The current struggles over nationality policy in Russia and in neighboring states are rooted in the history of the Narkomnats and in policies that Stalin established as Commissar. This history, based in large part on primary research, describes the Commissariat of Nationalities from 1917 to 1924, Stalin's role as its chief, and the policies that were the origins of the current ethnic dilemmas throughout the now collapsed Soviet Empire. This rich history is intended for scholars, students, and policymakers in European history and Slavic studies, and for general readers interested in the background of political and social conflicts in the former Soviet republics today.

What are the key factors that will shape the post-Soviet military system? Leading experts assess the geostrategic context in which leaders must operate, the nature of future war, foundations of military power, dilemmas confronting a multinational military force, problems in managing a nuclear arsenal, civil-military relations, economic priorities and problems, and ethnic questions. This current evaluation of how war and the Soviet Union are being transformed is an invaluable study for students and experts in military studies, political science, and the social sciences generally. In this collection of important perspectives, Soviet military elites and influential civilian policymakers discussed what previous and present developments will require in the future. This collaborative effort examines what Moscow sees as important requirements. The study analyzes Soviet forecasting methodologies, naval developments, views about theater warfare in Europe, developments in C3I, the role of space, the Soviet military economy, mobilization regimes, Soviet views on American military thought, perspectives on the initial period of warfare and changes in operational arts. Chapter endnotes and reference lists point to major sources of Soviet scholarship.

Taking on Tehran, provides concrete solutions to the emerging Iranian global threat. The aggressive policy recommendations call for a multidimensional confrontation and containment of Iran with a proactive move toward regime change. The book offers practical, achievable guidance to policy makers and unique insight for students into how foreign policy is really made. This book is published in cooperation with the American Foreign Policy Council.

While the Cold War is long past, the importance of arms control in Russo-American relations and the related issue of nuclear weapons for Russia remain vital concerns. Indeed, without an appreciation of the multiple dimensions of the latter, progress in the former domain is inconceivable. With this in mind, following essays explore many, if not all, of the issues connected with Russia's relatively greater reliance on nuclear weapons for its security. As such, they constitute an important contribution to the analysis of the Obama administration's reset policy, Russo-American relations, Russian foreign and defense policy, and international security in both Europe and Asia. Additionally, questions concerning the approach taken by other nuclear power nations in reference to the arms control agenda provide a crucial backdrop for the progress toward curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a long-standing central goal of U.S. security policy.

The following three papers comprise one of the panels from a conference on U.S.-Russia relations that SSI co-sponsored with the Carnegie Council at Pocantico, NY, from June 1-3, 2011: Carnegie Council's Program on "U.S. Global Engagement: A Two-Year Retrospective." The papers offer three contrasting looks at one of the major issues in today's arms control agenda, namely the future of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The three papers were written by leading experts in the field from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia and provide a revealing glimpse into the very different assessments that are being made by those three governments and the difficult issues involved in attempting to regenerate the process that led to the original treaty in 1990. These three chapters also implicitly contribute to a better understanding of the intractabilities facing the major players in any effort to advance not only arms control but also European stability.

The three papers presented here are by well-known experts and were delivered at SSI's third annual conference on Russia that took place at Carlisle, PA, on September 26-27, 2011. This conference, like its predecessors, had as its goal the assemblage of Russian, European, and American experts to engage in a regular, open, and candid dialogue on critical issues in contemporary security.

These three chapters originated in an SSI conference in January 2010 and go to the heart of a question of vital significance for both Asia and Russia, namely what are Russia's prospects in Asia. The three chapters outline the challenges Russia faces in Asia, the nature of the dynamic and complex Asian security environment, and the extent to which Russia is or is not meeting those challenges. These chapters represent both Russian and U.S. views and clearly do not agree in their conclusions or analyses. For this reason, they are all the more interesting. These chapters should provoke debate, reflection, and greater awareness as to the complexities of the current international scene in Asia and of Russia's success or lack thereof in participating in that environment. In view of the extraordinary dynamism that now characterizes Asia and the fact that it is the center of the world economy, the analysis provided here goes beyond obvious issues to address questions that we believe are unjustly neglected, e.g., Russia's prospects as an Asian power and as an independent great power player in Asia. The answers to these questions are urgent for Russians, but very consequential for the U.S. because getting Asia right will be among the most critical challenges to U.S. policymakers in the coming years.

