When we say that sharing is morally good and that murdering is wicked, what are we doing? Are we picking out existing moral values? Can our judgements be correct and incorrect? How do moral values fit into the natural world? Do moral values even exist? How do our moral judgements relate to how we are motivated to act?
Metaethics is an argumentative textbook that considers these and other metaethical questions in a lively and clear manner. As well as discussing all of the main metaethical positions, a new idea - metaethical pluralism - is introduced.
Chapters cover central topics in the subject, including:

- Moral realism: initial thoughts
- Moral realism: naturalism and reductionism
- Moral error theory
- Noncognitivism
- Sensibility theory
- Moral motivation

Metaethics is aimed at upper-level undergraduates and postgraduates, but should appeal to anyone with an interest in the area.

For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral statements true. Even seemingly obvious moral claims, such as "killing innocents is morally wrong" fail to be true. What would lead someone to adopt such a radical viewpoint? Are the arguments in its favor defensible or plausible? What impact would embracing such a view have on one s practical life?

Taking as its point of departure the work of moral philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981), A World Without Values is a collection of essays on moral skepticism by leading contemporary philosophers, some of whom are sympathetic to Mackie s views, some of whom are opposed. Rather than treating moral skepticism as something to dismiss as quickly as possible, this anthology is a comprehensive exploration of the topic, and as such will be a valuable resource for students of moral philosophy at all levels, as well as professionals in the field of meta-ethics. A World Without Values presents state-of-the-art arguments that advance the ongoing philosophical debate on several fronts, and will enjoy an important place on any meta-ethicist s bookshelf for some years to come."

Arguing about Metaethics collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics:

Do moral properties exist?

If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it?

If they dona (TM)t exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language?

What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation?

As well as these questions, this volume discusses a wide range of issues including moral objectivity, truth and moral judgements, moral psychology, thick evaluative concepts and moral relativism.

The editors provide lucid introductions to each of the eleven themed sections in which they show how the debate lies and outline the arguments of the papers. Arguing about Metaethics is an ideal resource text for students at upper undergraduate or postgraduate level.

Contents:
Notes on contributors Preface Acknowledgements List of Tables and Illustrations
Part I: Introduction and Contexts Cyberspace, Digital Media and the Internet 2 Mapping Cyberspace 3 ICT, Telecommunications and Cyberspace Part II: Using Cyberspace 4 Using the Internet 5 Cyberspace Technologies 6 Webcasting and Digital Broadcasting 7 Games and Entertainment Part III: Reading/Writing Cyberspace 8 Sources, Resources and Research 9 Online News and Journalism 10 E-Zines 11 Online Writing 12 Web Design Part IV: Regulations, Institutions and Ethics 13 Regulation and Cybercrime 14 Cyberspace and the Public Sphere 15 Ethics in Cyberspace
Glossary Web resources Bibliography Index

Derek Parfit was one of the world's leading philosophers. His On What Matters was the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy for many years. Reading Parfit: On What Matters is an essential overview and assessment of volumes 1 and 2 of Parfit's monumental work by a team of international contributors, and includes responses by Parfit himself. It discusses central features of Parfit's book, including the structure and nature of reasons; the ideas underlying moral principles; Parfit's discussions of consequentialism, contractualism and Kantian deontology; and his metaethical ideas and arguments. Reading Parfit will be central reading for students of ethics and anyone seeking a deeper understanding of one of the most important works of philosophy published in the last fifty years.

Arguing about Metaethics collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics:

Do moral properties exist?

If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it?

If they dona (TM)t exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language?

What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation?

As well as these questions, this volume discusses a wide range of issues including moral objectivity, truth and moral judgements, moral psychology, thick evaluative concepts and moral relativism.

The editors provide lucid introductions to each of the eleven themed sections in which they show how the debate lies and outline the arguments of the papers. Arguing about Metaethics is an ideal resource text for students at upper undergraduate or postgraduate level.

