Russia has deployed cyber operations to interfere in foreign elections, launch disinformation campaigns, and cripple neighboring states-all while maintaining a thin veneer of deniability and avoiding strikes that cross the line into acts of war. How should a targeted nation respond? In Russian Cyber Operations, Scott Jasper dives into the legal and technical maneuvers of Russian cyber strategies, proposing that nations develop solutions for resilience to withstand future attacks. Jasper examines the place of cyber operations within Russia's asymmetric arsenal and its use of hybrid and information warfare, considering examples from French and US presidential elections and the 2017 NotPetya mock ransomware attack, among others. A new preface to the paperback edition puts events since 2020 into context. Jasper shows that the international effort to counter these operations through sanctions and indictments has done little to alter Moscow's behavior. Jasper instead proposes that nations use data correlation technologies in an integrated security platform to establish a more resilient defense. Russian Cyber Operations provides a critical framework for determining whether Russian cyber campaigns and incidents rise to the level of armed conflict or operate at a lower level as a component of competition. Jasper's work offers the national security community a robust plan of action critical to effectively mounting a durable defense against Russian cyber campaigns.

According to the FBI, about 4000 ransomware attacks happen every day. In the United States alone, victims lost $209 million to ransomware in the first quarter of 2016. Even worse is the threat to critical infrastructure, as seen by the malware infections at electrical distribution companies in Ukraine that caused outages to 225,000 customers in late 2015. Further, recent reports on the Russian hacks into the Democratic National Committee and subsequent release of emails in a coercive campaign to apparently influence the U.S. Presidential Election have brought national attention to the inadequacy of cyber deterrence. The U.S. government seems incapable of creating an adequate strategy to alter the behavior of the wide variety of malicious actors seeking to inflict harm or damage through cyberspace. This book offers a systematic analysis of the various existing strategic cyber deterrence options and introduces the alternative strategy of active cyber defense. It examines the array of malicious actors operating in the domain, their methods of attack, and their motivations. It also provides answers on what is being done, and what could be done, by the government and industry to convince malicious actors that their attacks will not succeed and that risk of repercussions exists. Traditional deterrence strategies of retaliation, denial and entanglement appear to lack the necessary conditions of capability, credibly, and communications due to these malicious actors' advantages in cyberspace. In response, the book offers the option of adopting a strategy of active cyber defense that combines internal systemic resilience to halt cyber attack progress with external disruption capacities to thwart malicious actors' objectives. It shows how active cyber defense is technically capable and legally viable as an alternative strategy for the deterrence of cyber attacks.

More than ever, international security and economic prosperity depend upon safe access to the shared domains that make up the global commons: maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. Together these domains serve as essential conduits through which international commerce, communication, and governance prosper. However, the global commons are congested, contested, and competitive. In the January 2012 defense strategic guidance, the United States confirmed its commitment "to continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities". In the face of persistent threats, some hybrid in nature, and their consequences, "Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons" provides a forum where contributors identify ways to strengthen and maintain responsible use of the global commons. The result is a comprehensive approach that will enhance, align, and unify commercial industry, civil agency, and military perspectives and actions.

Russia has deployed cyber operations to interfere in foreign elections, launch disinformation campaigns, and cripple neighboring states-all while maintaining a thin veneer of deniability and avoiding strikes that cross the line into acts of war. How should a targeted nation respond? In Russian Cyber Operations, Scott Jasper dives into the legal and technical maneuvers of Russian cyber strategies, proposing that nations develop solutions for resilience to withstand future attacks. Jasper examines the place of cyber operations within Russia's asymmetric arsenal and its use of hybrid and information warfare, considering examples from French and US presidential elections and the 2017 NotPetya mock ransomware attack, among others. A new preface to the paperback edition puts events since 2020 into context. Jasper shows that the international effort to counter these operations through sanctions and indictments has done little to alter Moscow's behavior. Jasper instead proposes that nations use data correlation technologies in an integrated security platform to establish a more resilient defense. Russian Cyber Operations provides a critical framework for determining whether Russian cyber campaigns and incidents rise to the level of armed conflict or operate at a lower level as a component of competition. Jasper's work offers the national security community a robust plan of action critical to effectively mounting a durable defense against Russian cyber campaigns.

