The Objects of Thought addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. Tim Crane argues that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that we will not adequately understand thought's representational power ("intentionality") unless we have understood the representation of the non-existent. Intentionality is conceived by Crane in terms of the direction of the mind upon an object of thought, or an intentional object. Intentional objects are what we think about. Some intentional objects exist and some do not. Non-existence poses a problem because there seem to be truths about non-existent intentional objects, but truths are answerable to reality, and reality contains only what exists. The proposed solution is to accept that there are some genuine truths about non-existent intentional objects, but to hold that they must be reductively explained in terms of truths about what does exist. The Objects of Thought offers both an original account of the nature of intentionality and a solution to the problem of thought about the non-existent.

Fred Stoutland was a major figure in the philosophy of action and philosophy of language. This collection brings together essays on truth, language, action and mind and thus provides an important summary of many key themes in Stoutland's own work, as well as offering valuable perspectives on key issues in contemporary philosophy.

Franz Brentano is one of the founding fathers of twentieth century philosophy, celebrated for introducing the concept of intentionality to philosophy as well as making significant contributions to ethics and logic. His work exerted great influence on major philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, but also philosophers travelling in the opposite direction, such Gottlob Frege. He counted Sigmund Freud amongst his students and Freud expressed great admiration for his teacher in several letters. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is Brentano's most important and brilliant work. It helped to establish psychology as a scientific discipline, but did so in a highly original and distinctive manner by arguing for a form of introspectionism. Brentano argued that consciousness is always unified and that the hallmark of the mind is that one's thoughts are always directed towards something - his famous theory of 'intentionality' - arguments that have deep implications not just for philosophy but psychology, cognitive science and consciousness studies. With a new foreword by Tim Crane.

Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. Dispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation.

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How can the human mind represent the external world? What is thought, and can it be studied scientifically? Should we think of the mind as a kind of machine? Is the mind a computer? Can a computer think? Tim Crane sets out to answer these questions and more in a lively and straightforward way, presuming no prior knowledge of philosophy or related disciplines. Since its first publication, The Mechanical Mind has introduced thousands of people to some of the most important ideas in contemporary philosophy of mind. Crane explains the fundamental ideas that cut across philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science: what the mind-body problem is; what a computer is and how it works; what thoughts are and how computers and minds might have them. He examines different theories of the mind from dualist to eliminativist, and questions whether there can be thought without language and whether the mind is subject to the same causal laws as natural phenomena. The result is a fascinating exploration of the theories and arguments surrounding the notions of thought and representation. This third edition has been fully revised and updated, and includes a wholly new chapter on externalism about mental content and the extended and embodied mind. There is a stronger emphasis on the environmental and bodily context in which thought occurs. Many chapters have been reorganised to make the reader's passage through the book easier. The book now contains a much more detailed guide to further reading, and the chronology and the glossary of technical terms have also been updated. The Mechanical Mind is accessible to anyone interested in the mechanisms of our minds, and essential reading for those studying philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, or cognitive psychology.

Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. Dispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation.

Fred Stoutland was a major figure in the philosophy of action and philosophy of language. This collection brings together essays on truth, language, action and mind and thus provides an important summary of many key themes in Stoutland's own work, as well as offering valuable perspectives on key issues in contemporary philosophy.

The Objects of Thought addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. Tim Crane argues that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that we will not adequately understand thought's representational power ('intentionality') unless we have understood the representation of the non-existent. Intentionality is conceived by Crane in terms of the direction of the mind upon an object of thought, or an intentional object. Intentional objects are what we think about. Some intentional objects exist and some do not. Non-existence poses a problem because there seem to be truths about non-existent intentional objects, but truths are answerable to reality, and reality contains only what exists. The proposed solution is to accept that there are some genuine truths about non-existent intentional objects, but to hold that they must be reductively explained in terms of truths about what does exist. The Objects of Thought offers both an original account of the nature of intentionality and a solution to the problem of thought about the non-existent.

A deep concern with consciousness and intentionality is one of the several things that has lately moved into the centre of the philosophy of mind. The issue of consciousness is often treated as something distinct from intentionality, but - as Tim Crane notes in his incisive new Foreword - there is now something of a sea-change. This classic volume may be at least partly responsible for the shift in how philosophy of mind is starting to be understood. Before its first appearance, discussions of consciousness and intentionality in the context of perception were in their infancy. The book was a departure from the way this part of philosophy was conceived. It pointed to new ways to look at the discipline, addressing both the epistemology of mind, and intentionality and consciousness, especially in connection with perception. Showcasing many leading figures in the field, it offers a splendid overview of the issues at stake.

