The once-neglected study of counter-insurgency operations has recently emerged as an area of central concern for Western governments and their military organizations. While counter-insurgency represents a hugely challenging form of contemporary warfare, there exists a considerable body of experience that offers assistance in the form of examples of both good and bad practice. The main aim of this book is to present these examples and the lessons that can be drawn from them. Such lessons can be of considerable benefit to today's policy-makers and military practitioners. The book also considers how these lessons can actually fit into the contemporary framework - as defined by military, political and institutional logic - that shapes and bounds today's counter-insurgency warfare. Dimensions of Counter-Insurgency explores a number of key themes including: the experience of counter-insurgency in the Middle East; the contribution of maritime and air forces; the challenges posed in adapting Western armed forces to their new tasks; and the responses made - in light of the perceived need for international action against insurgencies - by multilateral institutions such as NATO and the European Union. This book features a broad range of contributions from academics and military thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic. This was previously published as a special issue of Contemporary Security Policy.

In 1909 the British Admiralty placed an order for a rigid airship, marking the beginning of the Royal Navy's involvement with airpower. This collection charts the Navy's involvement with aviation over the following century, and the ways in which its rapid expansion and evolution radically altered the nature of maritime power and naval strategy. Drawing on much new historical research, the collection takes a broadly chronological approach which allows a scholarly examination of key themes from across the history of British naval aviation. The subjects tackled include long-standing controversies over the control of naval air power, crucial turning points within British defence policy and strategy, the role of naval aviation in limited war, and discussion of campaigns - such the contribution of the Fleet Air Arm in the Mediterranean and Pacific theatres of the Second World War - that have hitherto received relatively little attention. The collection concludes with a discussion of recent debates surrounding the Royal Navy's acquisition of a new generation of carriers, setting the arguments within an historical context. Taken as a whole the volume offers fascinating insights into the development of a key aspect of naval power as well as shedding new light on one of the most important aspects of Britain's defence policy and military history. By simultaneous addressing historical and current political debates, it is sure to find a ready audience and stimulate further discussion.

The once-neglected study of counter-insurgency operations has recently emerged as an area of central concern for Western governments and their military organizations. While counter-insurgency represents a hugely challenging form of contemporary warfare, there exists a considerable body of experience that offers assistance in the form of examples of both good and bad practice.

The main aim of this book is to present these examples and the lessons that can be drawn from them. Such lessons can be of considerable benefit to today s policy-makers and military practitioners. The book also considers how these lessons can actually fit into the contemporary framework as defined by military, political and institutional logic that shapes and bounds today s counter-insurgency warfare. Dimensions of Counter-Insurgency explores a number of key themes including: the experience of counter-insurgency in the Middle East; the contribution of maritime and air forces; the challenges posed in adapting Western armed forces to their new tasks; and the responses made in light of the perceived need for international action against insurgencies by multilateral institutions such as NATO and the European Union. This book features a broad range of contributions from academics and military thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic.

This was previously published as a special issue of Contemporary Security Policy.

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In 1909 the British Admiralty placed an order for a rigid airship, marking the beginning of the Royal Navy's involvement with airpower. This collection charts the Navy's involvement with aviation over the following century, and the ways in which its rapid expansion and evolution radically altered the nature of maritime power and naval strategy. Drawing on much new historical research, the collection takes a broadly chronological approach which allows a scholarly examination of key themes from across the history of British naval aviation. The subjects tackled include long-standing controversies over the control of naval air power, crucial turning points within British defence policy and strategy, the role of naval aviation in limited war, and discussion of campaigns - such the contribution of the Fleet Air Arm in the Mediterranean and Pacific theatres of the Second World War - that have hitherto received relatively little attention. The collection concludes with a discussion of recent debates surrounding the Royal Navy's acquisition of a new generation of carriers, setting the arguments within an historical context. Taken as a whole the volume offers fascinating insights into the development of a key aspect of naval power as well as shedding new light on one of the most important aspects of Britain's defence policy and military history. By simultaneous addressing historical and current political debates, it is sure to find a ready audience and stimulate further discussion.

The D-Day landings of June 1944 were one of the most ambitious undertakings of all time, and their success one of the greatest military accomplishments. Operation Neptune was the initial assault stage of the broader Operation Overlord, the liberation of northwest Europe. It was a hugely complex undertaking involving several thousand ships and aircraft and hundreds of thousands of men, as the Allies took on Germany s vaunted Atlantic Wall. In the words of the man most responsible for the plan, Admiral Bertram Ramsay (Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief), It is to be our privilege to take part in the greatest amphibious operation in history Our task, in conjunction with the Merchant Navies of the United Nations, and supported by the Allied Air Forces, is to carry the Allied Expeditionary Force to the Continent, to establish it there in a secure bridgehead and to build it up and maintain it at a rate which will outmatch that of the enemy. The landings in Normandy represented the culmination of several long campaigns to put in place the strategic preconditions for the return to the continent, as well as marking the beginning of the campaign to finish the war in Europe. This volume provides the complete text of the Battle Summary written shortly after the war by the Admiralty historical staff, covering the planning, preparation and execution of the operation as well as the subsequent consolidation, together with the maps and detailed appendices from the original work. This is accompanied by a comprehensive introduction, newly written for this volume, that explains the context for the operation as well as an overview of further reading on the subject. This is the first volume in Helion s new series, 'Naval Staff Histories of the Second World War . The series aims to make available to a broad authorship these indispensable studies of the key operations of the war."

Few episodes in warfare are as famous as the evacuation of the British expeditionary force and many French troops from Dunkirk. It was a very British success, pulling something of a victory from the jaws of defeat - a triumph in the face of catastrophe. In May 1940, as France collapsed in the face of the German blitzkrieg, the British army and some French forces fell back on the Channel coast. The advancing Germans pushed them back and then briefly paused, confident that this cornered remnant of the allied forces was trapped. Yet the German command had failed to appreciate just what sea power could do to deny them the full fruits of their apparent victory; at short notice an evacuation was improvised which, it was initially thought, might if all went well last two days and rescue 45,000 men. The heroic rear guard action of the troops ashore against the renewed German advance, the ability of the RAF to provide just enough air cover, the tireless efforts of naval crews and those manning the priceless `little ships', and the organisational genius of Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay saw Operation Dynamo succeed beyond all realistic expectation: two days became nine, and over 338,000 men were saved. Operational disaster in the Battle of France did not become strategic defeat in the war, and albeit at great cost to the Navy, the British army survived to be rebuilt. Above all, Britain could continue to fight. This volume reproduces the complete text of the Battle Summary written shortly after the war by the Admiralty historical staff, comprising a detailed and authoritative account of these dramatic events. This is accompanied by a comprehensive introduction, newly written for this volume, that explains the context for the operation as well as an overview of further reading on the subject. This is the third volume in Helion's new series,`Naval Staff Histories of the Second World War'. The series aims to make available to a broad readership these indispensable studies of the key operations of the war.