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Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of
Mind delves into the relationship between the current analytical
debates on consciousness and the debates that took place within
continental philosophy in the twentieth century and in particular
around the time of Sartre and within his seminal works. Examining
the return of the problem of subjectivity in philosophy of mind and
the idea that phenomenal consciousness could not be reduced to
functional or cognitive properties, this volume includes twenty-two
unique contributions from leading scholars in the field. Asking
questions such as: Why we should think that self-consciousness is
non-reflective? Is subjectivity first-personal? Does consciousness
necessitate self-awareness? Do we need pre-reflective
self-consciousness? Are ego-disorders in psychosis a dysfunction of
pre-reflective self-awareness? How does the Cartesian duality
between body and mind fit into Sartre's conceptions of
consciousness?
"A remarkable book capable of reshaping what one takes philosophy
to be." -Cora Diamond, Kenan Professor of Philosophy Emerita,
University of Virginia Could there be a logical alien-a being whose
ways of talking, inferring, and contradicting exhibit an entirely
different logical shape than ours, yet who nonetheless is thinking?
Could someone, contrary to the most basic rules of logic, think
that two contradictory statements are both true at the same time?
Such questions may seem outlandish, but they serve to highlight a
fundamental philosophical question: is our logical form of thought
merely one among many, or must it be the form of thought as such?
From Descartes and Kant to Frege and Wittgenstein, philosophers
have wrestled with variants of this question, and with a range of
competing answers. A seminal 1991 paper, James Conant's "The Search
for Logically Alien Thought," placed that question at the forefront
of contemporary philosophical inquiry. The Logical Alien, edited by
Sofia Miguens, gathers Conant's original article with reflections
on it by eight distinguished philosophers-Jocelyn Benoist, Matthew
Boyle, Martin Gustafsson, Arata Hamawaki, Adrian Moore, Barry
Stroud, Peter Sullivan, and Charles Travis. Conant follows with a
wide-ranging response that places the philosophical discussion in
historical context, critiques his original paper, addresses the
exegetical and systematic issues raised by others, and presents an
alternative account. The Logical Alien challenges contemporary
conceptions of how logical and philosophical form must each relate
to their content. This monumental volume offers the possibility of
a new direction in philosophy.
Issues of subjectivity and consciousness are dealt with in very
different ways in the analytic tradition and in the
idealistic-phenomenological tradition central to continental
philosophy. This book brings together analytically inspired
philosophers working on the continent with English-speaking
philosophers to address specific issues regarding subjectivity and
consciousness. The issues range from acquaintance and immediacy in
perception and apperception, to the role of agency in bodily
'mine-ness', to self-determination (Selbstbestimmung) through
(free) action. Thus involving philosophers of different traditions
should yield a deeper vision of consciousness and subjectivity; one
relating the mind not only to nature, or to first-person authority
in linguistic creatures-questions which, in the analytic tradition,
are sometimes treated as exhausting the topic-but also to many
other aspects of mind's understanding of itself in ways which
disrupt classic inner/outer boundaries.
Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of
Mind delves into the relationship between the current analytical
debates on consciousness and the debates that took place within
continental philosophy in the twentieth century and in particular
around the time of Sartre and within his seminal works. Examining
the return of the problem of subjectivity in philosophy of mind and
the idea that phenomenal consciousness could not be reduced to
functional or cognitive properties, this volume includes twenty-two
unique contributions from leading scholars in the field. Asking
questions such as: Why we should think that self-consciousness is
non-reflective? Is subjectivity first-personal? Does consciousness
necessitate self-awareness? Do we need pre-reflective
self-consciousness? Are ego-disorders in psychosis a dysfunction of
pre-reflective self-awareness? How does the Cartesian duality
between body and mind fit into Sartre's conceptions of
consciousness?
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