This book traces the development and impact of regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa and addresses a timely question: do REC members, and the REC itself, positively influence member states’ behaviors towards other members and more broadly, regionally and continentally due to REC membership? ‘Changing member states’ behaviors’ is measured across three ‘interconnected, fundamental dimensions of societal-systems’ proposed by Marshall and Elzinga Marshall in CSP’s Global Repot 2017. These are i) the persistence of conflict or its counterpoint, achieving peace, ii) fostering democratization and better governance, and iii) achieving socio-economic development and (as proposed by this research, a fourth dimension), iv) being active participants in multilateralism? Is membership in a REC ultimately beneficial to the member and other countries in the region? While there are no clear and obvious – at least, discernible traditional – benefits such as increase in trade (perhaps because Africa’s overall trade relative to the world is about 3 percent), there are other non trade benefits (e.g., decrease in conflict, coercion to take certain actions towards peace and refrain from others, coups and wars) presenting in REC member states. These in/actions, abilities, coercions, exclusions and cooperation instances are outlined and discussed in the book.

This book explores foreign policy developments in post-colonial Africa. A continental foreign policy is a tenuous proposition, yet new African states emerged out of armed resistance and advocacy from regional allies such as the Bandung Conference and the League of Arab States. Ghana was the first Sub-Saharan African country to gain independence in 1957. Fourteen more countries gained independence in 1960 alone, and by May 1963, when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed, 30 countries were independent. An early OAU committee was the African Liberation Committee (ALC), tasked to work in the Frontline States (FLS) to support independence in Southern Africa. Pan-Africanists, in alliance with Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia groups, approached continental unity differently, and regionalism continued to be a major feature. Africa's challenges were often magnified by the capitalist-democratic versus communist-socialist bloc rivalry, but through Africa's use and leveraging of IGOs - the UN, UNDP, UNECA, GATT, NIEO and others - to advance development, the formation of the African Economic Community, OAU's evolution into the AU and other alliances belied collective actions, even as Africa implemented decisions that required cooperation: uti possidetis (maintaining colonial borders), containing secession, intra- and inter-state conflicts, rebellions and building RECs and a united Africa as envisioned by Pan Africanists worked better collectively.

This book addresses one main question: whether the United States has a cohesive foreign policy for Africa. In assessing the history of the United States and its interactions with the continent, particularly with the Horn of Africa, the author casts doubt on whether successive US administrations had a cohesive foreign policy for Africa. The volume examines the historical interactions between the US and the continent, evaluates the US involvement in Africa through foreign policy lenses, and compares foreign policy preferences and strategies of other European, EU and BRIC countries towards Africa.

For over 50 years, more than 225,000 Peace Corps volunteers have been placed in over 140 countries around the world, with the goals of helping the recipient countries need for trained men and women, to promote a better understanding of Americans for the foreign nationals, and to promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans. The Peace Corps program, proposed during a 2 a.m. campaign stop on October 14, 1960 by America's Camelot, was part idealism, part belief that the United States could help Global South countries becoming independent. At the height of the Cold War, the US and USSR were racing each other to the moon, missiles in Turkey and in Cuba and walls in Berlin consumed the archrivals; sending American graduates to remote villages seemed ill-informed. Kennedy's Kiddie Korps was derided as ineffectual, the volunteers accused of being CIA spies, and often, their work made no sense to locals. The program would fall victim to the vagaries of global geopolitics: in Peru, Yawar Malku (Blood of the Condor), depicting American activities in the country, led to volunteers being bundled out unceremoniously; in Tanzania, they were excluded over Tanzania's objection to the Vietnam War. Despite these challenges, the Peace Corps program shaped newly independent countries in significant ways: in Ethiopia they constituted half the secondary school teachers in 1961, in Tanzania they helped survey and build roads, in Ghana and Nigeria they were integral in the education systems, alongside other programs. Even in the Philippines, formerly a U.S. colony, Peace Corps volunteers were welcomed. Aside from these outcomes, the program had a foreign policy component, advancing U.S. interests in the recipient countries. Data shows that countries receiving volunteers demonstrated congruence in foreign policy preferences with the U.S., shown by voting behavior at the United Nations, a forum where countries' actions and preferences and signaling is evident. Volunteer-recipient countries particularly voted with the U.S. on Key Votes. Thus, Peace Corps volunteers who function as citizen diplomats, helped countries shape their foreign policy towards the U.S., demonstrating the viability of soft power in international relations.

This book explores foreign policy developments in post-colonial Africa. A continental foreign policy is a tenuous proposition, yet new African states emerged out of armed resistance and advocacy from regional allies such as the Bandung Conference and the League of Arab States. Ghana was the first Sub-Saharan African country to gain independence in 1957. Fourteen more countries gained independence in 1960 alone, and by May 1963, when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed, 30 countries were independent. An early OAU committee was the African Liberation Committee (ALC), tasked to work in the Frontline States (FLS) to support independence in Southern Africa. Pan-Africanists, in alliance with Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia groups, approached continental unity differently, and regionalism continued to be a major feature. Africa's challenges were often magnified by the capitalist-democratic versus communist-socialist bloc rivalry, but through Africa's use and leveraging of IGOs - the UN, UNDP, UNECA, GATT, NIEO and others - to advance development, the formation of the African Economic Community, OAU's evolution into the AU and other alliances belied collective actions, even as Africa implemented decisions that required cooperation: uti possidetis (maintaining colonial borders), containing secession, intra- and inter-state conflicts, rebellions and building RECs and a united Africa as envisioned by Pan Africanists worked better collectively.

This book addresses one main question: whether the United States has a cohesive foreign policy for Africa. In assessing the history of the United States and its interactions with the continent, particularly with the Horn of Africa, the author casts doubt on whether successive US administrations had a cohesive foreign policy for Africa. The volume examines the historical interactions between the US and the continent, evaluates the US involvement in Africa through foreign policy lenses, and compares foreign policy preferences and strategies of other European, EU and BRIC countries towards Africa.