This book argues that there is no morality and that people are not morally responsible for what they do. In particular, it argues that what people do is neither right nor wrong and that they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy for doing it. Morality and moral responsibility lie at the heart of how we view the world. In our daily life, we feel that people act rightly or wrongly, make the world better or worse, and are virtuous or vicious. These policies are central to our justifying how we see the world and treat others. In this book, the author argues that our views on these matters are false. He presents a series of arguments that threaten to undermine our theoretical and practical worldviews. The philosophical costs of denying moral responsibility and morality are enormous. It does violence to philosophical positions that many people took a lifetime to develop. Worse, it does violence to our everyday view of people. A host of concepts that we rely on daily (praiseworthy, blameworthy, desert, virtue, right, wrong, good, bad, etc.) fail to refer to any property in the world and are thus deeply mistaken. This book is of interest to philosophers, lawyers, and humanities professors as well as people interested in morality, law, religion, and public policy.

Among the most controversial issues in the United States is the question of whether public or private agencies should adopt preferential treatment programs or be required to pay reparations for slavery. Using a carefully reasoned philosophical approach, Stephen Kershnar argues that programs such as affirmative action and calls for slavery reparations are unjust for three reasons. First, the state has a duty to direct resources to those persons who, through their abilities, will benefit most from them. Second, he argues that, in the case of slavery, past injustice--where both the victims and perpetrators are long dead--cannot ground current claims to compensation. As terrible as slavery was, those who claim a right to compensation today owe their existence to it, he reasons, and since the events that bring about a person's existence are normally thought to be beneficial, past injustices do not warrant compensation. Finally, even if past injustices were allowed to serve as the basis of compensation in the present, other variables prevent a reasonable estimation of the amount owed.

Our worldview assumes that people are morally responsible. Our emotions, beliefs, and values assume that a person is responsible for what she thinks and does, and that this is a good thing. This book argues that this worldview is false. It provides four arguments for this conclusion that build on the free will and responsibility literatures in original and insightful ways: 1. Foundation: No one is responsible because there is no foundation for responsibility. A foundation for responsibility is something for which a person is responsible but not by being responsible for something else. 2. Epistemic Condition: No one is responsible because no one fulfills the epistemic condition necessary for blameworthiness. 3. Internalism: If a person were responsible, then she would be responsible for, and only for, what goes on in her head. Most of the evidence for responsibility says the opposite. 4. Amount: No one is responsible because we cannot make sense of what makes a person more or less praiseworthy (or blameworthy). There is no other book that argues against moral responsibility based on foundationalism, the epistemic condition, and internalism, and shows that these arguments cohere. The book’s arguments for internalism and quantifying responsibility are new to the literature. Ultimately, the book’s conclusions undermine our commonsense view of the world and the most common philosophical understanding of God, morality, and relationships. Responsibility Collapses: Why Moral Responsibility Is Impossible is essential reading for scholars and advanced students in philosophy, religious studies, and political science who are interested in debates about agency, free will, and moral responsibility.

People consider desert part of our moral world. It structures how we think about important areas such as love, punishment, and work. This book argues that no one deserves anything. If this is correct, then claims that people deserve general and specific things are false. At the heart of desert is the notion of moral credit or discredit. People deserve good things (credit) when they are good people or do desirable things. These desirable things might be right, good, or virtuous acts. People deserve bad things (discredit) when they are bad people or do undesirable things. On some theories, people deserve credit in general terms. For instance, they deserve a good life. On other theories, people deserve credit in specific terms. For instance, they deserve specific incomes, jobs, punishments, relationships, or reputations. The author's argument against desert rests on three claims: There is no adequate theory of what desert is. Even if there were an adequate theory of what desert is, nothing grounds (justifies) desert. Even if there were an adequate theory of what desert is and something were to ground it, there is no plausible account of what people deserve. Desert Collapses will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in ethics and political philosophy.

This book provides a philosophical analysis of adult-child sex and pedophilia. This sex intuitively strikes many people as sick, disgusting, and wrong. The problem is that it is not clear whether these judgments are justified and whether they are aesthetic or moral. By analogy, many people find it disgusting to view images of obese people having sex, but it is hard to see what is morally undesirable about such sex: here the judgment is aesthetic. This book looks at the moral status of such adult-child sex. In particular, it explores whether those who engage in adult-child sex have a disease, act wrongly, or are vicious. In addition, it looks at how the law should respond to such sex given the above analyses.

