This study examines the U.S. Army Field Artillery's current capability to provide close support to maneuver units on the AirLand Battlefield. It first analyses the environment of the modern battlefield and finds that in spite of technological improvements in weapons and command and control capabilities a preponderance of artillery fires will be needed at the small unit level and very close to friendly troops. The whole notion of close support is therefore historically examined in some detail to determine what close support means today and what precise demands it places on the field artillery system. From there the study goes on to examine the field artillery structure in the heavy division to determine its capability to provide the necessary support. A major conclusion is that if the division battle is to be won, then the priority of fire support effort must be focused on actions that will take place within 300 meters of friendly positions. Close support fires must be immediately responsive to units in contact. They must be closely integrated with all other means of fire support and delivered with finesse and precision as part of the overall scheme of maneuver. The study also concludes that the current artillery structure is ill-prepared to provide such close support. Field artillery organization, equipment, doctrine, and conceptual thinking leans toward efficiency in target destruction, not toward wedding fire support to maneuver requirements. It appears that within the fire support community the balance between firepower and maneuver is precarious at best.

The study explores the utility of employing airborne forces at the operational level of war in a mid- to high intensity environment. It first examines the theory of airborne warfare and the evolution of the airborne idea from pre-World War II until the present. Its major finding is that despite the theoretical capability of airborne forces to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, and moral dominance enabling friendly forces to attain decisive operational success, the U.S. Army has limited its vision on the employment of airborne forces to the tactical and strategic levels. The study then looks at the feasibility of airborne operations, both historically and in today's environment of combat, and finds that, while always risky, small-scale airborne operations are feasible at the operational level. Finally, the study considers what form such an employment might take. Looking at Soviet theoretical concepts, several German World War II operations, and the three major Allied airborne operations, Sicily, Normandy, and Operation Market-Garden, the study relates ideas developed from these examples to type missions airborne forces may be called upon to execute in the 1980's. These include airborne drops behind enemy lines to seize key terrain such as a river crossing site or mountain pass, which would facilitate a ground force deep operation, drops to tie up enemy reserves to enable amphibious operations or large river crossings to succeed, or vertical envelopments of key points of an enemy defensive belt. There are numerous historical examples in which brigade-sized or smaller airborne forces were employed in the true spirit of maneuver warfare in combination with other ground forces. Where such maneuvers depended on the success of the airborne operation for overall success, it is evident that even small scale airborne forces had decisive operational impact. Since the U.S. Army and Air Force today are capable of employing only brigade-size and smaller un