As the aspirations of the two rising Asian powers collide, the China-India rivalry is likely to shape twenty-first-century international politics in the region and far beyond. This volume by T.V. Paul and an international group of leading scholars examines whether the rivalry between the two countries that began in the 1950s will intensify or dissipate in the twenty-first century. The China-India relationship is important to analyze because past experience has shown that when two rising great powers share a border, the relationship is volatile and potentially dangerous. India and China's relationship faces a number of challenges, including multiple border disputes that periodically flare up, division over the status of Tibet and the Dalai Lama, the strategic challenge to India posed by China's close relationship with Pakistan, the Chinese navy's greater presence in the Indian Ocean, and the two states' competition for natural resources. Despite these irritants, however, both countries agree on issues such as global financial reforms and climate change and have much to gain from increasing trade and investment, so there are reasons for optimism as well as pessimism. The contributors to this volume answer the following questions: What explains the peculiar contours of this rivalry? What influence does accelerated globalization, especially increased trade and investment, have on this rivalry? What impact do US-China competition and China's expanding navy have on this rivalry? Under what conditions will it escalate or end? The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era will be of great interest to students, scholars, and policymakers concerned with Indian and Chinese foreign policy and Asian security.

This edited volume critically examines the concept of the "security dilemma" and applies it to India-China maritime competition. Though frequently employed in academic discussion and popular commentary on the Sino-Indian relationship, the term has rarely been critically analysed. The volume addresses the gap by examining whether the security dilemma is a useful concept in explaining the naval and foreign policy strategies of India and China. China's Belt and Road Initiative and its expansive engagement in the Indian Ocean Region have resulted in India significantly scaling up investment in its navy, adding ships, naval aircraft and submarines. This volume investigates how the rivalry is playing out in different sub-regions of the Indian Ocean, and the responses of other powers, notably the United States and prominent Southeast Asian states. Their reactions to the Sino-Indian rivalry are an underexplored topic and the chapters in this book reveal how they selectively use that rivalry while trying to steer clear of making definite choices. The book concludes with recommendations on mitigating the security dilemma. This work will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, international relations, maritime security, and Asian politics.

This edited volume critically examines the concept of the "security dilemma" and applies it to India-China maritime competition. Though frequently employed in academic discussion and popular commentary on the Sino-Indian relationship, the term has rarely been critically analysed. The volume addresses the gap by examining whether the security dilemma is a useful concept in explaining the naval and foreign policy strategies of India and China. China's Belt and Road Initiative and its expansive engagement in the Indian Ocean Region have resulted in India significantly scaling up investment in its navy, adding ships, naval aircraft and submarines. This volume investigates how the rivalry is playing out in different sub-regions of the Indian Ocean, and the responses of other powers, notably the United States and prominent Southeast Asian states. Their reactions to the Sino-Indian rivalry are an underexplored topic and the chapters in this book reveal how they selectively use that rivalry while trying to steer clear of making definite choices. The book concludes with recommendations on mitigating the security dilemma. This work will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, international relations, maritime security, and Asian politics.

As the aspirations of the two rising Asian powers collide, the China-India rivalry is likely to shape twenty-first-century international politics in the region and far beyond. This volume by T.V. Paul and an international group of leading scholars examines whether the rivalry between the two countries that began in the 1950s will intensify or dissipate in the twenty-first century. The China-India relationship is important to analyze because past experience has shown that when two rising great powers share a border, the relationship is volatile and potentially dangerous. India and China's relationship faces a number of challenges, including multiple border disputes that periodically flare up, division over the status of Tibet and the Dalai Lama, the strategic challenge to India posed by China's close relationship with Pakistan, the Chinese navy's greater presence in the Indian Ocean, and the two states' competition for natural resources. Despite these irritants, however, both countries agree on issues such as global financial reforms and climate change and have much to gain from increasing trade and investment, so there are reasons for optimism as well as pessimism. The contributors to this volume answer the following questions: What explains the peculiar contours of this rivalry? What influence does accelerated globalization, especially increased trade and investment, have on this rivalry? What impact do US-China competition and China's expanding navy have on this rivalry? Under what conditions will it escalate or end? The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era will be of great interest to students, scholars, and policymakers concerned with Indian and Chinese foreign policy and Asian security.

