One of the great successes of the law and economics movement has been the use of economic models to explain the structure and function of broad areas of law. The original contributions to this volume epitomize that tradition, offering state-of-the-art research on the many facets of economic modeling in law.The contributors employ a variety of economic methodologies to explore a wide range of topics, including torts, contracts, property, crime, employment, the environment, and legal procedure. This depth and breadth of scholarship reflect the continuing vitality of the economic approach to law, offering an illuminating look into the future of the field and providing inspiration and guidance for the next generation of theorists. This timely volume will appeal to students, professors and researchers in both law and economics, particularly those with an interest in the theoretical and practical intersections of the two fields. Contributors: L. Anderlini, M. Baker, F. Baumann, J. De Mot, B. Deporter, D. Dharmapala, W. Emons, L. Felli, C. Fluet, T. Friehe, N. Garoupa, Z. Grossman, S. Izmalkov, C. Landeo, R. McAdams, T. Miceli, M.Nikitin, J. Pincus, A. Postlewaite, R. Rabon, G. Ramello, K. Segerson, P. Shapiro, T. Tsvetanov, T. Ulen, N. Westelius, A. Wickelgren

One of the great successes of the law and economics movement has been the use of economic models to explain the structure and function of broad areas of law. The original contributions to this volume epitomize that tradition, offering state-of-the-art research on the many facets of economic modeling in law.The contributors employ a variety of economic methodologies to explore a wide range of topics, including torts, contracts, property, crime, employment, the environment, and legal procedure. This depth and breadth of scholarship reflect the continuing vitality of the economic approach to law, offering an illuminating look into the future of the field and providing inspiration and guidance for the next generation of theorists. This timely volume will appeal to students, professors and researchers in both law and economics, particularly those with an interest in the theoretical and practical intersections of the two fields. Contributors: L. Anderlini, M. Baker, F. Baumann, J. De Mot, B. Deporter, D. Dharmapala, W. Emons, L. Felli, C. Fluet, T. Friehe, N. Garoupa, Z. Grossman, S. Izmalkov, C. Landeo, R. McAdams, T. Miceli, M.Nikitin, J. Pincus, A. Postlewaite, R. Rabon, G. Ramello, K. Segerson, P. Shapiro, T. Tsvetanov, T. Ulen, N. Westelius, A. Wickelgren

Law and economics is the field of study devoted to understanding laws and legal institutions using the tools of economic theory. This growing subject has become a mainstream area of study in both law schools and economics departments and this book explores the "law and economics" approach to some of the most interesting questions, issues, and topics in law, order, and justice. Contemporary Issues in Law and Economics considers what economists call the "positive" analysis of the law - that is, using economic theory to explain the nature of the law as it actually exists. As part of this approach the author examines questions such as, what is the economic basis for the predominance of negligence rules in tort law? And, what is the explanation for the illegality of blackmail? Furthermore, another set of questions arises where the law seems to depart from the prescriptions of economic theory, and these issues are also examined in this volume. For example, the deeply rooted norm of proportionality between punishments and crimes, and the use of escalating penalties for repeat offenders, are both explored. With self-contained chapters written in a non-technical style, this book offers a rigorous discussion of the above themes while remaining accessible to those without formal legal or economic training. It offers the ideal introduction to the field of law and economics while also providing a basis for students in more advanced courses.

Master teacher Thomas J. Miceli provides an introduction to law and economics that reveals how economic principles can explain the structure of the law and make it more efficient. The third edition of this seminal textbook is thoroughly updated to include recent cases and the latest scholarship, with particular attention paid to torts, contracts, property rights, and the economics of crime. A new chapter organization, ideal for quarter- or semester-long courses, strengthens the book's focus on unifying themes in the field. As Miceli tells a cohesive, analytical "story" about law from a distinctly economic perspective, exercises and problems encourage students to deepen their knowledge. A companion website is available at http://www.sup.org/economiclaw. It offers a full suite of resources for both students and professors. Key pedagogical features include cases; discussion points that provide additional analysis of topics in the book; graduate notes, which enrich the text for more advanced readers; and relevant links. Professors have access to sample syllabi for undergraduate and graduate courses and an instructor's manual, which provides answers to all of the end-of-chapter questions and problems in the book.

Law and economics is the field of study devoted to understanding laws and legal institutions using the tools of economic theory. This growing subject has become a mainstream area of study in both law schools and economics departments and this book explores the "law and economics" approach to some of the most interesting questions, issues, and topics in law, order, and justice. Contemporary Issues in Law and Economics considers what economists call the "positive" analysis of the law - that is, using economic theory to explain the nature of the law as it actually exists. As part of this approach the author examines questions such as, what is the economic basis for the predominance of negligence rules in tort law? And, what is the explanation for the illegality of blackmail? Furthermore, another set of questions arises where the law seems to depart from the prescriptions of economic theory, and these issues are also examined in this volume. For example, the deeply rooted norm of proportionality between punishments and crimes, and the use of escalating penalties for repeat offenders, are both explored. With self-contained chapters written in a non-technical style, this book offers a rigorous discussion of the above themes while remaining accessible to those without formal legal or economic training. It offers the ideal introduction to the field of law and economics while also providing a basis for students in more advanced courses.

