This book probes the hollow rhetoric of debt, deficits and austerity. It explores the decisions of parties of the left which have attempted to deflect criticisms of economic mismanagement and gain trust by depoliticising the budget process and financial management with various rules, albeit with elements of discretion. The book argues that this is a perverse form of trust as it is premised on the belief that political leaders and the public sector cannot be trusted to make appropriate decisions given the economic circumstances of the time and need rules, but at the same time that they can be trusted to follow the rules. The book also explores parties of the right, which often advocate stricter rules and which tend to be the least effective. The book describes how few conservative governments have admirable records on sustained surpluses, given a propensity for unsustainable tax cuts, and the future opportunities this provides to advance a political program of deeper spending cuts.

Conventions are fundamental to the constitutional systems of parliamentary democracies. Unlike the United States which adopted a republican form of government, with a full separation of powers, codified constitutional structures and limitations for executive and legislative institutions and actors, Britain and subsequently Canada, Australia and New Zealand have relied on conventions to perform similar functions. The rise of new political actors has disrupted the stability of the two-party system, and in seeking power the new players are challenging existing practices. Conventions that govern constitutional arrangements in Britain and New Zealand, and the executive in Canada and Australia, are changing to accommodate these and other challenges of modern governance. In Westminster democracies, constitutional conventions provide the rules for forming government; they precede law and make law-making possible. This prior and more fundamental realm of government formation and law making is shaped and structured by conventions.