This study investigates the likelihood of heavy forces being able to conduct dominant maneuver in the twenty-first century. The concept is based upon Army Vision 2010 and establishes the relevance of indirect maneuver to help identify issues facing the U.S. Army today. The current heavy armored force relies predominately upon the direct maneuver approach. At issue is the appropriateness of future maneuver forces being developed based upon this force and a direct maneuver model. A thorough review of maneuver literature reveals that forces relying on the direct maneuver approach often fail when encountered by forces employing indirect maneuver. A hypothesis is developed predicting that heavy forces are insufficient to conduct future dominant maneuver. Three historical case studies are used to test the hypothesis. The analysis confirms that mobility, speed differential, and deployability are trends of success. Absent these, even technology and firepower are insufficient to generate success. A discussion of the implications and an air maneuver alternative is offered, as are suggestions for additional research. The study promotes the development of future forces based upon maneuver principles, and provides an alternative force that theoretically would meet the requirements of future dominant maneuver.