Rising powers such as Brazil, China, India, Russia, and Turkey are increasingly claiming heightened profiles in international politics. Although differing in other respects, rising states have a strong desire for recognition and respect. This pioneering volume on status features contributions that develop propositions on status concerns and illustrate them with case studies and aggregate data analysis. Four cases are examined in depth: the United States (how it accommodates rising powers through hierarchy), Russia (the influence of status concerns on its foreign policy), China (how Beijing signals its status aspirations), and India (which has long sought major power status). The authors analyze status from a variety of theoretical perspectives and tackle questions such as: How do states signal their status claims? How are such signals perceived by the leading states? Will these status concerns lead to conflict, or is peaceful adjustment possible?

In this volume distinguished scholars from different social science disciplines assess the emerging international order. The volume's three sections examine theories and strategies of order; the prospects of the major likely contenders for world leadership (the United States, Russia, China, the European Union, Japan and India); and the challenges to world order, including globalization, nationalism, ethnic and religious conflict, environmental degradation, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This book thus offers a comprehensive account of the prospects for a peaceful and just international order in the next century.

Two highly regarded scholars come together to examine Indiaas relationship with the worldas major powers and its own search for a significant role in the international system. Central to the argument is Indiaas belief that the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability is key to obtaining such status. The book details the major constraints at the international, domestic and perceptual levels that India has faced in this endeavor. It concludes, through a detailed comparison of Indiaas power capabilities, that India is indeed a rising power, but that significant systemic and domestic changes will be necessary before it can achieve its goal. The book examines the prospects and implications of Indiaas integration into the major-power system in the twenty-first century. Given recent developments, the book is extremely timely. Its incisive analysis will be illuminating for students, policy makers, and for anyone wishing to understand the region in greater depth.

The India-Pakistan rivalry remains one of the most enduring and unresolved conflicts of our times. It began with the birth of the two states in 1947, and it has continued ever since, with the periodic resumption of wars and crises. The conflict has affected every dimension of interstate and societal relations between the two countries and, despite occasional peace initiatives, shows no signs of abating. This volume, first published in 2005, brings together leading experts in international relations theory and comparative politics to explain the persistence of this rivalry. Together they examine a range of topics including regional power distribution, great power politics, territorial divisions, the nuclear weapons factor, and incompatible national identities. Based on their analyses, they offer possible conditions under which the rivalry could be terminated. The book will be of interest to scholars of politics and international relations, as well as those concerned about stability and peace in South Asia.

This book moves scholarly debates beyond the old question of whether or not international institutions matter in order to examine how they matter, even in a world of power politics. Power politics and international institutions are often studied as two separate domains, but this is in need of rethinking because today most states strategically use institutions to further their interests. Anders Wivel, T.V. Paul, and the international group of contributing authors update our understanding of how institutions are viewed among the major theoretical paradigms in international relations, and they seek to bridge the divides. Empirical chapters examine specific institutions in practice, including the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Union. The book also points the way to future research. International Institutions and Power Politics provides insights for both international relations theory and practical matters of foreign affairs, and it will be essential reading for all international relations scholars and advanced students.

Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, no state has unleashed nuclear weapons. What explains this? According to the author, the answer lies in a prohibition inherent in the "tradition of non-use," a time-honored obligation that has been adhered to by all nuclear states--thanks to a consensus view that use would have a catastrophic impact on humankind, the environment, and the reputation of the user.
The book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.

As the world enters the third decade of the twenty-first century, far-reaching changes are likely to occur. China, Russia, India, and Brazil, and perhaps others, are likely to emerge as contenders for global leadership roles. War as a system-changing mechanism is unimaginable, given that it would escalate into nuclear conflict and the destruction of the planet. It is therefore essential that policymakers in established as well as rising states devise strategies to allow transitions without resorting to war, but dominant theories of International Relations contend that major changes in the system are generally possible only through violent conflict. This volume asks whether peaceful accommodation of rising powers is possible in the changed international context, especially against the backdrop of intensified globalization. With the aid of historic cases, it argues that peaceful change is possible through effective long-term strategies on the part of both status quo and rising powers.

