When the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany partitioned Poland in September of 1939, thousands of Jews fled Poland into Lithuania and fled across the USSR to Japan. With the help of Jan Zwartendijk, acting Dutch consul, and Chiune Sugihara, Japan's vice consul in Lithuania, the refugees obtained documents for their perilous escape from Nazi persecution. From Japan, many refugees moved on to Dutch-controlled Curacao or other final destinations. Decades after the war, and one year before his death in 1986, Sugihara was finally honored by Israel with the "Righteous Among the Nations" Award for the help he gave to the Jews in 1940. He also received the Raoul Wallenburg Award posthumously in 1990. However, in Japan little was known about Sugihara's heroic actions for more than five decades. The author, Seishiro Sugihara (no relation to Chiune), reveals a pattern of deception and obfuscation by Japan's foreign ministry to obstruct recognition of Sugihara's philanthropy. The Sugihara episode, the author contends, is only one in a long line of scandalous cover-ups which have plagued the Ministry, including its ill-fated Twenty-One Demands upon Nationalist China in 1915; and more infamously the failure of its Washington Embassy to follow orders and deliver the "declaration of war" on December 7, 1941 which resulted in the Pearl Harbor operation being stigmatized as a "sneak attack." His book is the first to demonstrate that, while Japan's military was abolished during the Occupation, the Foreign Ministry secured its own future at the expense of Japan and the Japanese people, and deliberately and systematically placed Sugihara's act of kindness beyond public scrutiny.

Harry Wray and Seishiro Sugihara transcend the one-sided Tokyo Trial view of the war in an effort to conduct a balanced exchange on historical perception. This will be of interest equally to both those inside and outside Japan who are perplexed by Japan's "victimization consciousness." Through this impassioned and heartfelt dialogue, Wray challenges theories embraced by some Japanese who believe that the US simply "used the atomic bombings to make the Soviet Union manageable in the Cold War," as alleged by the Hiroshima Peace Museum and in Japanese school history textbooks. They ask why it is the Japanese people don't recognize how the atomic bombings not only spared the further sacrifice of American and Japanese lives by accelerating the end of the war, but also prevented a wide-scale Soviet invasion of the Japanese mainland, had the war continued into the latter half of 1945. While early censorship of writings about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both outright and self-imposed, continued through the Occupation, Sugihara proposes that, long after the Americans had packed up and gone home, the Foreign Ministry established and nurtured a postwar paradigm which rendered open and critical discussion of war-related issues, such as Pearl Harbor and the atomic bombings, impossible for the Japanese public. It is no wonder then that Japanese attitudes towards the atomic bombings remain mired in victimization myths. Uniquely, Wray and Sugihara attempt to persuade the Japanese to reexamine their attitudes to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to show that the atomic bombings, perversely, brought a swift end to the war and helped Japan escape the act of partition which afflicted postwar Germany and remains an intractable problem in a divided Korea.

Harry Wray and Seishiro Sugihara transcend the one-sided Tokyo Trial view of the war in an effort to conduct a balanced exchange on historical perception. This will be of interest equally to both those inside and outside Japan who are perplexed by Japan's "victimization consciousness." Through this impassioned and heartfelt dialogue, Wray challenges theories embraced by some Japanese who believe that the US simply "used the atomic bombings to make the Soviet Union manageable in the Cold War," as alleged by the Hiroshima Peace Museum and in Japanese school history textbooks. They ask why it is the Japanese people don't recognize how the atomic bombings not only spared the further sacrifice of American and Japanese lives by accelerating the end of the war, but also prevented a wide-scale Soviet invasion of the Japanese mainland, had the war continued into the latter half of 1945. While early censorship of writings about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both outright and self-imposed, continued through the Occupation, Sugihara proposes that, long after the Americans had packed up and gone home, the Foreign Ministry established and nurtured a postwar paradigm which rendered open and critical discussion of war-related issues, such as Pearl Harbor and the atomic bombings, impossible for the Japanese public. It is no wonder then that Japanese attitudes towards the atomic bombings remain mired in victimization myths. Uniquely, Wray and Sugihara attempt to persuade the Japanese to reexamine their attitudes to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to show that the atomic bombings, perversely, brought a swift end to the war and helped Japan escape the act of partition which afflicted postwar Germany and remains an intractable problem in a divided Korea.