Contents:
Notes on contributors Preface Acknowledgements List of Tables and Illustrations
Part I: Introduction and Contexts Cyberspace, Digital Media and the Internet 2 Mapping Cyberspace 3 ICT, Telecommunications and Cyberspace Part II: Using Cyberspace 4 Using the Internet 5 Cyberspace Technologies 6 Webcasting and Digital Broadcasting 7 Games and Entertainment Part III: Reading/Writing Cyberspace 8 Sources, Resources and Research 9 Online News and Journalism 10 E-Zines 11 Online Writing 12 Web Design Part IV: Regulations, Institutions and Ethics 13 Regulation and Cybercrime 14 Cyberspace and the Public Sphere 15 Ethics in Cyberspace
Glossary Web resources Bibliography Index

Metaethics is an engaging and argumentative textbook introducing advanced students to the cutting edge of the debate in one of the most exciting areas of contemporary philosophy. Kirchin covers key topics, including varieties of moral realism, error theory, noncognitivism, and a brand new position; metaethical pluralism.

For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral statements true. Even seemingly obvious moral claims, such as "killing innocents is morally wrong" fail to be true. What would lead someone to adopt such a radical viewpoint? Are the arguments in its favor defensible or plausible? What impact would embracing such a view have on one s practical life?

Taking as its point of departure the work of moral philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981), A World Without Values is a collection of essays on moral skepticism by leading contemporary philosophers, some of whom are sympathetic to Mackie s views, some of whom are opposed. Rather than treating moral skepticism as something to dismiss as quickly as possible, this anthology is a comprehensive exploration of the topic, and as such will be a valuable resource for students of moral philosophy at all levels, as well as professionals in the field of meta-ethics. A World Without Values presents state-of-the-art arguments that advance the ongoing philosophical debate on several fronts, and will enjoy an important place on any meta-ethicist s bookshelf for some years to come."

Derek Parfit was one of the world's leading philosophers. His On What Matters was the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy for many years. Reading Parfit: On What Matters is an essential overview and assessment of volumes 1 and 2 of Parfit's monumental work by a team of international contributors, and includes responses by Parfit himself. It discusses central features of Parfit's book, including the structure and nature of reasons; the ideas underlying moral principles; Parfit's discussions of consequentialism, contractualism and Kantian deontology; and his metaethical ideas and arguments. Reading Parfit will be central reading for students of ethics and anyone seeking a deeper understanding of one of the most important works of philosophy published in the last fifty years.

What is the difference between judging someone to be good and judging them to be kind? Both judgements are typically positive, but the latter seems to offer more description of the person: we get a more specific sense of what they are like. Very general evaluative concepts (such as good, bad, right and wrong) are referred to as thin concepts, whilst more specific ones (including brave, rude, gracious, wicked, sympathetic, and mean) are termed thick concepts. In this volume, an international team of experts addresses the questions that this distinction opens up. How do the descriptive and evaluative functions or elements of thick concepts combine with each other? Are these functions or elements separable in the first place? Is there a sharp division between thin and thick concepts? Can we mark interesting further distinctions between how thick ethical concepts work and how other thick concepts work, such as those found in aesthetics and epistemology? How, if at all, are thick concepts related to reasons and action? These questions, and others, touch on some of the deepest philosophical issues about the evaluative and normative. They force us to think hard about the place of the evaluative in a (seemingly) nonevaluative world, and raise fascinating issues about how language works.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. We use evaluative terms and concepts every day. We call actions right and wrong, teachers wise and ignorant, and pictures elegant and grotesque. Philosophers place evaluative concepts into two camps. Thin concepts, such as goodness and badness, and rightness and wrongness have evaluative content, but they supposedly have no or hardly any nonevaluative, descriptive content: they supposedly give little or no specific idea about the character of the person or thing described. In contrast, thick concepts such as kindness, elegance and wisdom supposedly give a more specific idea of people or things. Yet, given typical linguistic conventions, thick concepts also convey evaluation. Kind people are often viewed positively whilst ignorance has negative connotations. The distinction between thin and thick concepts is frequently drawn in philosophy and is central to everyday life. However, very few articles or books discuss the distinction. In this full-length study, Simon Kirchin discusses thin and thick concepts, highlighting key assumptions, questions and arguments, many of which have gone unnoticed. Kirchin focuses in on the debate between 'separationists' (those who think that thick concepts can be separated into component parts of evaluative, often very 'thin', content and nonevaluative content) and 'nonseparationists' (who deny this). Thick Evaluation argues for a version of nonseparationism, and in doing so argues both that many concepts are evaluative and also that evaluation is not exhausted by thin positive and negative stances.