Since the end of World War II, there have been 181 insurgencies around the world. Today, there are over three dozen violent insurgencies, including in such high-profile countries as Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. These insurgencies have been led by a range of groups, from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In fact, most warfare today occurs in the form of insurgencies. If we are to understand modern warfare, we need to understand insurgencies. While numerous books have been written on the subject of insurgencies, there is no book that brings together all of what we know into one accessible volume that policymakers can understand and use. Waging Insurgent Warfare is that book. Seth G. Jones, who has been deeply involved in the Afghanistan war over the last decade, aims to help policymakers, scholars, and general readers better understand how groups start, wage, and end insurgencies. He weaves together examples from today and from recent history into an analytic synthesis that focuses on several sets of questions. First, what factors contribute to the rise of an insurgency? Second, what are the key components involved in conducting an insurgency? As he explains, insurgent groups need to decide on a strategy, employ a range of tactics, select an organizational structure, secure outside aid from state and non-state actors, and conduct information campaigns. They then have to routinely re-assess these decisions over the course of an insurgency. Third, what factors contribute to the end of insurgencies? Finally, what do the answers to these questions mean for the conduct of counterinsurgency warfare? Waging Insurgent Warfare is not only a practical handbook for understanding insurgent warfare, but it also has implications for waging counterinsurgent warfare. Highly readable, empirically sophisticated, and historically informed, Waging Insurgent Warfare will become a standard work on the topic.

One of the most striking developments in recent international politics has been the significant increase in security cooperation among European Union states. Seth Jones argues that this increase in cooperation, in areas such as economic sanctions, weapons production and collaboration among military forces, has occurred because of the changing structure of the international and regional systems. Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar structure characterized by United States dominance. This has caused EU states to cooperate in the security realm to increase their ability to project power abroad and to decrease reliance on the US. Furthermore, European leaders in the early 1990s adopted a 'binding' strategy to ensure long-term peace on the continent, suggesting that security cooperation is caused by a desire to preserve peace in Europe whilst building power abroad.

After the swift defeat of the Taliban in 2001, American optimism has steadily evaporated in the face of mounting violence; a new "war of a thousand cuts" has now brought the country to its knees. In the Graveyard of Empires is a political history of Afghanistan in the "Age of Terror" from 2001 to 2009, exploring the fundamental tragedy of America's longest war since Vietnam. After a brief survey of the great empires in Afghanistan-the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the British in the era of Kipling, and the late Soviet Union-Seth G. Jones examines the central question of our own war: how did an insurgency develop? Following the September 11 attacks, the United States successfully overthrew the Taliban regime. It established security throughout the country-killing, capturing, or scattering most of al Qa'ida's senior operatives-and Afghanistan finally began to emerge from more than two decades of struggle and conflict. But Jones argues that as early as 2001 planning for the Iraq War siphoned off resources and talented personnel, undermining the gains that had been made. After eight years, he says, the United States has managed to push al Qa'ida's headquarters about one hundred miles across the border into Pakistan, the distance from New York to Philadelphia. While observing the tense and often adversarial relationship between NATO allies in the Coalition, Jones-who has distinguished himself at RAND and was recently named by Esquire as one of the "Best and Brightest" young policy experts-introduces us to key figures on both sides of the war. Harnessing important new research and integrating thousands of declassified government documents, Jones then analyzes the insurgency from a historical and structural point of view, showing how a rising drug trade, poor security forces, and pervasive corruption undermined the Karzai government, while Americans abandoned a successful strategy, failed to provide the necessary support, and allowed a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan to catalyze the Taliban resurgence. Examining what has worked thus far-and what has not-this serious and important book underscores the challenges we face in stabilizing the country and explains where we went wrong and what we must do if the United States is to avoid the disastrous fate that has befallen many of the great world powers to enter the region.

One of the most striking developments in recent international politics has been the significant increase in security cooperation among European Union states. Seth Jones argues that this increase in cooperation, in areas such as economic sanctions, weapons production and collaboration among military forces, has occurred because of the changing structure of the international and regional systems. Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar structure characterized by United States dominance. This has caused EU states to cooperate in the security realm to increase their ability to project power abroad and to decrease reliance on the US. Furthermore, European leaders in the early 1990s adopted a 'binding' strategy to ensure long-term peace on the continent, suggesting that security cooperation is caused by a desire to preserve peace in Europe whilst building power abroad.

