It is widely recognized that a person's values will profoundly affect what that person attends to, thinks about, and remembers. Yet, despite this, psychologists have only begun to study and think about the deep connections between values and knowledge. This volume explores this important area in psychology by offering an overview of what is known about the developmental role of valuation in the acquisition of knowledge, and also by examining a range of new ideas for understanding the intricate connection between evaluation and thinking. More specifically, the text: provides a historical overview of philosophical and psychological theories relating the values and knowledge; reviews the importance of values for infants and their caretakers in the origins of both cognition and social relations; offers a provocative view of how the differences among families in their values may have profound affects on psychological development; explicates the development of a personal sphere within which one strives to shape one's own values; emphasizes the heterogeneity of valuation inherent in every culture and how conflicts of values are likely to be common and important to human development; presents eye-opening research on social-cognitive limitations of average people in respecting the points of view of others; and summarizes and critiques Piaget's theory of the role of values in development. For practitioners in the fields of developmental and social psychology, and education, this volume will introduce a number of important and current issues, from multiculturality and gender to the differential roles of temperament and upbringing in development. The emphasis is placed squarely on developing individuals and how they shape themselves in a world that is structured by values as well as by facts.

Despite dissent in many quarters, Piaget's epistemology and the developmental psychology derived from it remain the most powerful theories in either field. From the beginning, Piaget's fundamental epistemological notion was that all knowledge is rooted in action, and for a long time, he identified action with transformation. What is known is that which remains constant under transformatory action. This book represents a fundamental reformulation of that point of view. Alongside transformatory schemes, Piaget now presents evidence that nontransformatory actions -- comparisons that create morphisms and categories among diverse situations constitute a necessary and complementary instrument of knowledge. This work aims to elucidate that insight experimentally and theoretically and to understand the developmental interaction of comparing and transforming as knowledge is constructed. This first English translation of Piaget's work includes studies of children's understanding of geometric forms, machines, and abstract concepts. It contains a clear statement of his mature position on continuity with biology as well as with the history of ideas.

It is widely recognized that a person's values will profoundly affect what that person attends to, thinks about, and remembers. Yet, despite this, psychologists have only begun to study and think about the deep connections between values and knowledge. This volume explores this important area in psychology by offering an overview of what is known about the developmental role of valuation in the acquisition of knowledge, and also by examining a range of new ideas for understanding the intricate connection between evaluation and thinking. More specifically, the text: provides a historical overview of philosophical and psychological theories relating the values and knowledge; reviews the importance of values for infants and their caretakers in the origins of both cognition and social relations; offers a provocative view of how the differences among families in their values may have profound affects on psychological development; explicates the development of a personal sphere within which one strives to shape one's own values; emphasizes the heterogeneity of valuation inherent in every culture and how conflicts of values are likely to be common and important to human development; presents eye-opening research on social-cognitive limitations of average people in respecting the points of view of others; and summarizes and critiques Piaget's theory of the role of values in development. For practitioners in the fields of developmental and social psychology, and education, this volume will introduce a number of important and current issues, from multiculturality and gender to the differential roles of temperament and upbringing in development. The emphasis is placed squarely on developing individuals and how they shape themselves in a world that is structured by values as well as by facts.

Despite dissent in many quarters, Piaget's epistemology and the developmental psychology derived from it remain the most powerful theories in either field. From the beginning, Piaget's fundamental epistemological notion was that all knowledge is rooted in action, and for a long time, he identified action with transformation. What is known is that which remains constant under transformatory action. This book represents a fundamental reformulation of that point of view. Alongside transformatory schemes, Piaget now presents evidence that nontransformatory actions -- comparisons that create morphisms and categories among diverse situations constitute a necessary and complementary instrument of knowledge. This work aims to elucidate that insight experimentally and theoretically and to understand the developmental interaction of comparing and transforming as knowledge is constructed.
This first English translation of Piaget's work includes studies of children's understanding of geometric forms, machines, and abstract concepts. It contains a clear statement of his mature position on continuity with biology as well as with the history of ideas.

Among the many conceits of modern thought is the idea that philosophy, tainted as it is by subjective evaluation, is a shaky guide for human affairs. People, it is argued, are better off if they base their conduct either on know-how with its pragmatic criterion of truth (i.e., possibility) or on science with its universal criterion of rational necessity. Since Helmholtz, there has been increasing concern in the life sciences about the role of reductionism in the construction of knowledge. Is psychophysics really possible? Are biological phenomena just the deducible results of chemical phenomena? And if life can be reduced to molecular mechanisms only, where do these miraculous molecules come from, and how do they work? On a psychological level, people wonder whether psychological phenomena result simply from genetically hardwired structures in the brain or whether, even if not genetically determined, they can be identified with the biochemical processes of that organ. In sociology, identical questions arise. If physical or chemical reduction is not practicable, should we think in terms of other forms of reduction, say, the reduction of psychological to sociological phenomena or in terms of what Piaget has called the "reduction of the lower to the higher" (e.g., teleology)? All in all, then, reductionism in both naive and sophisticated forms permeates all of human thought and may, at least in certain cases, be necessary to it. If so, what exactly are those cases? The papers collected in this volume are all derived from the 29th Annual Symposium of the Jean Piaget Society. The intent of the volume is to examine the issue of reductionism on the theoretical level in several sciences, including biology, psychology, and sociology. A complementary intent is to examine it from the point of view of the practical effects of reductionistic doctrine on daily life.

Among the many conceits of modern thought is the idea that philosophy, tainted as it is by subjective evaluation, is a shaky guide for human affairs. People, it is argued, are better off if they base their conduct either on know-how with its pragmatic criterion of truth (i.e., possibility) or on science with its universal criterion of rational necessity.

Since Helmholtz, there has been increasing concern in the life sciences about the role of reductionism in the construction of knowledge. Is psychophysics really possible? Are biological phenomena just the deducible results of chemical phenomena? And if life can be reduced to molecular mechanisms only, where do these miraculous molecules come from, and how do they work? On a psychological level, people wonder whether psychological phenomena result simply from genetically hardwired structures in the brain or whether, even if not genetically determined, they can be identified with the biochemical processes of that organ. In sociology, identical questions arise.

If physical or chemical reduction is not practicable, should we think in terms of other forms of reduction, say, the reduction of psychological to sociological phenomena or in terms of what Piaget has called the "reduction of the lower to the higher" (e.g., teleology)? All in all, then, reductionism in both naive and sophisticated forms permeates all of human thought and may, at least in certain cases, be necessary to it. If so, what exactly are those cases?

The papers collected in this volume are all derived from the 29th Annual Symposium of the Jean Piaget Society. The intent of the volume is to examine the issue of reductionism on the theoretical level in several sciences, including biology, psychology, and sociology. A complementary intent is to examine it from the point of view of the practical effects of reductionistic doctrine on daily life.