Given the stakes involved in achieving a correct understanding of Russian and Chinese defense policies and military developments, the magnitude of Mary Fitzgerald's enlightening accomplishments in this regard becomes clear. However, the problems that we have outlined in this volume were not unfamiliar to students of the Soviet Union. Indeed, they are enduring strategic issues for Russian policymakers as well as those who analyze or contribute to foreign policies toward the Russian military, despite the magnitude of the tremendous changes that have occurred since 1989 when the Soviet empire began to collapse. Even more importantly, Mary and her colleagues recognized that the issues outlined here are not just tasks relevant for the general study of Russia, but by addressing these strategic issues, and their underlying implications, policymakers will engage in the essential tasks necessary for the creation of an enduring structure of peace.

These papers represent the first in a series of papers taken from the Strategic Studies Institute's (SSI) fourth annual Russia conference that took place at SSI's headquarters in Carlisle, PA, on September 26-27, 2011. As such, they also are part of our on-going effort to make sense of and clarify developments in Russia. The three papers presented here offer attempts to characterize first of all, the nature of the state; second, the prospects for economic reform within that state-perhaps the most pressing domestic issue and one with considerable spillover into defense and security agendas as well-in contemporary Russia; and third, the nature and lasting effects of the defense reform that began in 2008. The papers are forthright and pull no punches, though we certainly do not claim that they provide the last or definitive word on these subjects.

The best recent scholarship on Russian civil-military relations explicitly addresses this issue's importance for both domestic and external security. An inquiry into the present state of those relations under conditions of defense reform and the current international situation is of immense analytical and policy relevance for both domestic and external security in Russia. While the Russian regime is serious about military reform, it is encountering severe objections from the uniformed military, and the military has successfully persuaded the government to accept its expansive concept of the threats to Russia, i.e., its threat assessment. Therefore, we must closely follow those developments to understand more clearly current tendencies in Russian politics and policy as a whole. Specifically, this chapter examines issues pertaining to civil-military relations in several areas of Russian national security policies that suggest some disturbing trends for the future.

These three papers represent the third monograph to come out of the SSI-U.S. State Department conference "Contemporary issues in International Security," that took place at the Finnish Embassy in Washington, DC, on January 25-26, 2010. This monograph consists of three deeply probing essays into the genesis of Russia's 2010 defense doctrine, the political struggle behind it, and the actual content of the doctrine. They reveal a highly politicized minefield of struggle comprising leading actors in the military, the government, and in Russian security policy as a whole. They duly illuminate the ongoing struggles between and among these sets of military and civilian elites and therefore cast a shining light on critical aspects of Russian policy that all too often are left in darkness. They are essential to any understanding of Russian defense and security policy as well as the nature of the relationship between the Russian military and the government and the way in which these actors formulate key policy statements and resolve pressing political issues.

The essays gathered here represent a panel at SSI's annual Russia conference in 2011. They focus on the analysis of Russian foreign policy both on its material side or actual conduct as well as on the cognitive bases of Russian thinking about international affairs and Russian national security. They span much of the gamut of that foreign policy and also show its strong linkages to the Russian historical tradition and to the imperatives of Russian domestic development.

The papers collected here represent the Strategic Studies Institute's (SSI) continuing activity to foster dialogue on topical issues in international security among experts from the United States and abroad. These papers are taken from the conference that SSI conducted on January 25-26, 2010, entitled, "Contemporary Issues in International Security," at the Finnish embassy in Washington, DC. This was the second conference that SSI organized, bringing together U.S., Russian, and European experts to discuss important questions in contemporary world affairs. This particular collection is devoted to the question of civil-military relations in Russia, a topic of profound significance for both domestic and foreign policies in Russia.