Conventional warfare-clashes between large military forces-defined twentieth-century power. But today, facing a dominant American military, principal adversaries Russia, China and Iran, have adopted a new style of competition. Cyber attacks, covert action, proxy conflicts, information and disinformation campaigns, espionage and economic coercion-these are the tools of irregular or asymmetric warfare, which will increasingly reshape international politics. In Three Dangerous Men, defence expert Seth G. Jones profiles pioneers of irregular warfare in Moscow, Beijing and Tehran who adapted American techniques and made huge gains without waging traditional warfare. Drawing on interviews with dozens of US military, diplomatic and intelligence officials, such as CIA directors Michael Hayden and David Petraeus, the author demonstrates why the US abandoned its own irregular capabilities and is thus steadily losing ground to its global adversaries. Jones argues the US must significantly alter how it thinks about-and engages in-competition before it is too late.

In Three Dangerous Men, defence expert Seth Jones argues that the US is woefully unprepared for the future of global competition. While America has focused on building fighter jets, missiles and conventional warfighting capabilities, its three principal rivals-Russia, China and Iran-have increasingly adopted irregular warfare: cyber-attacks, the use of proxy forces, propaganda, espionage and disinformation to undermine American power. Jones profiles three pioneers of irregular warfare in Moscow, Beijing and Tehran who adapted American techniques and made huge gains without waging traditional warfare: Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov; the deceased Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani; and vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia. Each has spent his career studying American power and devised techniques to avoid a conventional or nuclear war with the US. Gerasimov helped oversee a resurgence of Russian irregular warfare, which included attempts to undermine the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections and the SolarWinds cyber-attack. Soleimani was so effective in expanding Iranian power in the Middle East that Washington targeted him for assassination. Zhang Youxia presents the most alarming challenge because China has more power and potential at its disposal. Drawing on interviews with dozens of US military, diplomatic and intelligence officials, as well as hundreds of documents translated from Russian, Farsi and Mandarin, Jones shows how America's rivals have bloodied its reputation and seized territory worldwide. Instead of standing up to autocratic regimes, Jones demonstrates that the United States has largely abandoned the kind of information, special operations, intelligence and economic and diplomatic action that helped win the Cold War. In a powerful conclusion, Jones details the key steps the United States must take to alter how it thinks about-and engages in-competition before it is too late.

Unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) have played an important role in warfare over the past two decades, including to conduct counterterrorism operations. To better understand the utility of UASs, this latest report from CSIS adopts a comparative case study approach and examines the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Ukraine war in 2022, and Northern Edge-21 exercise in the Indo-Pacific in 2021. These cases demonstrate that UASs have been increasingly integrated into combined arms warfare, a major change from the past. In addition, UASs are likely to play an increasingly important role in several types of missions as part of strategic competition and warfare with such countries as China and Russia.

This landmark history chronicles the dramatic, decade-long war against al Qa'ida and provides a model for understanding the ebb and flow of terrorist activity. Tracing intricately orchestrated terrorist plots and the elaborate, multiyear investigations to disrupt them, Seth G. Jones identifies three distinct "waves" of al Qa'ida violence. As Jonathan Mahler wrote in the New York Times Book Review, "studying these waves and the counterwaves that repelled them can tell us a lot about what works and what doesn't when it comes to fighting terrorism." The result is a sweeping, insider's account of what the war has been and what it might become.

The U.S. defense industrial base is not adequately prepared for the international security environment that now exists. In a major regional conflict—such as a war with China in the Taiwan Strait—the U.S. use of munitions would likely exceed the current stockpiles of the U.S. Department of Defense. According to the results of a series of CSIS war games, the United States would likely run out of some munitions—such as long-range, precision-guided munitions—in less than one week in a Taiwan Strait conflict. The war in Ukraine has also exposed serious deficiencies in the U.S. defense industrial base and serves as a stark reminder that a protracted conflict is likely to be an industrial war that requires a defense industry able to manufacture enough munitions, weapons systems, and matériel to replace depleted stockpiles. As timelines for a possible conflict in Asia shrink, the goal should be to support the production capacity required to enable the United States and its allies and partners to deter and, if deterrence fails, fight and win at least one major theater war—if not two. “Just in time” and lean manufacturing operations must be balanced with carrying added capacity. The U.S. Department of Defense, in coordination with Congress, should develop a plan now that involves taking steps to streamline and improve production, acquisitions, replenishment, Foreign Military Sales, ITAR, and other policies and procedures. A revitalization of the defense industrial base will not happen overnight for the United States or its allies and partners. It is time to prepare for the era of competition that now exists.

