Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries.

The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status.

Much of the debate about development in the past decade pitted proponents of unfettered markets against advocates of developmental states. Yet, in many developing countries what best explains variations in economic performance is not markets or states but rather the character of relations between business and government. The studies in Business and the State in Developing Countries identify a range of close, collaborative relations between bureaucrats and capitalists that enhance elements of economic performance and defy conventional expectations that such relations lead ineluctably to rent-seeking, corruption, and collusion. All based on extensive field research, the essays contrast collaborative and collusive relations in a wide range of developing countries, mostly in Latin America and Asia, and isolate the conditions under which collaboration is most likely to emerge and survive. The contributors highlight the crucial roles played by capable bureaucracies and strong business associations.

Japan, South Korea, Mexico, France, and Spain once exercised significant control over the allocation of credit, and used that control to facilitate economic adjustment and industrial development. In the 1980s all that changed. Why and how these states dismantled their activist credit policies is the subject of Capital Ungoverned. The volume brings together five specialists in the economics and politics of these various states to assess the internal and global changes that prompted them to adopt financial liberalization.Comparison reveals the distinctive political and institutional logic that guided liberalization in each country from the role of a newly dominant capitalist class in Korea to the replacement of state financing by private financing and self-financing in Japan, from the maneuvers of the banking establishment in Spain to attempts to attract foreign capital in Mexico. At the same time, these cases clarify the importance of international factors, in particular the shifts that occurred in U.S. policy as it sought to respond to the effects of uneven growth in the world economy."