Radbruchs Rechtsdenken markiert heute wieder einen Schwerpunkt der rechtsphilosophischen Diskussion. Seine Aktualität beruht auf zwei scheinbar gegenläufigen Entwicklungen in der neueren Rechtsphilosophie: Zum einen der Wiedergewinnung der materialen Dimension des Rechtsdiskurses - im Anschluss an eine analytische, auf Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie fokussierte Phase. Zum anderen der Verfestigung der Einsicht, dass eine Rückkehr zu einem ontologisch verstandenen Naturrecht erkenntnistheoretisch unhaltbar wäre. In seinen Beiträgen versucht Ulfrid Neumann zu zeigen, dass es Radbruch gelingt, Erkenntniskritik und Wertorientierung in Einklang zu bringen - durch ein neukantianisch geprägtes Verständnis der Wertorientierung des Rechts sowie durch die Gegenüberstellung von theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie. In keiner Phase seines Rechtsdenkens lässt sich Radbruch schlicht einer rechtspositivistischen oder naturrechtlichen Position zuordnen.

Eugenio Bulygin is a distinguished representative of legal science and legal philosophy as they are known on the European continent - no accident, given the role of the civil law tradition in his home country, Argentina. Over the past half-century, Bulygin has engaged virtually all major legal philosophers in the English-speaking countries, including H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and Joseph Raz. Bulygin's essays, several written together with his eminent colleague and close friend Carlos E. Alchourron, reflect the genre familiar from Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, and Georg Henrik von Wright's Norm and Action. Bulygin's wide-ranging interests include most of the topics found under the rubric of analytical jurisprudence - interpretation and judicial reasoning, validity and efficacy of law, legal positivism and the problem of normativity, completeness and consistency of the legal system, the nature of legal norms, and the role of deontic logic in the law. The reader will take delight in the often agreeably unorthodox character of Bulygin's views and in his hard-hitting arguments in defence of them. He challenges the received opinion on gaps in the law, on legal efficacy, on permissory norms, and on the criteria for legal validity. Bulygin's essays have been wellnigh inaccessible in the past, appearing in specialized journals, often in Spanish or German. They are now available for the first time in an English-language collection.

Hans Kelsen's efforts in the areas of legal philosophy and legal theory are considered by many scholars of law to be the most influential thinking of this century. This volume makes available some of the best work extant on Kelsen's theory, including papers newly translated into English. The book covers such topics as competing philosophical positions on the nature of law, legal validity, legal powers, and the unity of municipal and international law. It also throws much light on Kelsen's intellectual milieu--as well as his intellectual debts.

A self-contained treatise, by one of the leading European legal philosophers of this century, on such topics as the legal norm, law and morality, the concept of the legal person, the legal system, legal interpretation, the identity of the law and state, and the theory of international law.

The volume brings together a collection of original papers on some of the main tenets of Joseph Raz's legal and political philosophy: Legal positivism and the nature of law, practical reason, authority, the value of equality, incommensurability, harm, group rights, and multiculturalism.

At the heart of this book is the age-old question of how law and morality are related. The legal positivist, insisting on the separation of the two, explicates the concept of law independently of morality. The author challenges this view, arguing that there are, first, conceptually necessary connections between law and morality and, second, normative reasons for including moral elements in the concept of law. While the conceptual argument alone is too limited to establish a sufficiently strong connection between law and morality, and the normative argument alone fails to address the nature of law, the two arguments together support a nonpositivistic concept of law, toppling legal positivism qua comprehensive theory of law.