This book analyzes the emergence, rise, and decline of insurgency by the Pakistani Taliban in Pakistan's North-Western region, also known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It provides a detailed account of the rise and decline of the FATA insurgency and also examines aftereffects of the insurgency. Offering an in-depth analysis of how insurgency in the FATA began in 2004 after Pakistan entered its military forces into the tribal areas, the author illustrates that the insurgency erupted when state repression on masses is combined with a disruption of the previous modus vivendi centered on co-optation of local elites. In the following years, the insurgency became so powerful that most of the FATA region fell under the control of the insurgents. The book further argues that a weak counterinsurgency strategy by the Pakistani government characterised by the overzealous use of force and a failure to win the support of local communities led the insurgency to become stronger and expand its control. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that a more robust counterinsurgency strategy, relying more on a determined and a judicious use of force and attempts to gain the trust and support of local communities, adopted in the later years led to the collapse of the insurgency. In short, this book offers an explanation of what makes an insurgency more likely to occur and how insurgency escalates and declines. In addition, this book sheds light on recent development in FATA including the merger of FATA with the mainstream Pakistan, the rise of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, a non-violent protest movement, and the resurgence of the Pakistani Taliban especially after the Afghan Taliban capture of Kabul in the wake of US withdrawal of forces in Afghanistan. This book is a timely addition to the literature on South Asian Politics and Security Studies.

Pakistan is a frontline ally of the United States in the US war against terrorism in Afghanistan. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan was coerced by Washington to join the US effort to dismantle the Taliban-Al Qaeda terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is believed that Pakistan has employed a selective approach in the war against terrorism. It has targeted Al Qaeda and other militants but has remained reluctant to target the Afghan Taliban. The underlying reason for this inconsistent behaviour can be located in Pakistan's conflicting interests in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. By joining the war, Pakistan gained economic benefits, improved its international standing, and also denied India, an arch foe, an opportunity to use US engagement in the area against it. On the other hand, the removal of the Taliban regime after 9/11 deprived Pakistan of a pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan. Moreover, the emergence of an anti-Pakistan regime and the increasing involvement of India in Afghanistan added to Pakistan's insecurities and Islamabad felt encircled from both eastern and western fronts.Pakistan thus has been reluctant to fight against the Taliban.