This CSIS report examines the evolution of European military capabilities over the next decade. It asks two main questions. What military capabilities might European allies and partners of the United States possess by 2030? And what types of military missions will these states be able (and unable) to effectively perform by 2030? First, European militaries-including the largest and most capable European NATO members-will continue to struggle to conduct several types of missions without significant U.S. assistance. Second, European militaries will face significant challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Third, Europe's major powers will likely have the capability to conduct most types of missions at the lower end of the conflict continuum without significant U.S. military aid. To sustain progress and overcome remaining challenges, NATO will have to revise its burden-sharing metrics, modernize defense planning and procurement practices, and address lagging political will.

There are growing calls for a decrease in the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. This CSIS report assesses three posture options for U.S. forces in the region to inform the debate over the United States' military presence in the Middle East. The report finds that the United States should keep a notable but tailored presence in the Middle East to contain the further expansion of Chinese and Russian military power and to check the actions of Iran and terrorist organizations that threaten the United States and its allies and partners.

Since the end of World War II, there have been 181 insurgencies around the world. In fact, most modern warfare occurs in the form of insurgencies, including in such high-profile countries as Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. However, in spite of their prevalence, we still know relatively little about how insurgencies function. With more than three dozen violent insurgencies currently taking place today, a deeper understanding of insurgent groups is more important than ever. In Waging Insurgent Warfare, Seth G. Jones offers new insights into the dynamics of insurgent groups. Jones weaves together examples from current events and recent history to identify the factors that contribute to the rise of an insurgency, the key components involved in conducting an insurgency, from selecting an organizational structure to securing aid from an outside source, and the elements that contribute to the end of insurgencies. Through examining the strategies, tactics, and campaigns that insurgents use, as well as how these factors relate to each other on the ground, Jones provides a comprehensive understanding of the ways in which insurgent groups operate. Empirically rich and historically informed, Waging Insurgent Warfare features data on over one hundred factors for every insurgency that has taken place between 1946 and 2015. While the primary emphasis revolves around insurgency, the findings in this book also have important implications for waging counterinsurgent warfare. Bringing together the existing body of knowledge on insurgencies, Jones provides a practical, accessible resource to help understand insurgent warfare. The definitive resource on insurgency, Waging Insurgent Warfare will appeal to anyone with an interest in insurgency, counterinsurgency, or modern war.

This report examines Russia's military and diplomatic campaign in Syria, the largest and most significant Russian out-of-area operation since the end of the Cold War. Russia's experience in Syria will shape its military thinking, influence promotion and personnel decisions, impact research and development for its arms industry, and expand its influence in the Middle East and beyond for the foreseeable future. Yet despite the importance of Russia's involvement in Syria-especially as the United States competes with countries such as Russia and China-there has been little systematic analysis of Russia's campaign in Syria. This research aims to help fill the gap and provides some new analysis and data. It conducts a broad assessment of the Russian campaign-including political objectives, diplomatic initiatives, and civilian targeting-which places the military campaign in a wider context. In addition, it compiles a data set of Russia's civilian targeting and analyzes satellite imagery of Russian activity. Overall, this report concludes that Russia was relatively successful in achieving its main near-term political and military objectives in Syria, including preventing the collapse of the Assad regime (an important regional partner) and thwarting a possible U.S. attempt to overthrow Assad. Still, Russia used a systematic punishment campaign that involved attacks against civilian and humanitarian infrastructure in an attempt to deny resources-including food, fuel, and medical aid-to the opposition while simultaneously eroding the will of civilians to support opposition groups.

In Afghanistan, local communities have played a critical role in security, especially in rural areas. Afghan national security forces are important to the top-down strategy, but the Afghan government and NATO forces also need to leverage local communities to gain a complementary bottom-up strategy. This analysis discusses the viability of establishing local security forces in Afghanistan and addresses concerns about the wisdom of such policies.

Since 2001, Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups, including al Qa'ida, that directly affect U.S. national security. Despite some successes, militant groups continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and a range of other countries. Pakistan will not be able to deal with the militant threat over the long run unless it does a more effective job of addressing the root causes of the crisis and makes security of the civilian population, rather than destroying the enemy, its top counter insurgency priority. In addition, Pakistan needs to abandon militancy as a tool of its foreign and domestic policy; it sends a confusing message internally and has a large potential to backfire.

