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This book is, in essence, about incentives: the incentives for
competing societal interest groups to cooperate with each other to
benefit from a growing economic pie, rather than fighting over a
bigger share of a smaller one. This is the conundrum of economic
development. If elite interest groups have both incentive and
ability to allocate resources toward themselves, and if such rent
seeking causes a decline in economic inefficiency, how can
economies ever grow? The book illuminates the mechanisms by which
in one of the world's recent economic success stories- Vietnam's
rapid industrialization and passage into the middle-income
category-the interest in cooperating to grow the economy overrode
the elites' instinct to allocate resources through the use of
political power. The book shows how the need to provide positive
conditions for international investment altered pay-off structures
and pushed the all-powerful Communist Party of Vietnam to engage in
bargaining with provincial officials; provincial officials with
international investors; and finally all coercive elites even with
the working classes. It describes the emergence of a harmony of
interest among societal groups in which each group benefits from a
growing economy, and no one group can monopolize the benefits of
growth without hurting itself. The Vietnam case validates
Nobel-Prize winning economist Mancur Olson's proposition that elite
predation can only be kept in check when the elite itself suffers
from the economic decline it causes at least as much as it gains
from the rents it collects.
This book is, in essence, about incentives: the incentives for
competing societal interest groups to cooperate with each other to
benefit from a growing economic pie, rather than fighting over a
bigger share of a smaller one. This is the conundrum of economic
development. If elite interest groups have both incentive and
ability to allocate resources toward themselves, and if such rent
seeking causes a decline in economic inefficiency, how can
economies ever grow? The book illuminates the mechanisms by which
in one of the world's recent economic success stories- Vietnam's
rapid industrialization and passage into the middle-income
category-the interest in cooperating to grow the economy overrode
the elites' instinct to allocate resources through the use of
political power. The book shows how the need to provide positive
conditions for international investment altered pay-off structures
and pushed the all-powerful Communist Party of Vietnam to engage in
bargaining with provincial officials; provincial officials with
international investors; and finally all coercive elites even with
the working classes. It describes the emergence of a harmony of
interest among societal groups in which each group benefits from a
growing economy, and no one group can monopolize the benefits of
growth without hurting itself. The Vietnam case validates
Nobel-Prize winning economist Mancur Olson's proposition that elite
predation can only be kept in check when the elite itself suffers
from the economic decline it causes at least as much as it gains
from the rents it collects.
In diesem Buch fangen Fallstudien mit Losungen die Facetten der
Wirtschaft ein. Die Falle gehen auf die unterschiedlichsten
Bereiche der Wirtschaft zuruck und beziehen sowohl
betriebswirtschaftliche als auch volkswirtschaftliche Themen ein,
wobei bei diesen nicht selten auch die Politik eine Rolle spielt.
Alle Aspekte sind bei der Ausbildung von Okonomen gleichermassen
von Bedeutung."
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