This book provides a philosophical analysis of adult-child sex and pedophilia. This sex intuitively strikes many people as sick, disgusting, and wrong. The problem is that it is not clear whether these judgments are justified and whether they are aesthetic or moral. By analogy, many people find it disgusting to view images of obese people having sex, but it is hard to see what is morally undesirable about such sex: here the judgment is aesthetic. This book looks at the moral status of such adult-child sex. In particular, it explores whether those who engage in adult-child sex have a disease, act wrongly, or are vicious. In addition, it looks at how the law should respond to such sex given the above analyses.

Americans are very grateful to veterans. Veterans are celebrated via speeches, statues, memorials, holidays, and affirmative action. They are lavishly praised in public gatherings and private conversations. Contrary to this widespread attitude, Stephen Kershnar argues that U.S. citizens should not be very grateful to veterans. In evaluating whether the significant gratitude toward veterans is justified, Kershnar begins by exploring the nature of gratitude. He argues that one person should be very grateful to a second person only when the second person reasonably attempted to provide a significant benefit to the first and was primarily motivated by concern for the first's well-being. Gratitude toward Veterans: Why Americans Should Not Be Very Grateful to Veterans looks at whether veterans typically satisfy these conditions and argues that they do not. The book should be taken seriously not only by scholars in military ethics and ethics in general, but also by anyone interested in the question of how much gratitude is owed to people holding different roles.

Sex, Discrimination, and Violence is about how the systematic application of some basic principles of applied ethics yields some surprising and very unpopular results. In particular, Stephen Kershnar investigates three areas: sex, discrimination, and violence. In his discussion of sex, he concludes that adult-child sex is not always wrong and that it is not clear that watching rape pornography is bad for the viewer. When discussing discrimination, Kershnar argues for the following startling conclusions: persons of different races on average differ in their value, professional schools may and probably should discriminate against women, and equal opportunity is not worth pursuing. In his discussion of violence, he contends that in some cases governments are morally permitted to use torture in order to interrogate suspected terrorists and may assassinate foreign leaders. These controversial conclusions will no doubt spur animated and thoughtful discussion amongst readers.

Desert and Virtue: A Theory of Intrinsic Value presents a comprehensive examination of desert and what makes people deserve things. Stephen Kershnar demonstrates how desert relates to virtue, good deeds, moral responsibility, and personal change and growth through the life process. He persuasively argues that desert is a function that relates well-being, intrinsic value, and a "ground," which is defined as a person's character or act. Kershnar also explores whether his theory is consistent with the limited responsibility people have for who they are. Desert and Virtue's insightful analysis will be particularly useful for those interested in philosophy, religion, and other fields that touch on value theory.

On some accounts, punishment is justified by the good results that it brings about. In particular, punishment deters, incapacitates, and may, in some cases, rehabilitate criminals. On a retributivist theory, punishment is not justified on the basis of these desirable results, but rather on the fact that the wrongdoer has done something that deserves punishment. In Desert, Retribution, and Torture, Stephen Kershnar provides an in-depth defense of retributivism. Kershnar then uses this theory to provide support for the notion that very harsh forms of punishment, including torture, are morally justified.

This book argues that there is no morality and that people are not morally responsible for what they do. In particular, it argues that what people do is neither right nor wrong and that they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy for doing it. Morality and moral responsibility lie at the heart of how we view the world. In our daily life, we feel that people act rightly or wrongly, make the world better or worse, and are virtuous or vicious. These policies are central to our justifying how we see the world and treat others. In this book, the author argues that our views on these matters are false. He presents a series of arguments that threaten to undermine our theoretical and practical worldviews. The philosophical costs of denying moral responsibility and morality are enormous. It does violence to philosophical positions that many people took a lifetime to develop. Worse, it does violence to our everyday view of people. A host of concepts that we rely on daily (praiseworthy, blameworthy, desert, virtue, right, wrong, good, bad, etc.) fail to refer to any property in the world and are thus deeply mistaken. This book is of interest to philosophers, lawyers, and humanities professors as well as people interested in morality, law, religion, and public policy.

This book looks at a family of views involving the pro-life view of abortion and Christianity. These issues are important because major religious branches (for example, Catholicism and some large branches of Evangelicalism) and leading politicians assert, or are committed to, the following: (a) it is permissible to prevent some people from going to hell, (b) abortion prevents some people from going to hell, and (c) abortion is wrong. They also assert, or are committed to, the following: (d) it is permissible to use defensive violence to prevent people from killing innocents, (e) doctors who perform abortions kill innocents, and (f) it is wrong to use defensive violence against doctors who perform abortions. Stephen Kershnar argues that these and other principles are inconsistent. Along the way, he explores the ways in which theories of hell, right forfeiture, and good consequences relate to each other and the above inconsistencies.