The economic approach to law relies on the use of economic models, mostly mathematical, for understanding the nature and function of law. The articles in this collection reflect state-of-the-art modeling techniques and explore how to use these to both formulate important questions and resolve particular legal issues. Following an original introduction by the editors, the volume spans the many sub-areas of law and economics (with papers in torts, contracts, property, crime, and legal procedure) and includes a wide range of papers, incorporating classics and some less well-known papers. Economic Models of Law will be an invaluable resource for active scholars as well as an inspiration for the next generation of modelers.

This book explores the insights that can be gained by looking at the criminal justice system from an economic point of view. It provides an economic analysis of the institutional structure and function of the criminal justice system, how its policies are formulated, and how they affect behavior. Yet it goes beyond an examination of specific policies to address the broad question of how law influences behavior. For example, it examines how concepts such as the possibility of redemption affect the decisions of repeat offenders, and whether individual responsibility is (or should be) a pre-requisite for punishment. Finally, the book argues that, in addition to the threat of criminal sanctions, law inculcates principles of acceptable behavior among citizens by asserting that certain acts are "against the law." This "expressive function" of law can influence behavior to the extent that at least some people in society are receptive to such a message. For these people, the moral content of law has more than mere symbolic value, and consequently, it can expand the scope of traditional law enforcement while lowering its cost. Another goal of the book is therefore to use economic theory to assess this dualistic function of law by specifically recognizing how its policies can both internalize an ethic of obedience to the law among some people irrespective of its consequences, while simultaneously threatening to punish those who only respond to external incentives.

This book explores the insights that can be gained by looking at the criminal justice system from an economic point of view. It provides an economic analysis of the institutional structure and function of the criminal justice system, how its policies are formulated, and how they affect behavior. Yet it goes beyond an examination of specific policies to address the broad question of how law influences behavior. For example, it examines how concepts such as the possibility of redemption affect the decisions of repeat offenders, and whether individual responsibility is (or should be) a pre-requisite for punishment. Finally, the book argues that, in addition to the threat of criminal sanctions, law inculcates principles of acceptable behavior among citizens by asserting that certain acts are "against the law." This "expressive function" of law can influence behavior to the extent that at least some people in society are receptive to such a message. For these people, the moral content of law has more than mere symbolic value, and consequently, it can expand the scope of traditional law enforcement while lowering its cost. Another goal of the book is therefore to use economic theory to assess this dualistic function of law by specifically recognizing how its policies can both internalize an ethic of obedience to the law among some people irrespective of its consequences, while simultaneously threatening to punish those who only respond to external incentives.

This book surveys the contributions that economic theory has made to the often contentious debate over the government's use of its power of eminent domain, as prescribed by the Fifth Amendment. It addresses such questions as: When should the government be allowed to take private property without the owner's consent? Does it depend on how the land will be used? And what amount of compensation is the landowner entitled to receive (if any)? The recent case of Kelo v. New London (2005) revitalized the debate, but it was only the latest skirmish in the ongoing struggle between advocates of strong governmental powers to acquire private property in the public interest and private property rights advocates. Written for a general audience, the book advances a coherent theory that views eminent domain within the context of the government's proper role in an economic system whose primary objective is to achieve efficient land use.

This accessible volume integrates wide-ranging economic methodologies with a vast array of legal subjects. Coverage includes the first-year law school curriculum along with institutions and doctrines comprising the core foundation of upper level legal study. Dedicated chapters introduce neoclassical economics, interest group theory, social choice, and game theory, and the book intersperses alternative methodological insights. The analysis synthesizes these methodologies with modern and classic case law, other legal materials, and policy discussions inspired by current events. Ideal for a law school seminar or capstone course, this unique volume is also perfectly suited for business school courses on legal methods and public policy. Professors will find a rich array of materials adaptable to varying pedagogical styles and substantive areas of emphasis. Students exploring these materials will emerge with a deeper understanding of law and economics and a greater appreciation of our lawmaking institutions.

This book surveys the contributions that economic theory has made to the often contentious debate over the government's use of its power of eminent domain, as prescribed by the Fifth Amendment. It addresses such questions as: When should the government be allowed to take private property without the owner's consent? Does it depend on how the land will be used? And what amount of compensation is the landowner entitled to receive (if any)? The recent case of Kelo v. New London (2005) revitalized the debate, but it was only the latest skirmish in the ongoing struggle between advocates of strong governmental powers to acquire private property in the public interest and private property rights advocates. Written for a general audience, the book advances a coherent theory that views eminent domain within the context of the government's proper role in an economic system whose primary objective is to achieve efficient land use.

This book introduces economic analysis of private law institutions and provides useful overview of current research.