South Asia, which consists of eight states of different sizes and capabilities, is characterized by high levels of insecurity at the inter-state, intra-state, and human level: insecurity that is manifest in both traditional and non-traditional security problems—especially transnational terrorism fuelled by militant religious ideologies. To explain what has caused and contributed to the perpetual insecurity and human suffering in the region, this book engages scholars of international relations, comparative politics, historical sociology, and economic development, among others, to reveal and analyze the key underlying and proximate drivers. It argues that the problems are driven largely by two critical variables: the presence of weak states and weak cooperative interstate norms. Based on this analysis and the conclusions drawn, the book recommends specific policies for making the region secure and for developing the long lasting inter- and intra-state cooperative mechanisms necessary for the perpetuation of that security.

South Asia, which consists of eight states of different sizes and capabilities, is characterized by high levels of insecurity at the inter-state, intra-state, and human level: insecurity that is manifest in both traditional and non-traditional security problems-especially transnational terrorism fuelled by militant religious ideologies. To explain what has caused and contributed to the perpetual insecurity and human suffering in the region, this book engages scholars of international relations, comparative politics, historical sociology, and economic development, among others, to reveal and analyze the key underlying and proximate drivers. It argues that the problems are driven largely by two critical variables: the presence of weak states and weak cooperative interstate norms. Based on this analysis and the conclusions drawn, the book recommends specific policies for making the region secure and for developing the long lasting inter- and intra-state cooperative mechanisms necessary for the perpetuation of that security.

Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, no state has unleashed nuclear weapons. What explains this? According to the author, the answer lies in a prohibition inherent in the "tradition of non-use," a time-honored obligation that has been adhered to by all nuclear states--thanks to a consensus view that use would have a catastrophic impact on humankind, the environment, and the reputation of the user.
The book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.

Since the 16th century, balance of power politics have profoundly influenced international relations. But in recent years-with the sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union, growing power of the United States, and increasing prominence of international institutions-many scholars have argued that balance of power theory is losing its relevance. This book examines the current position and future of balance of power dynamics in international politics. In this book, prominent scholars pay special attention to the theoretical and historical criticisms of balance of power theory while empirically assessing its validity at both global and regional levels. The volume also looks at systemic factors favoring or hindering a return to balance of power politics. It evaluates the challenges posed by subnational actors, such as terrorist groups, and weapons of mass destruction to international order. Further, it examines the relevance of balance of power axioms in selected regions: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America.

This book moves scholarly debates beyond the old question of whether or not international institutions matter in order to examine how they matter, even in a world of power politics. Power politics and international institutions are often studied as two separate domains, but this is in need of rethinking because today most states strategically use institutions to further their interests. Anders Wivel, T.V. Paul, and the international group of contributing authors update our understanding of how institutions are viewed among the major theoretical paradigms in international relations, and they seek to bridge the divides. Empirical chapters examine specific institutions in practice, including the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Union. The book also points the way to future research. International Institutions and Power Politics provides insights for both international relations theory and practical matters of foreign affairs, and it will be essential reading for all international relations scholars and advanced students.

Seemingly from its birth, Pakistan has teetered on the brink of becoming a failed state. Today, it ranks 133rd out of 148 countries in global competitiveness. Its economy is as dysfunctional as its political system is corrupt; both rely heavily on international aid for their existence. Taliban forces occupy 30 percent of the country. It possesses over a hundred nuclear weapons that could easily fall into terrorists' hands. Why, in an era when countries across the developing world are experiencing impressive economic growth and building democratic institutions, has Pakistan been such a conspicuous failure? In The Warrior State, noted international relations and South Asia scholar T.V. Paul untangles this fascinating riddle. Paul argues that the "geostrategic curse"-akin to the "resource curse" that plagues oil-rich autocracies-is at the root of Pakistan's unique inability to progress. Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has been at the center of major geopolitical struggles: the US-Soviet rivalry, the conflict with India, and most recently the post 9/11 wars. No matter how ineffective the regime is, massive foreign aid keeps pouring in from major powers and their allies with a stake in the region. The reliability of such aid defuses any pressure on political elites to launch the far-reaching domestic reforms necessary to promote sustained growth, higher standards of living, and more stable democratic institutions. Paul shows that excessive war-making efforts have drained Pakistan's limited economic resources without making the country safer or more stable. Indeed, despite the regime's emphasis on security, the country continues to be beset by widespread violence and terrorism. In an age of transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation, understanding Pakistan's development, particularly the negative effects of foreign aid and geopolitical centrality, is more important than ever. Painstakingly researched and brilliantly The Warrior State tackles what may be the world's most dangerous powder keg and uncovers the true causes of Pakistan's enormously consequential failure.

