Oil and the Kurdish Question critiques the conventional narrative of the Iran-Iraq War and the associated Anfal campaign. This narrative claims that in the last two years (1987-88) of the Iran-Iraq War the Ba'thists dominated the fighting using gas attacks. According to this narrative, the Ba'thists also used gas in a fearsome campaign of extermination against the Kurds of northern Iraq. This book argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Iraqis trained hard to turn the tables on Iran in the last months of the war and won by superior generalship without the use of gas. Further, it was only when the Iranians conceded defeat that the Iraqi army went north and-in the space of nine days, using conventional arms-suppressed pockets of Kurdish insurgent unrest. The book also examines how publicists exploited the myth of the Kurdish holocaust as justification for America to declare war on Iraq. It exposes a scheme laid out before the war that aimed to defeat Iraq, deconstruct it, and create an autonomous Kurdish Regional Government which would then let lucrative oil concessions to interests mainly in the west. The intrigue accomplished two things: it subverted Iraq's oil nationalization law which forbade granting concessions to foreigners, and it ended Iraq's existence as a sovereign nation-state.

More and more Arab societies are being buffeted by economic forces their rulers cannot control. Until recently the Arab populations largely have submitted to these economic stresses. Lately, however, they have become more active in protest. This study argues that in a large measure the increased activism is due to the appearance of radical religious groups that have exploited the popular discontent, focusing in particular on the youth. Unable to find jobs, young people lack hope. Even the prospect of a fulfilling family life is remote as long as they are unemployed. Hamas and Hizbollah are the two most famous of the religious groups - Hamas operating in the Israeli occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank; Hizbollah, in southern Lebanon. Recent publicity has spotlighted Hamas because of terrorist attacks it has perpetrated inside Israel. But, as the study argues, both Hamas and Hizbollah are significant far beyond any isolated kidnappings or terrorist bombings. They are part of a movement that is attempting to radicalize the whole Arab world. This study seeks to alert U. S. policymakers and military leaders to the larger potential danger posed by the groups. The U. S. military, in particular, should take heed, the study finds, because of a recent proposal to station U. S. forces in the very center of the radicals' area of operation. William W. Allen Colonel, U. S. Army Acting Director, Strategic Studies Institute

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 3-203, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War, Vol. I, provides useful information to the reader about the Iran-Iraq War, particularly the lessons that can be drawn from it. This manual starts with an overview of the Iran-Iraq War. It also discusses the strategy followed by both sides and the tactics which evolved as the war unfolded.

According to the Bush administration, the war in Iraq ended in May 2003, when the president pronounced mission accomplished from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln. Yet, fighting, resistance, and American casualties continue. Stephen Pelletiere argues that it is Iraqi suspicion of the Americans' motives--the belief that the United States is out to tear the state apart--that is fueling the current rebellion. Resistance in Iraq has become a national struggle, tied to the mood of Iraqis generally, as well as to anger fed by experiences of the whole people over the course of the last quarter century. Americans see Iraq as a failed state because they lack knowledge of those experiences and of Iraqi history. That is what Pelletiere has set out to remedy. Chief among his analyses is a brief history of the Iraqi army, focussing on the period of the 1980s and the Iran-Iraq War. The war transformed the army, a change which largely escaped the notice of the United States. Pelletiere also discusses American intelligence about Iraq on the eve of the war, characterizing it as delusory and showing that, even after the invasion, intelligence did not improve. This has led to the deterioration of relations with the Iraqis and precipitated the current revolt. Finally, he discusses the clash between the so-called expatriates and native Iraqis and the part the Islamic Republic is playing under the occupation. Perhaps more critically, Pelletiere relates American behavior in Iraq to the wider sphere of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf specifically and the Middle East overall. In doing so, he positions the war as part of a larger geo-political struggle that encompasses not just the Iraqis or the Iranians, but the Israelis and all of the other client states of the United States in the Middle East.

Ten years after the end of the Gulf War, the conflict continues with unresolved questions about economic sanctions and IraQ's participation in the oil export system. A specialist in Middle Eastern politics and an intelligence officer, Pelletiere covered the Iran-Iraq War as well as the subsequent Gulf conflict. He argues that IraQ's victory over Iran in 1988 gave the nation the capability of becoming a regional superpower with a strong say in how the Gulf's oil reserves were managed. Because the United States could not tolerate an ultranationalist state with the potential to destabilize the world's economy, war then became inevitable.

This study examines the rise of the international oil system from the 1920s when the great cartel was formed. Comprised of seven companies, it was designed to ensure their continued control over the world's oil supplies. When the companies lost control with the OPEC revolution in 1973, the United States moved into the realm of Gulf politics with the goal of protecting the world economy. Pelletire details how Saddam Hussein unwillingly precipitated the Gulf crisis and why the conflict is not likely to be resolved soon-or peacefully.