Enforcing Consumer and Capital Markets Law: The Diesel Emissions Scandal is an international and intradisciplinary work. On the example of one topical and global collective damage event with far reaching consequences for both consumers and investors, this work critically analyses the various approaches of public and private law enforcement and their effectiveness across several jurisdictions, namely those of Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, England and Wales, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Australia, Brazil, China and the United States of America. Based on decided and pending cases, the book demonstrates to what extent public authorities, but also private claimants, can take effective steps against the violation of their rights in their respective jurisdictions. The following is examined: law enforcement by public institutions, law enforcement by private parties and overlaps as well as hybrids and connections between both areas. A particular focus is given to collective redress, that is representative actions and model case proceedings. Comments from renowned practitioners sharing their experiences are included throughout the book. Separate concluding comparative chapters have two different aims: A comparative analysis of the legal solutions with a supranational European Union level focus provides invaluable insights into best practices and effectiveness. In addition, an intradisciplinary comparison assesses and evaluates the effectiveness of consumer law vs capital markets law mechanisms. Furthermore mechanisms of competition law and company law are taken into account. With contributions by Willem H. van Boom (University of Leiden), Peter Cashman (3 Wentworth Chambers; University of New South Wales), Tanja Domej (University of Zurich), Marcello Gaboardi (Bocconi University Milan), Beate Gsell (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munich; Munich Higher Regional Court), Jutta Gurkmann (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.), Patrick Honegger-Muntener (University of Zurich), Emmanuel Jeuland (University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne), Remigijus Jokubauskas (Court of Appeal of Lithuania), Georg E. Kodek (Vienna University of Economics and Business), Lene Kohl (Osborne Clarke, Berlin), Petra Leupold (VKI-Academy), Claudia Lima Marques (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul), Caroline Meller-Hannich (Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg), Thomas M.J. Moellers (University of Augsburg), Charlotte M.D.S. Pavillon (University of Groningen), Anders Schafer (Kammeradvokaten/Poul Schmidt, Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen), Amy J. Schmitz (University of Missouri), John Sorabji (Nine St John Street Chambers; University College London), Henrique Sousa Antunes (Catholic University of Portugal), Egidija Tamosiuniene (Court of Appeal of Lithuania; University of Vilnius), Rudiger Veil (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munich), Maximilian Weiss (TILP Litigation, Kirchentellinsfurt), Tong Zhang (China University of Political Science and Law).

In the debate on the enforcement of competition law, many take the view that Europe should avoid the traps US law has fallen into by admitting excessive litigation. European law should not pave the way for judicial proceedings which ultimately serve the interests of lawyers or other agents rather than injured parties. This inquiry describes the state of remedies in competition law in fifteen European countries, analyses the underlying determinants, and proposes ways of improving the enforcement of competition law. The International and European legal frameworks are presented, as is the approach of US-American law. It is argued that efforts to strengthen private enforcement of antitrust law should benefit from the rich European experience in unfair competition law. The divergence between the two fields of law is not so huge that a completely different treatment is justified. Thus, a specifically European way of competition law enforcement could be developed.

In the debate on the enforcement of competition law, many take the view that Europe should avoid the traps US law has fallen into by admitting excessive litigation. European law should not pave the way for judicial proceedings which ultimately serve the interests of lawyers or other agents rather than injured parties. This inquiry describes the state of remedies in competition law in fifteen European countries, analyses the underlying determinants, and proposes ways of improving the enforcement of competition law. The International and European legal frameworks are presented, as is the approach of US-American law. It is argued that efforts to strengthen private enforcement of antitrust law should benefit from the rich European experience in unfair competition law. The divergence between the two fields of law is not so huge that a completely different treatment is justified. Thus, a specifically European way of competition law enforcement could be developed.