Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
|
Your cart is empty |
|||
Showing 1 - 12 of 12 matches in All Departments
The first textbook to integrate standard philosophy of mind approach with developments in psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience Covers all the essential subjects and topics in philosophy of mind,such as dualism, materialism, mental representation, functionalism and mental causation Also discusses many more recent topics, including infant and animal cognition; the embodied or 'extended' mind; and consciousness Includes chapter summaries, further reading, boxes, and notes to help students Clearly explains the ideas and arguments of leading philosophers of mind such as Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam and Jaegwon Kim
The first textbook to integrate standard philosophy of mind approach with developments in psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience Covers all the essential subjects and topics in philosophy of mind,such as dualism, materialism, mental representation, functionalism and mental causation Also discusses many more recent topics, including infant and animal cognition; the embodied or 'extended' mind; and consciousness Includes chapter summaries, further reading, boxes, and notes to help students Clearly explains the ideas and arguments of leading philosophers of mind such as Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam and Jaegwon Kim
It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory
phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of
the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a
distinctive "cognitive phenomenology"--that is, a kind of
phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some
sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents
new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the
question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology.
It also includes a number of essays which consider whether
cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and
conscious emotion.
This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions and self-deception raise many of the same challenges for those seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? The essays in this volume tackle these questions from both empirical and conceptual perspectives. Some contributors focus on the general question of how to locate self-deception and delusion within our taxonomy of psychological states. Some contributors ask whether particular delusions - such as the Capgras delusion or anosognosia for hemiplegia - might be explained by appeal to motivational and affective factors. And some contributors provide general models of motivated reasoning, against which theories of pathological belief-formation might be measured. The volume will be of interest to cognitive scientists, clinicians, and philosophers interested in the nature of belief and the disturbances to which it is subject.
This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions and self-deception raise many of the same challenges for those seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? The essays in this volume tackle these questions from both empirical and conceptual perspectives. Some contributors focus on the general question of how to locate self-deception and delusion within our taxonomy of psychological states. Some contributors ask whether particular delusions - such as the Capgras delusion or anosognosia for hemiplegia - might be explained by appeal to motivational and affective factors. And some contributors provide general models of motivated reasoning, against which theories of pathological belief-formation might be measured. The volume will be of interest to cognitive scientists, clinicians, and philosophers interested in the nature of belief and the disturbances to which it is subject.
In The Unity of Consciousness Tim Bayne draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. In the first part of the book Bayne develops an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified. Part II applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. Bayne argues that the unity of consciousness remains intact in each of these cases. Part III explores the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the sense of embodiment, and for accounts of the self. In one of the most comprehensive examinations of the topic available, The Unity of Consciousness draws on a wide range of findings within philosophy and the sciences of the mind to construct an account of the unity of consciousness that is both conceptually sophisticated and scientifically informed.
It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory
phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of
the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a
distinctive "cognitive phenomenology"--that is, a kind of
phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some
sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents
new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the
question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology.
It also includes a number of essays which consider whether
cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and
conscious emotion.
In The Unity of Consciousness Tim Bayne draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. In the first part of the book Bayne develops an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified. Part II applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. Bayne argues that the unity of consciousness remains intact in each of these cases. Part III explores the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the sense of embodiment, and for accounts of the self. In one of the most comprehensive examinations of the topic available, The Unity of Consciousness draws on a wide range of findings within philosophy and the sciences of the mind to construct an account of the unity of consciousness that is both conceptually sophisticated and scientifically informed.