The new millennium has brought with it an ever-expanding range of threats to global security: from cyber attacks to blue-water piracy to provocative missile tests. Now, more than ever then, national security and prosperity depend on the safekeeping of a global system of mutually supporting networks of commerce, communication, and governance. The global commons--outer space, international waters, international airspace, and cyberspace--are assets outside of national jurisdiction that serve as essential conduits for these networks, facilitating the free flow of trade, finance, information, people, and technology. These commons also comprise much of the international security environment, enabling the physical and virtual movement and operations of allied forces. Securing freedom of use of the global commons is therefore fundamental to safeguarding the global system.
Unfortunately, the fact that civil and military operations in the commons are inherently interwoven and technically interdependent makes them susceptible to intrusion. This intrinsic vulnerability confronts the international defense community with profound challenges in preserving access to the commons while countering elemental and systemic threats to the international order from both state and non-state actors. In response, the authors of this volume--a team of distinguished academics and international security practitioners--describe the military-operational requirements for securing freedom of action in the commons. Collaborating from diverse perspectives, they examine initiatives and offer frameworks that are designed to minimize vulnerabilities and preserve advantages, while recognizing that global security must be underscored by international cooperation and agreements.
The book is written for security professionals, policy makers, policy analysts, military officers in professional military education programs, students of security studies and international relations, and anyone wishing to understand the challenges we face to our use of the global commons.

The new millennium has brought with it an ever-expanding range of threats to global security: from cyber attacks to blue-water piracy to provocative missile tests. Now, more than ever then, national security and prosperity depend on the safekeeping of a global system of mutually supporting networks of commerce, communication, and governance. The global commons--outer space, international waters, international airspace, and cyberspace--are assets outside of national jurisdiction that serve as essential conduits for these networks, facilitating the free flow of trade, finance, information, people, and technology. These commons also comprise much of the international security environment, enabling the physical and virtual movement and operations of allied forces. Securing freedom of use of the global commons is therefore fundamental to safeguarding the global system.
Unfortunately, the fact that civil and military operations in the commons are inherently interwoven and technically interdependent makes them susceptible to intrusion. This intrinsic vulnerability confronts the international defense community with profound challenges in preserving access to the commons while countering elemental and systemic threats to the international order from both state and non-state actors. In response, the authors of this volume--a team of distinguished academics and international security practitioners--describe the military-operational requirements for securing freedom of action in the commons. Collaborating from diverse perspectives, they examine initiatives and offer frameworks that are designed to minimize vulnerabilities and preserve advantages, while recognizing that global security must be underscored by international cooperation and agreements.
The book is written for security professionals, policy makers, policy analysts, military officers in professional military education programs, students of security studies and international relations, and anyone wishing to understand the challenges we face to our use of the global commons.

According to the FBI, about 4000 ransomware attacks happen every day. In the United States alone, victims lost $209 million to ransomware in the first quarter of 2016. Even worse is the threat to critical infrastructure, as seen by the malware infections at electrical distribution companies in Ukraine that caused outages to 225,000 customers in late 2015. Further, recent reports on the Russian hacks into the Democratic National Committee and subsequent release of emails in a coercive campaign to apparently influence the U.S. Presidential Election have brought national attention to the inadequacy of cyber deterrence. The U.S. government seems incapable of creating an adequate strategy to alter the behavior of the wide variety of malicious actors seeking to inflict harm or damage through cyberspace. This book offers a systematic analysis of the various existing strategic cyber deterrence options and introduces the alternative strategy of active cyber defense. It examines the array of malicious actors operating in the domain, their methods of attack, and their motivations. It also provides answers on what is being done, and what could be done, by the government and industry to convince malicious actors that their attacks will not succeed and that risk of repercussions exists. Traditional deterrence strategies of retaliation, denial and entanglement appear to lack the necessary conditions of capability, credibly, and communications due to these malicious actors' advantages in cyberspace. In response, the book offers the option of adopting a strategy of active cyber defense that combines internal systemic resilience to halt cyber attack progress with external disruption capacities to thwart malicious actors' objectives. It shows how active cyber defense is technically capable and legally viable as an alternative strategy for the deterrence of cyber attacks.