Despite having devoted considerable energy and resources to its national security over the last 65 years, Pakistan remains a hotbed of international terrorism, religious extremism, and nuclear proliferation: the world's most dangerous powder keg. In The Warrior State, noted international relations and South Asia scholar T.V. Paul poses a fascinating puzzle. In many states across the developing world, military-led regimes have experienced impressive and stable economic growth and over time have evolved into at least partially democratic states. Yet Pakistan, a state in which the military has outsized power, has been a conspicuous failure. Its economy is a shambles, heavily dependent on international aid agencies. Its political system, while containing some democratic features, is notoriously corrupt and unresponsive. And despite the regime's heavy emphasis on security, the country is beset by internecine violence and terrorism. As Paul explains, this is a historical anomaly. War-making and state-building have typically gone hand in hand. After all, the inexorable rise of the European nation-state is largely due the rise of powerful militaries under the control of centralized administrations. What explains Pakistan's unique inability to progress? While there are many factors, the "geostrategic curse" looms large. Since its founding, the country has been at the center of a series of major geopolitical struggles - US-Soviet rivalry, the India-Pakistan struggle, and - most recently - the post 9/11 wars. No matter how ineffective the regime is, it always ends up being the recipient of massive amounts of aid. Moreover, given the constant state of geopolitical crisis, the state always prioritizes the military at the expense of political and economic development. Incorporating a rich theoretical explanation into a swift narrative, drawing insights from history, international relations, sociology, religious studies, political science, and comparative development, The Warrior State presents a deep, multidimensional, and readable account of how such an acutely troubled and unstable country became the way it is, as well as the forces that keep it mired in instability.

In the past two decades, many have posited a correlation between the spread of globalization and the decline of the nation-state. In the realm of national security, advocates of the globalization thesis have argued that states' power has diminished relative to transnational governmental institutions, NGOs, and transnational capitalism. Initially, they pointed to declines in both global military spending (which has risen dramatically in recent years) and interstate war. But are these trends really indicative of the decline of nation-state's role as a guarantor of national security? In Globalization and the National Security State, T.V. Paul and Norrin M. Ripsman test the proposition against the available evidence and find that the globalization school has largely gotten it wrong. The decline in interstate warfare can largely be attributed to the end of the Cold War, not globalization. Moreover, great powers (the US, China, and Russia) continue to pursue traditional nation-state strategies. Regional security arrangements like the EU and ASEAN have not achieved much, and weak states--the ones most impacted by the turmoil generated by globalization--are far more traditional in their approaches to national security, preferring to rely on their own resources rather than those of regional and transnational institutions. This is a bold argument, and Paul and Ripsman amass a considerable amount of evidence for their claims. It cuts against a major movement in international relations scholarship, and is sure to generate controversy.

In the past two decades, many have posited a correlation between the spread of globalization and the decline of the nation-state. In the realm of national security, advocates of the globalization thesis have argued that states' power has diminished relative to transnational governmental institutions, NGOs, and transnational capitalism. Initially, they pointed to declines in both global military spending (which has risen dramatically in recent years) and interstate war. But are these trends really indicative of the decline of nation-state's role as a guarantor of national security? In Globalization and the National Security State, T.V. Paul and Norrin M. Ripsman test the proposition against the available evidence and find that the globalization school has largely gotten it wrong. The decline in interstate warfare can largely be attributed to the end of the Cold War, not globalization. Moreover, great powers (the US, China, and Russia) continue to pursue traditional nation-state strategies. Regional security arrangements like the EU and ASEAN have not achieved much, and weak states--the ones most impacted by the turmoil generated by globalization--are far more traditional in their approaches to national security, preferring to rely on their own resources rather than those of regional and transnational institutions. This is a bold argument, and Paul and Ripsman amass a considerable amount of evidence for their claims. It cuts against a major movement in international relations scholarship, and is sure to generate controversy.

