Midway through 1942, Japanese and Allied forces found themselves fighting on two fronts-in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. These concurrent campaigns, conducted between July 1942 and February 1943, proved a critical turning point in the war being waged in the Pacific, as the advantage definitively shifted from the Japanese to the Americans. Key to this shift was the Allies seizing of the strategic initiative-a concept that Sean Judge examines in this book, particularly in the context of the Pacific War. The concept of strategic initiative, in this analysis, helps to explain why and how contending powers design campaigns and use military forces to alter the trajectory of war. Judge identifies five factors that come into play in capturing and maintaining the initiative: resources, intelligence, strategic acumen, combat effectiveness, and chance, all of which are affected by political will. His book uses the dual campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands as a case study in strategic initiative by reconstructing the organizations, decisions, and events that influenced the shift of initiative from one adversary to the other. Perhaps the most critical factor in this case is strategic acumen, without which the other advantages are easily squandered. Specifically, Judge details how General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, in designing and executing these campaigns, provided the strategic leadership essential to reversing the tide of war-whose outcome, Judge contends, was not as inevitable as conventional wisdom tells us. The strategic initiative, once passed to American and Allied forces in the Pacific, would never be relinquished. In its explanation of how and why this happened, The Turn of the Tide in the Pacific War holds important lessons for students of military history and for future strategic leaders.

Historians and other military analysts often use the term "strategic initiative." Most assume a common understanding of this term. But the concept has been neither carefully defined nor examined in depth. This thesis contributes to the elimination of that gap by answering the question, what factors lead to shifts in strategic initiative during the conduct of modern, conventional war? The Russo-German War of 1941-1945 and the Pacific War of 1941-1945 provide the historical evidence for this study. Both conflicts progressed through three distinct phases in which the Axis combatant first seized the strategic initiative, the initiative then fell into dispute, and the initiative eventually shifted to control of the Allied combatant. Four factors contributing to strategic initiative have been examined for each phase of each war: resources, intelligence, strategic acumen, and operational and tactical methods. These elements of military effectiveness reflect each nation's war-making capacity, knowledge, wisdom, and technique. The relative advantages each side enjoyed in each category have been compared to determine which factors more significantly influenced shifts in strategic initiative and how each component acted upon the others. The heart of the study focuses on the transition into, conduct during, and the transition from the second phase of each war, where the actual shifts in initiative occurred. Strategic acumen led the hierarchy of factors that influence strategic initiative in war. The side that better matched its goals with its capabilities, took advantage of opportunities, and planned more realistically reaped the largest rewards. Good intelligence proved to be a key enabler to the clear judgments that are the hallmark of strategic acumen and placed second in the hierarchy. Resources, followed by operational and tactical methods, placed third and fourth respectively. Nevertheless, each of these components influenced the possession of and shifts in strategic ini

The Slovak National Uprising of 1944 is ignored and/ or treated as a nonevent in the Western historiography of World War II. The political climate during World War II and the Cold War that followed obscured and distorted the history and understanding of this revolt. The raising of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s removed the veil of secrecy from much of Eastern Europe's wartime history, and Western historians are exploring the new resources available, but coverage of Slovakia's story and uprising remains very limited. This work aims to fill some of the void. Fully understanding the uprising requires an analysis of a number of different viewpoints in order to avoid capture by the political views of the parties involved: the Slovaks, the Germans, or the Soviets. Each group had different plans and goals: the Slovaks found themselves precariously between the Allies and Germany, the Germans fought to maintain their strategic position in central Europe while the Soviets hoped to expand their influence through eastern and central Europe. Each group naturally interpreted events differently and acted accordingly. Ultimately the Germans crushed the Slovak rebellion. Events surrounding the uprising remain cloudy to this day. The Slovaks won only short-term political gains, but their Jewish and ethnic German populations paid a heavy price. The Germans won their last significant victory in the war and maintained their presence in Slovak territory until the very end. The Soviet Union suffered significant casualties, but saw Communist influence increase in the region. Recriminations swirl around the lack of Allied support and the duplicity of Stalin. Western historians have excluded coverage of the uprising in part to avoid embarrassment. Significantly, the Slovaks remain at odds among themselves about the importance and the meaning of the uprising.

The Slovak National Uprising of 1944 is ignored and/or treated as a non-event in Western historiography of World War II. The political climate during World War II and the Cold War that followed obscured and distorted the history and understanding of this revolt. The fall of the 'Iron Curtain' raised the veil of secrecy off much of Eastern Europe's wartime history and Western historians are exploring the new resources available, but coverage of Slovakia's story and uprising remains very limited. This work aims to fill some of the void.

Historians and other military analysts often use the term "strategic initiative." Most assume a common understanding of this term. But the concept has been neither carefully defined nor examined in depth. This thesis contributes to the elimination of that gap by answering the question, what factors lead to shifts in strategic initiative during the conduct of modern, conventional war?