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Bringing together world-class scholars who have devoted themselves
to the study of legal obligation, this book addresses key
dimensions of the current debate: providing novel insights and
perspectives, as well as critically discussing the leading theories
of legal obligation. The notion of legal obligation is widely
regarded as fundamental by both legal practitioners and legal
theorists. For the language that explicitly refers to obligation is
pervasive insofar as paradigmatic legal materials make reference to
obligation either directly, by specifying what a subject is
obligated to do, or indirectly, by attributing rights, privileges,
powers, permissions, and other normative statuses to both single
individuals and groups. There is, then, broad agreement that
obligation constitutes a central element in legal studies. At the
same time, however, there is considerable disagreement among
contemporary legal theorists about how legal obligation can or
should be elucidated. This book accounts for both the significance
of obligation in law and the variety of views of legal obligation
championed in legal philosophy today. With contributions from
renowned theorists, this book will be invaluable for scholars and
students of legal theory, legal philosophy, and jurisprudence.
Bringing together world-class scholars who have devoted themselves
to the study of legal obligation, this book addresses key
dimensions of the current debate: providing novel insights and
perspectives, as well as critically discussing the leading theories
of legal obligation. The notion of legal obligation is widely
regarded as fundamental by both legal practitioners and legal
theorists. For the language that explicitly refers to obligation is
pervasive insofar as paradigmatic legal materials make reference to
obligation either directly, by specifying what a subject is
obligated to do, or indirectly, by attributing rights, privileges,
powers, permissions, and other normative statuses to both single
individuals and groups. There is, then, broad agreement that
obligation constitutes a central element in legal studies. At the
same time, however, there is considerable disagreement among
contemporary legal theorists about how legal obligation can or
should be elucidated. This book accounts for both the significance
of obligation in law and the variety of views of legal obligation
championed in legal philosophy today. With contributions from
renowned theorists, this book will be invaluable for scholars and
students of legal theory, legal philosophy, and jurisprudence.
This book focuses on a specific component of the normative
dimension of law, namely, law's normative claim. By 'normative
claim, ' meaning the claim that, inherent in the law, is an ability
to guide action by generating practical reasons having a special
status. The thesis that law lays the normative claim has become a
subject of controversy. It has its defenders, as well as many
scholars of different orientations who have acknowledged the
normative claim of law without making a point of defending it
head-on. It has also come under attack from other contemporary
legal theorists and a lively debate has sprung up. This debate
makes up the main subject of this book, which is in essence an
attempt to account for the normative claim and see how its
recognition molds our understanding of the law itself. This
involves: (a) specifying the exact content, boundaries, quality,
and essential traits of the normative claim, (b) explaining how law
can make a claim so specified, and (c) justifying why this should
happen in the first place. The argument is set out in two stages,
corresponding to the two parts in which the book is divided. In the
first part, the author introduces and discusses the meaning,
status, and fundamental traits of law's normative claim. In the
second section, he explores some foundational questions and
determines the grounds of law's normative claim by framing an
account that elaborates on some contemporary discussions of Kant's
conception of humanity as the source of the normativity of
practical reason. This is the first book in Hart Publishing,
Oxford's new series Law and Practical Reason, which addresses
fundamental issues in legal philosophy. The series will be of
interest to students and scholars in moral, political, and legal
philosophy
The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of
legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its
own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses
the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively
conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he
defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment
of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential
in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such
critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and
unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is
characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for
carrying out certain courses of conduct.
H.L.A. Hart once argued that a theory suppressing the normative
component of law "fails to mark and explain the crucial distinction
between mere regularities of human behavior and rule-governed
behavior." This is a serious drawback for a theory of law, since an
important part of the legal domain is concerned with rule-governed
conduct and may be expressed only by use of such notions as norm,
obligation, duty, and right. These notions require us to
acknowledge the existence of a normative dimension in the legal
domain. This collection of essays contributes to the study of
normativity in law by staging a thorough discussion of the notion,
approached from three directions: the theory of planning agency,
legal conventionalism, and the constitutivist approach. Though not
offering an exhaustive picture of the current debate on the
normativity of law, the book is meant rather to provide the reader
with some authoritative statements of some widely-discussed
families of views of legal normativity. Thus, the volume encourages
a dialogue between different traditions of study and stimulates
those who would not otherwise look outside their tradition of
thought to engage with new ideas. The underlying idea of the
collection is that no general theory of normativity can be put
forward unless it addresses distinct - albeit interrelated -
disciplines, such as the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, theory of
action, meta-ethics, social philosophy, political theory, ethical
theory, and jurisprudence. (Series: Law and Practical Reason)
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