Currency crises in Europe and Mexico during the 1990s provided stark reminders of the importance and the fragility of international financial markets. These experiences led some commentators to conclude that open international capital markets are incompatible with financial stability. But the pre-1914 gold standard is an obvious challenge to the notion that open capital markets are sources of instability. To deepen our understanding of how this system worked, this volume draws together recent research on the gold standard. Theoretical models are used to guide qualitative discussions of historical experience, while econometric methods are used to help the historical data speak clearly. The result is an overview of the gold standard, a survey of the relevant applied research in international macroeconomics, and a demonstration of how the past can help to inform the present.

Currency crises in Europe and Mexico during the 1990s provided stark reminders of the importance and the fragility of international financial markets. These experiences led some commentators to conclude that open international capital markets are incompatible with financial stability. But the pre-1914 gold standard is an obvious challenge to the notion that open capital markets are sources of instability. To deepen our understanding of how this system worked, this volume draws together recent research on the gold standard. Theoretical models are used to guide qualitative discussions of historical experience, while econometric methods are used to help the historical data speak clearly. The result is an overview of the gold standard, a survey of the relevant applied research in international macroeconomics, and a demonstration of how the past can help to inform the present.

A penetrating critique tracing how under-regulated trading between European and U.S. banks led to the 2008 financial crisis--with a prescription for preventing another meltdown There have been numerous books examining the 2008 financial crisis from either a U.S. or European perspective. Tamim Bayoumi is the first to explain how the Euro crisis and U.S. housing crash were, in fact, parasitically intertwined. Starting in the 1980s, Bayoumi outlines the cumulative policy errors that undermined the stability of both the European and U.S. financial sectors, highlighting the catalytic role played by European mega banks that exploited lax regulation to expand into the U.S. market and financed unsustainable bubbles on both continents. U.S. banks increasingly sold sub-par loans to under-regulated European and U.S. shadow banks and, when the bubbles burst, the losses whipsawed back to the core of the European banking system. A much-needed, fresh look at the origins of the crisis, Bayoumi's analysis concludes that policy makers are ignorant of what still needs to be done both to complete the cleanup and to prevent future crises.

Robust GDP growth, declining unemployment, low and stable inflation, and a string of fiscal and current account surpluses - it's a record to be envied. These outcomes in Canada owe much to sound macroeconomic policies as well as to a favorable external environment. This book focuses on these policies and the economy's salient features, including its close trade integration with the United States, large commodity sector, and substantial decentralization and regional diversity. What is unique about the Canadian experience is delineated, while polices and philosophies that can be fruitfully applied in other economies are illuminated.

A penetrating critique tracing how under-regulated trading between European and U.S. banks led to the 2008 financial crisis-with a prescription for preventing another meltdown There have been numerous books examining the 2008 financial crisis from either a U.S. or European perspective. Tamim Bayoumi is the first to explain how the Euro crisis and U.S. housing crash were, in fact, parasitically intertwined. Starting in the 1980s, Bayoumi outlines the cumulative policy errors that undermined the stability of both the European and U.S. financial sectors, highlighting the catalytic role played by European mega banks that exploited lax regulation to expand into the U.S. market and financed unsustainable bubbles on both continents. U.S. banks increasingly sold sub-par loans to under-regulated European and U.S. shadow banks and, when the bubbles burst, the losses whipsawed back to the core of the European banking system. A much-needed, fresh look at the origins of the crisis, Bayoumi's analysis concludes that policy makers are ignorant of what still needs to be done both to complete the cleanup and to prevent future crises.