Francisco Suarez was a principal figure in the transition from scholastic to modern natural law, summing up a long and rich tradition and providing much material both for adoption and controversy in the seventeenth century and beyond. Most of the selections translated in this volume are from 'On the Laws and God the Law-Giver (De legibus ac Deo legislatore, 1612)', a work that is considered one of Suarez' greatest achievements. Working within the framework originally elaborated by Thomas Aquinas, Suarez treated humanity as the subject of four different laws, which together guide human beings toward the ends of which they are capable. Suarez achieved a double objective in his systematic account of moral activity. First, he examined and synthesized the entire scholastic heritage of thinking on this topic, identifying the key issues of debate and the key authors who had formulated the different positions most incisively. Second, he went beyond this heritage of authorities to present a new account of human moral action and its relationship to the law. Treading a fine line between those to whom moral directives are purely a matter of reason and those to whom they are purely a matter of a commanding will, Suarez attempted to show how both human reason and the command of the lawgiver dictate the moral space of human action.

Francisco Suarez was a principal figure in the transition from scholastic to modern natural law, summing up a long and rich tradition and providing much material both for adoption and controversy in the seventeenth century and beyond.Most of the selections translated in this volume are from "On the Laws and God the Law-Giver" ("De legibus ac Deo legislatore, " 1612), a work that is considered one of Suarez's greatest achievements. Working within the framework originally elaborated by Thomas Aquinas, Suarez treated humanity as the subject of four different laws, which together guide human beings toward the ends of which they are capable. Suarez achieved a double objective in his systematic account of moral activity. First, he examined and synthesized the entire scholastic heritage of thinking on this topic, identifying the key issues of debate and the key authors who had formulated the different positions most incisively. Second, he went beyond this heritage of authorities to present a new account of human moral action and its relationship to the law.Treading a fine line between those to whom moral directives are purely a matter of reason and those to whom they are purely a matter of a commanding will, Suarez attempted to show how both human reason and the command of the lawgiver dictate the moral space of human action.The Liberty Fund edition is a revised version of that prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by translators Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown, and John Waldron, with revisions by Henry Davis, S. J.Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), a Jesuit priest, was professor of theology at the University of Salamanca in Spain.Annabel S. Brett is a Fellow, Tutor, and University Lecturer in History at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.Knud Haakonssen is Professor of Intellectual History at the University of Sussex, England.

Thomas Pink's Very Short Introduction to Free Will is an accessible and stimulating investigation of one of the most important and enduring problems of Western philosophy. He argues that in order to get clear about freedom and its implications for morality, we need to pay proper attention to the arguments of the philosophers of the past, and especially their views on the will.

Thomas Pink offers a new approach to the problem of free will. Do we have control of how we act, so that we are free to act in more than one way, and does it matter to morality whether we do? Pink argues that what matters to morality is not in fact the freedom to do otherwise, but something more primitive - a basic capacity or power to determine for ourselves what we do. This capacity might or might not take the form of a freedom to act in more than one way, and it might or might not be compatible with causal determinism. What really matters to morality is that it is we who determine what we do. What we do must not simply be a function of powers or capacities for which we are not responsible, or a matter of mere chance. At the heart of moral responsibility is a distinctive form of power that is quite unlike ordinary causation - a power by which we determine outcomes in a way quite differently from the way ordinary causes determine outcomes. Pink examines how this power is involved in action, and how the nature of action permits the operation of such a power to determine it.

Thomas Pink offers a new approach to the problem of free will. Do we have control of how we act, so that we are free to act in more than one way, and does it matter to morality whether we do? Pink argues that what matters to morality is not in fact the freedom to do otherwise, but something more primitive - a basic capacity or power to determine for ourselves what we do. This capacity might or might not take the form of a freedom to act in more than one way, and it might or might not be compatible with causal determinism. What really matters to morality is that it is we who determine what we do. What we do must not simply be a function of powers or capacities for which we are not responsible, or a matter of mere chance. At the heart of moral responsibility is a distinctive form of power that is quite unlike ordinary causation - a power by which we determine outcomes in a way quite differently from the way ordinary causes determine outcomes. Pink examines how this power is involved in action, and how the nature of action permits the operation of such a power to determine it.

This 1996 book presents an alternative theory of the will - of our capacity for decision making. The book argues that taking a decision to act is something we do, and do freely - as much an action as the actions which our decisions explain - and that our freedom of action depends on this capacity for free decision-making. But decision-making is no ordinary action. Decisions to act also have a special executive function, that of ensuring the rationality of the further actions which they explain. This executive function makes decision-making an action importantly unlike any other, with its own distinctive rationality. Pink's highly persuasive study uses this theory of the will to provide accounts of freedom, action and rational choice. The author argues that, in a tradition that runs from Hobbes to Davidson and Frankfurt, Anglo-American philosophy has misrepresented the common-sense psychology of our freedom and action - a psychology which this book now presents and defends.

This 1996 book presents an alternative theory of the will - of our capacity for decision making. The book argues that taking a decision to act is something we do, and do freely - as much an action as the actions which our decisions explain - and that our freedom of action depends on this capacity for free decision-making. But decision-making is no ordinary action. Decisions to act also have a special executive function, that of ensuring the rationality of the further actions which they explain. This executive function makes decision-making an action importantly unlike any other, with its own distinctive rationality. Pink's highly persuasive study uses this theory of the will to provide accounts of freedom, action and rational choice. The author argues that, in a tradition that runs from Hobbes to Davidson and Frankfurt, Anglo-American philosophy has misrepresented the common-sense psychology of our freedom and action - a psychology which this book now presents and defends.