President Sapirmurat Niyazov, the all-powerful leader of Turkmenistan, suddenly died on December 21, 2006. Because Central Asia is a cockpit of great power rivalry and a potential theater in the Global War on Terrorism, no sooner had Niyazov died than the great powers were all in Turkmenistan seeking to influence its future policies away from the neutrality that had been Niyazov's policy. Turkmenistan's importance lies almost exclusively in its large natural gas holdings and proximity to the Caspian Sea and Iran. Because energy is regarded as a strategic asset as much if not more than as a mere lubricant or commodity, Russia, Iran, China, and the United States have all been visibly engaged in competition for influence there. The outcome of this competition and of the domestic struggle for power will have repercussions throughout Central Asia, if not beyond. The author shows the linkage between energy and security policies in Central Asia and in the policies of the major powers towards Central Asia. Beyond this analysis, he provides recommendations for U.S. policymakers as to how they should conduct themselves in this complex situation.

The Arctic has returned with a vengeance as an area of international contention. Beginning in 2007, Russia has continued to make aggressive moves and claims regarding territory in the Arctic Ocean. These moves undoubtedly have been prompted by global climate change and the importance of energy, with which Russia believes the Arctic is lavishly supplied. These moves apparently were intended to compel other Arctic states, like Norway, to come to terms with Russia. Nonetheless, the tendency to invoke military and security issues and instruments in this region of the world continues apace. These essays, taken from SSI's 2010 conference on Russia, fully explore the Russian and international competition for influence and rights over the exploration and commercial exploitation of the Arctic.

In one way or another, the papers included in this monograph, from the Strategic Studies Institute's annual conference on Russia in May 2012, all point to the internal pathologies that render Russian security a precarious affair at the best of times. As the editor suggests, the very fact of this precariousness makes Russia an inherently unpredictable and even potentially dangerous actor, not necessarily because it will actively attack its neighbors, though we certainly cannot exclude that possibility, but rather because Russia may come apart trying to play the role of a great power in Eurasia or elsewhere. As we all know, that outcome happened in 1917 and in 1989-91, with profound implications for international security and U.S. interests.

As NATO and the United States proceed to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, the inherent and preexisting geopolitical, security, and strategic challenges in Central Asia become ever more apparent. The rivalry among the great powers: the United States, China, Russia, India, and others to a lesser degree, are all becoming increasingly more visible as a key factor that will shape this region after the allied withdrawal from Afghanistan. The papers collected here, presented at SSI's annual conference on Russia in 2012, go far to explaining what the agenda for that rivalry is and how it is likely to influence regional trends after 2013. Therefore, these papers provide a vital set of insights into an increasingly critical area of international politics and security, especially as it is clear that the United States is reducing, but not totally withdrawing, its military establishment in Afghanistan and is seeking to consolidate long-term relationships with Central Asian states. Accordingly, these papers provide assessments of Sino-Russian rivalry, the U.S.-Russian rivalry, and a neglected but critical topic-Chinese military capability for action in Central Asia. All of these issues are essential for any informed analysis of the future of Central Asian security, as well as relations among the great powers in Central Asia.

Given the stakes involved in achieving a correct understanding of Russian and Chinese defense policies and military developments, the magnitude of Mary Fitzgerald's enlightening accomplishments in this regard becomes clear. However, the problems that we have outlined in this volume were not unfamiliar to students of the Soviet Union. Indeed, they are enduring strategic issues for Russian policymakers as well as those who analyze or contribute to foreign policies toward the Russian military, despite the magnitude of the tremendous changes that have occurred since 1989 when the Soviet empire began to collapse. Even more importantly, Mary and her colleagues recognized that the issues outlined here are not just tasks relevant for the general study of Russia, but by addressing these strategic issues, and their underlying implications, policymakers will engage in the essential tasks necessary for the creation of an enduring structure of peace. Mary Fitzgerald made many contributions to the national security field over the course of the years through her close reading of the writings of Soviet and Russian military officers. Particularly useful was her focus on those of Soviet military theorists who put forward forecasts of future warfare and the impact of technology on warfare. These Russian reviews deserved respect and study; Mary's work made this possible. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became easier to meet with and talk with a number of these Soviet officers so as to explore more fully their thinking and the continuing development of their ideas about future warfare, and the likely direction of the military revolution they had begun writing about in the late 1970s. Organizing meetings with them was greatly aided by Mary because of the good relations she had developed with several of these officers, who liked her as a person and were flattered that she had been so careful a reader of their writings. Strategic Studies Institute.