The discipline of international relations offers much insight into why violent power transitions occur, yet there have been few substantive examinations of why and how peaceful changes happen in world politics. This work is the first comprehensive treatment of that subject. The Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Change in International Relations provides a thorough examination of research on the problem of change in the international arena and the reasons why change happens peacefully at times, and at others, violently. It contains over forty chapters, which examine the historical, theoretical, global, regional, and national foreign-policy dimensions of peaceful change. As the world enters a new round of power transition conflict, involving a rapidly rising China and a relatively declining United States, this Handbook provides a necessary resource for decisionmakers and scholars engaged in this vital area of research.

Has globalization forever undermined the state as the mighty guarantor of public welfare and security? In the 1990s, the prevailing and even hopeful view was that it had. The euphoria did not last long. Today the "return of the state" is increasingly being discussed as a desirable reality. This book is the first to bring together a group of prominent scholars from comparative politics, international relations, and sociology to systematically reassess--through a historical lens that moves beyond the standard focus on the West--state-society relations and state power at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

The contributors examine the sources and forms of state power in light of a range of welfare and security needs in order to tell us what states can do today. They assess the extent to which international social forces affect states, and the capacity of states to adapt in specific issue areas. Their striking conclusion is that states have continued to be pivotal in diverse areas such as nationalism, national security, multiculturalism, taxation, and industrial relations. Offering rich insights on the changing contours of state power, "The Nation-State in Question" will be of interest to social scientists, students, and policymakers alike. John Hall's introduction is followed by chapters by Peter Baldwin, John Campbell, Francesco Duina, Grzegorz Ekiert, Jeffrey Herbst, Christopher Hood, Anatoly Khazanov, Brendan O'Leary, T. V. Paul, Bernard Yack, Rudra Sil, and Minxin Pei. The conclusion is by John Ikenberry.

As the world enters the third decade of the twenty-first century, far-reaching changes are likely to occur. China, Russia, India, and Brazil, and perhaps others, are likely to emerge as contenders for global leadership roles. War as a system-changing mechanism is unimaginable, given that it would escalate into nuclear conflict and the destruction of the planet. It is therefore essential that policymakers in established as well as rising states devise strategies to allow transitions without resorting to war, but dominant theories of International Relations contend that major changes in the system are generally possible only through violent conflict. This volume asks whether peaceful accommodation of rising powers is possible in the changed international context, especially against the backdrop of intensified globalization. With the aid of historic cases, it argues that peaceful change is possible through effective long-term strategies on the part of both status quo and rising powers.

As the costs of a preemptive foreign policy in Iraq have become clear, strategies such as containment and deterrence have been gaining currency among policy makers. This comprehensive book offers an agenda for the contemporary practice of deterrence--especially as it applies to nuclear weapons--in an increasingly heterogeneous global and political setting.
Moving beyond the precepts of traditional deterrence theory, this groundbreaking volume offers insights for the use of deterrence in the modern world, where policy makers may encounter irrational actors, failed states, religious zeal, ambiguous power relationships, and other situations where the traditional rules of statecraft do not apply. A distinguished group of contributors here examines issues such as deterrence among the Great Powers; the problems of regional and nonstate actors; and actors armed with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. "Complex Deterrence "will be a valuable resource for anyone facing the considerable challenge of fostering security and peace in the twenty-first century.

The India-Pakistan rivalry remains one of the most enduring and unresolved conflicts of our times. It began with the birth of the two states in 1947, and it has continued ever since, with the periodic resumption of wars and crises. The conflict has affected every dimension of interstate and societal relations between the two countries and, despite occasional peace initiatives, shows no signs of abating. This volume, first published in 2005, brings together leading experts in international relations theory and comparative politics to explain the persistence of this rivalry. Together they examine a range of topics including regional power distribution, great power politics, territorial divisions, the nuclear weapons factor, and incompatible national identities. Based on their analyses, they offer possible conditions under which the rivalry could be terminated. The book will be of interest to scholars of politics and international relations, as well as those concerned about stability and peace in South Asia.