All terrorist groups eventually end. But how? Most modern groups have ended because they joined the political process or local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policing and intelligence, not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida.All terrorist groups end. But how do they end? Most groups since 1968 have ended because they joined the political process or are defeated by police and intelligence services. This has significant implications for countering al Qa'ida.

This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. It argues that successful counterinsurgency requires effective indigenous security forces, especially police; a viable and legitimate local government; and the suppression of external support for insurgents.An examination of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan illustrates that successful counterinsurgency requires effective indigenous security forces, especially police; a viable local government; and the suppression of external support for insurgents.

Peace is the most essential product of nation-building. Without peace, neither economic growth nor democratization is possible. The authors of "Europe's Role in Nation-Building" investigate the use of armed force as part of broader nation-building efforts led by European powers and its success at achieving the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbours. They then evaluate Europe's performance against the U.S. and United Nations records in past nation-building operations.The authors focus on factors that can be influenced by outside powers, making valuable recommendations that address the pitfalls of and lessons learned from past operations. They emphasize the need for multilateral operations and the involvement of crucial actors like the European Union and NATO. The success of nation-building activities depends on the wisdom with which all resources are employed."The RAND Nation-Building" series is just this kind of resource, having drawn from a total of 22 European, U.N. and U.S. led nation-building operations since World War II. Other volumes in the series examine the involvement of the United States and the UN in nation-building efforts. In this new addition to the series, the authors take an in-depth look at six European cases (Macedonia, Bosnia, Cote d'Ivoire, Albania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone) and one Australian-led operation (the Solomon Islands) to complete a comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building. This series serves as an indispensable reference for the planning of successful future interventions.

The challenges of nation-building and of dealing with the societal and political aftermaths of conflicts have consumed tremendous international energy during the past decades. "Women and Nation-Building" tackles the exceedingly complex task of assessing the multilayered development of women's diverse roles in the post-conflict context. The author examines the role of women in the recent reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, while evaluating the effect of societal circumstances and nation-building processes on the status of female populations in post-conflict regions. Does women's part make a difference to the post-conflict trajectories of very volatile societies? "Women and Nation-Building" presents compelling findings for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars concerned with both the academic and pragmatic implementation of a more engendered approach to nation-building.The book concludes that the steps necessary to strengthen nation-building activities include an emphasis on human security, establishing governance based on the principles of equity and the rule of law, and women's early economic inclusion in reconstruction activities. Societies on a path toward equity and the rule of law are more peaceful and more prosperous, and the status of women is not merely a litmus test but an active agent in bringing about such an outcome.

In two earlier volumes, the authors defined nation building as the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a transition to democracy. By various actors, it is often called stabilisation and reconstruction, peace building, or state building, but at any name these missions have become more frequent, and frequently more complex and ambitious. As American forces entered Iraq, little effort was made to marshal abundant, recent, and relevant experience in support of the new nation-building mission in Iraq, with severe consequences.This guidebook is designed to contribute to future nation building efforts. It is organized around the components that make up any nation-building mission: planning, military and police contingents, civil administrators, humanitarian and relief efforts, governance, economic stabilization, democratisation, and infrastructure development. This guide should help practitioners avoid repeating earlier mistakes, help political leaders evaluate the cost and likelihood of success of any proposed operation, and help citizens evaluate their government's consequent performance.

In a nation-building operation, outside states invest much of their resources in establishing and maintaining the host country's police, internal security forces, and justice system. This book examines post-Cold War reconstruction efforts, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, and assesses the success of U.S. and allied efforts in reconstructing internal security institutions.

Reviews UN nation-building efforts to transform unstable countries into democratic, peaceful, and prosperous partners, and compares those efforts to U.S.-led missions. Reviews UN efforts to transform eight unstable countries into democratic, peaceful, and prosperous partners, and compares those missions with U.S. nation-building operations. The UN provides the most suitable institutional framework for nation-building missions that require fewer than 20,000 men-one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy.

Reports the results of a two-day workshop that brought together a diverse group of modelers, specialists in international relations, and thinkers about power from both the public and the private sectors. Reports the results of a two-day workshop that brought together a diverse group of modelers, specialists in international relations, and thinkers about power from both the public and the private sectors. They considered how to measure state power and the power of non-state actors, and how states and non-state actors wield power on a continuum ranging from persuasion, through economic aid, to military action.