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OndrejMajer, Ahti-VeikkoPietarinen, andTeroTulenheimo 1 Games and
logic in philosophy Recent years have witnessed a growing interest
in the unifying methodo- gies over what have been perceived as
pretty disparate logical 'systems', or else merely an assortment of
formal and mathematical 'approaches' to phi- sophical inquiry. This
development has largely been fueled by an increasing
dissatisfaction to what has earlier been taken to be a
straightforward outcome of 'logical pluralism' or 'methodological
diversity'. These phrases appear to re ect the everyday chaos of
our academic pursuits rather than any genuine attempt to clarify
the general principles underlying the miscellaneous ways in which
logic appears to us. But the situation is changing. Unity among
plurality is emerging in c- temporary studies in logical philosophy
and neighbouring disciplines. This is a necessary follow-up to the
intensive research into the intricacies of logical systems and
methodologies performed over the recent years. The present book
suggests one such peculiar but very unrestrained meth- ological
perspective over the eld of logic and its applications in
mathematics, language or computation: games. An allegory for
opposition, cooperation and coordination, games are also concrete
objects of formal study.
Andinmy haste, I said: "Allmenare Liars" 1 -Psalms 116:11 The
Original Lie Philosophical analysis often reveals and seldom solves
paradoxes. To quote Stephen Read: A paradox arises when an
unacceptable conclusion is supported by a plausible argument from
apparently acceptable premises. [...] So three di?erent reactions
to the paradoxes are possible: to show that the r- soning is
fallacious; or that the premises are not true after all; or that 2
the conclusion can in fact be accepted. There are sometimes
elaborate ways to endorse a paradoxical conc- sion. One might be
prepared to concede that indeed there are a number of grains that
make a heap, but no possibility to know this number. However, some
paradoxes are more threatening than others; showing the
conclusiontobeacceptableisnotaseriousoption,iftheacceptanceleads to
triviality. Among semantic paradoxes, the Liar (in any of its
versions) 3 o?ers as its conclusion a bullet no one would be
willing to bite. One of the most famous versions of the Liar
Paradox was proposed by Epimenides, though its attribution to the
Cretan poet and philosopher has only a relatively recent history.
It seems indeed that Epimenides was mentioned neither in ancient
nor in medieval treatments of the Liar 1 Jewish Publication Society
translation. 2 Read [1].
Andinmy haste, I said: "Allmenare Liars" 1 -Psalms 116:11 The
Original Lie Philosophical analysis often reveals and seldom solves
paradoxes. To quote Stephen Read: A paradox arises when an
unacceptable conclusion is supported by a plausible argument from
apparently acceptable premises. [...] So three di?erent reactions
to the paradoxes are possible: to show that the r- soning is
fallacious; or that the premises are not true after all; or that 2
the conclusion can in fact be accepted. There are sometimes
elaborate ways to endorse a paradoxical conc- sion. One might be
prepared to concede that indeed there are a number of grains that
make a heap, but no possibility to know this number. However, some
paradoxes are more threatening than others; showing the
conclusiontobeacceptableisnotaseriousoption,iftheacceptanceleads to
triviality. Among semantic paradoxes, the Liar (in any of its
versions) 3 o?ers as its conclusion a bullet no one would be
willing to bite. One of the most famous versions of the Liar
Paradox was proposed by Epimenides, though its attribution to the
Cretan poet and philosopher has only a relatively recent history.
It seems indeed that Epimenides was mentioned neither in ancient
nor in medieval treatments of the Liar 1 Jewish Publication Society
translation. 2 Read [1].
OndrejMajer, Ahti-VeikkoPietarinen, andTeroTulenheimo 1 Games and
logic in philosophy Recent years have witnessed a growing interest
in the unifying methodo- gies over what have been perceived as
pretty disparate logical 'systems', or else merely an assortment of
formal and mathematical 'approaches' to phi- sophical inquiry. This
development has largely been fueled by an increasing
dissatisfaction to what has earlier been taken to be a
straightforward outcome of 'logical pluralism' or 'methodological
diversity'. These phrases appear to re ect the everyday chaos of
our academic pursuits rather than any genuine attempt to clarify
the general principles underlying the miscellaneous ways in which
logic appears to us. But the situation is changing. Unity among
plurality is emerging in c- temporary studies in logical philosophy
and neighbouring disciplines. This is a necessary follow-up to the
intensive research into the intricacies of logical systems and
methodologies performed over the recent years. The present book
suggests one such peculiar but very unrestrained meth- ological
perspective over the eld of logic and its applications in
mathematics, language or computation: games. An allegory for
opposition, cooperation and coordination, games are also concrete
objects of formal study.
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