Consciousness is undoubtedly one of the last remaining scientific mysteries and hence one of the greatest contemporary scientific challenges. How does the brain's activity result in the rich phenomenology that characterizes our waking life? Are animals conscious? Why did consciousness evolve? How does science proceed to answer such questions? Can we define what consciousness is? Can we measure it? Can we use experimental results to further our understanding of disorders of consciousness, such as those seen in schizophrenia, delirium, or altered states of consciousness? These questions are at the heart of contemporary research in the domain. Answering them requires a fundamentally interdisciplinary approach that engages not only philosophers, but also neuroscientists and psychologists in a joint effort to develop novel approaches that reflect both the stunning recent advances in imaging methods as well as the continuing refinement of our concepts of consciousness. In this light, the Oxford Companion to Consciousness is the most complete authoritative survey of contemporary research on consciousness. Five years in the making and including over 250 concise entries written by leaders in the field, the volume covers both fundamental knowledge as well as more recent advances in this rapidly changing domain. Structured as an easy-to-use dictionary and extensively cross-referenced, the Companion offers contributions from philosophy of mind to neuroscience, from experimental psychology to clinical findings, so reflecting the profoundly interdisciplinary nature of the domain. Particular care has been taken to ensure that each of the entries is accessible to the general reader and that the overall volume represents a comprehensive snapshot of the contemporary study of consciousness. The result is a unique compendium that will prove indispensable to anyone interested in consciousness, from beginning students wishing to clarify a concept to professional consciousness researchers looking for the best characterization of a particular phenomenon.
Consciousness is undoubtedly one of the last remaining scientific
mysteries and hence one of the greatest contemporary scientific
challenges. How does the brain's activity result in the rich
phenomenology that characterizes our waking life? Are animals
conscious? Why did consciousness evolve? How does science proceed
to answer such questions? Can we define what consciousness is? Can
we measure it? Can we use experimental results to further our
understanding of disorders of consciousness, such as those seen in
schizophrenia, delirium, or altered states of consciousness?
What is the philosophy of religion? How can we distinguish it from theology on the one hand and the psychology/sociology of religious belief on the other? What does it mean to describe God as 'eternal'? And should religious people want there to be good arguments for the existence of God, or is religious belief only authentic in the absence of these good arguments? In this Very Short Introduction Tim Bayne introduces the field of philosophy of religion, and engages with some of the most burning questions that philosophers discuss. Considering how 'religion' should be defined, and whether we even need to be able to define it in order to engage in the philosophy of religion, he goes on to discuss whether the existence of God matters. Exploring the problem of evil, Bayne also debates the connection between faith and reason, and the related question of what role reason should play in religious contexts. Shedding light on the relationship between science and religion, Bayne finishes by considering the topics of reincarnation and the afterlife. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.
There is no denying that thinking comes naturally to human beings
and that thinking is indeed central to what it means to be human.
But what are thoughts? How does the brain--billions of tiny neurons
and synapses--accomplish thought? In this compelling Very Short
Introduction, Tim Bayne offers a compact but wide-ranging account
of the nature of thought, drawing upon philosophy, psychology,
neuroscience, and anthropology. Bayne touches on a stimulating
array of topics. Does thinking occur in public or is it a purely
private affair? Do young children and non-human animals think? Is
human thought the same everywhere, or are there culturally specific
modes of thought? What is the relationship between thought and
language? What kind of responsibility do we have for our thoughts?
In what ways can the process of thinking go wrong? Beginning with
questions about what thought is and what distinguishes it from
other kinds of mental states, he explores the logical structures of
thought as well as the mechanisms that make thought possible. In
sum, this book provides an engaging survey of what we know--and
what we don't know--about one of the most central of human
capacities.
|
You may like...
Performance and Public Value in the…
Kelly LeRoux, Nathaniel S. Wright
Hardcover
R2,446
Discovery Miles 24 460
Elgar Encyclopedia of European Union…
Paolo R Graziano, Jale Tosun
Hardcover
R7,605
Discovery Miles 76 050
Asteroseismology of Stellar Populations…
Andrea Miglio, Patrick Eggenberger, …
Hardcover
Compound-Nuclear Reactions - Proceedings…
Jutta Escher, Yoram Alhassid, …
Hardcover
R4,513
Discovery Miles 45 130
|