Elgar Advanced Introductions are stimulating and thoughtful introductions to major fields in the social sciences, business and law, expertly written by the world’s leading scholars. Designed to be accessible yet rigorous, they offer concise and lucid surveys of the substantive and policy issues associated with discrete subject areas. This Advanced Introduction to Substantive Criminal Law explores the doctrines, issues and controversies in the substantive field of criminal law. Chapters cover important theoretical and doctrinal topics, including the justifications for state blame and punishment, the foundations for criminalization, the prima facie case, affirmative defences of justification and excuse, and sentencing. Stephen J. Morse uses copious concrete examples drawn from cases, statutes and extended case studies, including the intricate grading of homicide, to enliven the discussion. Key Features: Concise and accessible format Theoretical explication of doctrinal intricacies Informative coverage and real world examples of criminal law Discussion of the challenges and responsibilities surrounding legal concepts of the person Providing a compact and succinct introduction to the rich scholarship of the field, this Advanced Introduction will be an ideal read for lawyers and law students interested in criminal law and justice. It will also be a valuable resource for law enforcement personnel and anyone looking to understand the role of criminal law as a means to achieve justice and social safety.

Elgar Advanced Introductions are stimulating and thoughtful introductions to major fields in the social sciences, business and law, expertly written by the world’s leading scholars. Designed to be accessible yet rigorous, they offer concise and lucid surveys of the substantive and policy issues associated with discrete subject areas. This Advanced Introduction to Substantive Criminal Law explores the doctrines, issues and controversies in the substantive field of criminal law. Chapters cover important theoretical and doctrinal topics, including the justifications for state blame and punishment, the foundations for criminalization, the prima facie case, affirmative defences of justification and excuse, and sentencing. Stephen J. Morse uses copious concrete examples drawn from cases, statutes and extended case studies, including the intricate grading of homicide, to enliven the discussion. Key Features: Concise and accessible format Theoretical explication of doctrinal intricacies Informative coverage and real world examples of criminal law Discussion of the challenges and responsibilities surrounding legal concepts of the person Providing a compact and succinct introduction to the rich scholarship of the field, this Advanced Introduction will be an ideal read for lawyers and law students interested in criminal law and justice. It will also be a valuable resource for law enforcement personnel and anyone looking to understand the role of criminal law as a means to achieve justice and social safety.

Perhaps more than any other scholar, Michael Moore has argued that there are deep and necessary connections between metaphysics, morality, and law. Moore has developed every contour of a theory of criminal law, from philosophy of action to a theory of causation. Indeed, not only is he the central figure in retributive punishment but his moral realist position places him at the center of many jurisprudential debates. Comprised of essays by leading scholars, this volume discusses and challenges the work of Michael Moore from one or more of the areas where he has made a lasting contribution, namely, law, morality, metaphysics, psychiatry, and neuroscience. The volume begins with a riveting contribution by Heidi Hurd, wherein she takes an unadorned and unabashed look at the man behind this monumental body of work, full of both triumphs and sadness. A number of essays focus on Moore's view of the purpose and justification of the criminal law, specifically his endorsement of retributivism and legal moralism. The book then addresses Moore's work in the various aspects of the general part of the criminal law, including Moore's position on how to understand criminal acts for double jeopardy purposes, Moore's claim that accomplice liability is superfluous, and Moore's views about the culpability of negligence, as well as the relationship between that view and proximate causation. Furthermore, the subject of defenses in criminal law is addressed, including self-defense, and also the intersection of psychiatry, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and the criminal law. Also discussed are features of morality, and Moore's work in general jurisprudence. Finally, Moore concludes the volume with an essay that defends and delineates the features of his views.

This book presents a comprehensive overview of what the criminal law would look like if organized around the principle that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with, but no greater than, that which they deserve. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan argue that desert is a function of the actor s culpability, and that culpability is a function of the risks of harm to protected interests that the actor believes he is imposing and his reasons for acting in the face of those risks. The authors deny that resultant harms, as well as unperceived risks, affect the actor s desert. They thus reject punishment for inadvertent negligence as well as for intentions or preparatory acts that are not risky. Alexander and Ferzan discuss the reasons for imposing risks that negate or mitigate culpability, the individuation of crimes, and omissions. They conclude with a discussion of rules versus standards in criminal law and offer a description of the shape of criminal law in the event that the authors conceptualization is put into practice."

This book presents a comprehensive overview of what the criminal law would look like if organized around the principle that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with, but no greater than, that which they deserve. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan argue that desert is a function of the actor s culpability, and that culpability is a function of the risks of harm to protected interests that the actor believes he is imposing and his reasons for acting in the face of those risks. The authors deny that resultant harms, as well as unperceived risks, affect the actor s desert. They thus reject punishment for inadvertent negligence as well as for intentions or preparatory acts that are not risky. Alexander and Ferzan discuss the reasons for imposing risks that negate or mitigate culpability, the individuation of crimes, and omissions. They conclude with a discussion of rules versus standards in criminal law and offer a description of the shape of criminal law in the event that the authors conceptualization is put into practice.