This book examines the United States military's use of concepts from non-linear science, such as chaos and complexity theory, in its efforts to theorise information-age warfare. Over the past three decades, the US defence community has shown an increasing interest in learning lessons from the non-linear sciences. Theories, strategies, and doctrines of warfare that have guided the conduct of US forces in recent conflicts have been substantially influenced by ideas borrowed from non-linear science, including manoeuvre warfare, network-centric warfare, and counterinsurgency. This book accounts for the uses that the US military has made of non-linear science by examining the long-standing historical relationship between the natural sciences and Western militaries. It identifies concepts and metaphors borrowed from natural science as a key formative factor behind the development of military theory, strategy, and doctrine. In doing so, Nonlinear Science and Warfare not only improves our understanding of the relationship between military professional identity, professional military education, and changes in technology, but also provides important insights into the evolving nature of conflict in the Information Age. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, military science, US foreign policy, technology and war, and security studies.

This book examines the United States military's use of concepts from non-linear science, such as chaos and complexity theory, in its efforts to theorise information-age warfare. Over the past three decades, the US defence community has shown an increasing interest in learning lessons from the non-linear sciences. Theories, strategies, and doctrines of warfare that have guided the conduct of US forces in recent conflicts have been substantially influenced by ideas borrowed from non-linear science, including manoeuvre warfare, network-centric warfare, and counterinsurgency. This book accounts for the uses that the US military has made of non-linear science by examining the long-standing historical relationship between the natural sciences and Western militaries. It identifies concepts and metaphors borrowed from natural science as a key formative factor behind the development of military theory, strategy, and doctrine. In doing so, Nonlinear Science and Warfare not only improves our understanding of the relationship between military professional identity, professional military education, and changes in technology, but also provides important insights into the evolving nature of conflict in the Information Age. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, military science, US foreign policy, technology and war, and security studies.

This book examines the role of cyber-doom rhetoric in the U.S. cybersecurity debate. For more than two decades, fear of "cyber-doom" scenarios-i.e. cyberattacks against critical infrastructure resulting in catastrophic physical, social, and economic impacts-has been a persistent feature of the U.S. cybersecurity debate. This is despite the fact that no cyberattack has come close to realizing such impacts. This book argues that such scenarios are part of a broader rhetoric of cyber-doom within the U.S. cybersecurity debate, and takes a multidisciplinary approach that draws on research in history, sociology, communication, psychology, and political science. It identifies a number of variations of cyber-doom rhetoric, then places them into a larger historical context, assesses how realistic the fears expressed in such rhetoric are, and finally draws out the policy implications of relying on these fears to structure our response to cybersecurity challenges. The United States faces very real cybersecurity challenges that are, nonetheless, much less dramatic than what is implied in the rhetoric. This book argues that relying on cyber-doom rhetoric to frame our thinking about such threats is counterproductive, and encourages us to develop ways of thinking and speaking about cybersecurity beyond cyber-doom. This book will be of much interest to students of cybersecurity, foreign policy, public administration, national security, and international relations in general.

This book examines the role of cyber-doom rhetoric in the U.S. cybersecurity debate. For more than two decades, fear of "cyber-doom" scenarios-i.e. cyberattacks against critical infrastructure resulting in catastrophic physical, social, and economic impacts-has been a persistent feature of the U.S. cybersecurity debate. This is despite the fact that no cyberattack has come close to realizing such impacts. This book argues that such scenarios are part of a broader rhetoric of cyber-doom within the U.S. cybersecurity debate, and takes a multidisciplinary approach that draws on research in history, sociology, communication, psychology, and political science. It identifies a number of variations of cyber-doom rhetoric, then places them into a larger historical context, assesses how realistic the fears expressed in such rhetoric are, and finally draws out the policy implications of relying on these fears to structure our response to cybersecurity challenges. The United States faces very real cybersecurity challenges that are, nonetheless, much less dramatic than what is implied in the rhetoric. This book argues that relying on cyber-doom rhetoric to frame our thinking about such threats is counterproductive, and encourages us to develop ways of thinking and speaking about cybersecurity beyond cyber-doom. This book will be of much interest to students of cybersecurity, foreign policy, public administration, national security, and international relations in general.