In 1990, the Malaysian state of Johor - along with Singapore and the Indonesian island of Batam - launched the Growth Triangle to attract foreign direct investment. For Johor, this drive was very successful, transforming its economy and driving up income levels. Today, Johor is one of Malaysia's 'developed' states, housing large clusters of electrical and electronics, food processing, and furniture producing firms.These economic and social changes have also had political ramifications. While Johor is a bastion of two of the country's oldest and most established political parties, the state's large, urban and connected electorate has made it hospitable terrain for new political organisations. Beyond electoral politics, Johor is also the home of a powerful and influential royal family, with very specific ideas about its role in the state's political life. Building upon earlier work by the ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute on the Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands Cross-Border Region, this book focuses on this important Malaysian state, as it deals with important domestic challenges on one hand and strives to engage with international markets on the other.

This volume features a set of distinct, compelling, and intentionally disparate case studies that shed much needed attention on the varied ways in which local cultural, social, and political dynamics inform and mitigate the veritable roadmap toward palpable and meaningful progress with respect to enabling the goals of environmental sustainability. The volume includes contributions from notable academics - including some based in Southeast Asia - with 'on the ground experience,' and thus they bring a much more nuanced and locally informed orientation to their respective contributions.

Malaysia was initially lauded for its ability to combat the first few waves of COVID-19 but infection spikes since the Sabah state elections in September 2020 and subsequent exponential increases in both infections and deaths in 2021 left the nation reeling. Nationwide vaccination is seen as the only way out of the pandemic. Malaysia's COVID-19 communication strategy was hampered by political machinations and myriad changes in government. The need to shore up favour among the electorate resulted in inconsistent messaging and regular U-turns whenever there was public outrage at arbitrary restrictions. This resulted in confusion on the ground, preventing successful COVID-19 management and containment. Under the current regime, claims to more accessible data have been disputed and doubts have surfaced over data transparency and accuracy. There is an urgent need to ensure convincingly reliable information, as well as to use more engaging messaging on more suitable media.

Malaysia pledged to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 in relation to its 2005 GDP figure. The sectors listed as the main focus of this effort included: energy, industrial processes, waste, agriculture, land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). Several initiatives under myriad governments have been launched to reduce Malaysia’s climate change impacts; among those has been the emphasis on renewable energy (RE). Malaysia’s current energy mix relies heavily on coal and natural gas. Long-entrenched subsidies on these energy sources, coupled with greatly depreciating prices make it difficult for new RE producers to enter the market and increase their market share. This is in spite of positive developments in RE infrastructure and reduced RE material costs. Solar, biogas, biomass and mini-hydro have been put forward as the RE sources with the most potential, but all have issues of consistency and reliability. Because small energy generators cannot guarantee infallible energy production, they may not be the most viable options for the long term. Their size also denies them the economies of scale that would reduce their costs. Instead, these higher costs may be transferred to the consumer. Other issues include the competition for land in the development of large-scale solar farms, including the possible loss of community farmlands and hence livelihoods, if not displacement. A push for biomass and biogas as a source of energy might also lead to increased oil palm production to meet the need for consistent supplies of oil palm waste. Biogas from municipal landfills is made even more challenging given that Malaysian municipal waste is not sorted at source. One possible solution is the use of hybrid RE in rural areas, comprising a mix of micro-hydro, solar and diesel-based energy generation as a back-up. However an immediate win is to ensure energy efficiency and public education to encourage emissions reduction and climate change impacts on the individual consumer.

Over the past year, there has been increasing recognition of women’s roles as recruiters, financiers and influencers for radical Islamic groups. More women have been arrested for their support for and involvement in the Islamic State (IS), but much of the focus has been on their desire to marry a jihadi soldier or channel funds to the cause. In Malaysia, these women (including returnees from IS) are seen to be followers, not decision-makers or active agents in extremist action. While Malay-Muslim women were both economically and socially active prior to colonization, patriarchal norms are now commonplace because of Islamic and Western conventions, as well as increasing conservatism in society. Women do have agency in the home, however, and exercise this power and centrality within the private sphere by wielding religion as a tool to exert influence over their spouse and children. More attention needs to be paid to mothers as potential nurturers of extremist interpretations of Islam. Their actions in active support of non-violent extremism and intolerant exclusivity could have far-reaching effects given their unrivalled influence in the home. Their need to achieve social recognition through religion, coupled with increasing Salafi infiltration into mainstream Malaysian society and Islam, could be highly detrimental in multi-faith Malaysia. At the very least, these women may not report family members who intend to participate in terror; at the worst, they may encourage it and sanction jihadi theology and action.