breach of an ECHR protected right or equality duty,
and constitutional allocation of powers, constitutional rights, or
other complex constitutional principles. It explains each of these
grounds, what academic and judicial support there might be for them
outside case law analysis, and their similarities and differences
when viewed against popular existing taxonomies. It concludes that
Administrative Court judges are engaged in ordinary common law
statutory interpretation in approximately half of all cases, and
that where discretionary judgement is involved on the part of the
initial decision-maker, judges do indeed consider their task to be
one of determining whether the challenged decision was justified by
reasoning of adequate quality. It finds that judges apply ordinary
common law principles of statutory interpretation with historical
pedigrees, including assessing the initial decision-maker's
reasoning with reference to statutory purpose, and sifting relevant
from irrelevant considerations, including moral considerations. The
result is a ground-breaking reassessment of the grounds of judicial
review in England and Wales and the practice of the Administrative
Court.
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