How can the human mind represent the external world? What is thought, and can it be studied scientifically? Should we think of the mind as a kind of machine? Is the mind a computer? Can a computer think? Tim Crane sets out to answer these questions and more in a lively and straightforward way, presuming no prior knowledge of philosophy or related disciplines. Since its first publication, The Mechanical Mind has introduced thousands of people to some of the most important ideas in contemporary philosophy of mind. Crane explains the fundamental ideas that cut across philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science: what the mind-body problem is; what a computer is and how it works; what thoughts are and how computers and minds might have them. He examines different theories of the mind from dualist to eliminativist, and questions whether there can be thought without language and whether the mind is subject to the same causal laws as natural phenomena. The result is a fascinating exploration of the theories and arguments surrounding the notions of thought and representation. This third edition has been fully revised and updated, and includes a wholly new chapter on externalism about mental content and the extended and embodied mind. There is a stronger emphasis on the environmental and bodily context in which thought occurs. Many chapters have been reorganised to make the reader's passage through the book easier. The book now contains a much more detailed guide to further reading, and the chronology and the glossary of technical terms have also been updated. The Mechanical Mind is accessible to anyone interested in the mechanisms of our minds, and essential reading for those studying philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, or cognitive psychology.

Aspects of Psychologism is a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane's formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject's point of view. How should we think about the mind? Analytical philosophy tends to address this question by examining the language we use to talk about our minds, and thus translates our knowledge of mind and consciousness into knowledge of the concepts which this language embodies. Psychologism rejects this approach. The philosophy of mind, Crane believes, has become too narrow in its purely conceptual focus on the logical and linguistic formulas that structure thought. We cannot assume that the categories needed to understand the mind correspond absolutely with such semantic categories. A central claim of Crane's psychologism is that intentionality--the "aboutness" or "directedness" of the mind--is essential to all mental phenomena. In addition, Crane responds to proponents of materialist doctrines about consciousness and defends the claim that perception can represent the world in a non-conceptual, non-propositional way. Philosophers must take more seriously the findings of psychology and phenomenology, Crane contends. An investigation of mental phenomena from this broader viewpoint opens up philosophy to a more realistic and plausible account of the mind's nature.

The nature of perception has long been a central question in philosophy. It is of crucial importance not just in the philosophy of mind, but also in epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of science. The essays in this 1992 volume not only offer fresh answers to some of the traditional problems of perception, but also examine the subject in light of contemporary research on mental content. A substantial introduction locates the essays within the recent history of the subject, and demonstrates the links between them. The Contents of Experience brings together some prominent philosophers in the field, and offers a major statement on a problem central to current philosophical thinking. Notable contributors include Christopher Peacocke, Brian O'Shaughnessy and Michael Tye.

This book provides an accessible lively introduction to the main problems and debates in contemporary philosophy of mind. Tim Crane proposes an original and unified theory of all the phenomena of mind, and, in the light of his theory, examines the central problems of the philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem, the problem of intentionality, the problem of consciousness, and the problem of perception.

The nature of perception has long been a central question in philosophy. It is of central importance not just for the philosophy of mind, but also for epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of science. This volume represents the best of the latest research on perception, with contributions from some of the leading philosophers in the area, including Christopher Peacocke, Brian O'Shaughnessy and Michael Tye. As well as discussing traditional problems, the essays also approach the topic in light of recent research on mental content and representation.

This anthology provides a complete and self-contained introduction to metaphysics. Both an anthology and commentary, it contains an extensive collection of the best classical and contemporary readings on the subject, as well as substantial editorial material, which set the extracts in context and guide the reader through them. The book is divided into 10 sections, providing instructors with flexibility in designing and teaching a variety of courses.

Franz Brentano is one of the founding fathers of twentieth century philosophy, celebrated for introducing the concept of intentionality to philosophy as well as making significant contributions to ethics and logic. His work exerted great influence on major philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, but also philosophers travelling in the opposite direction, such Gottlob Frege. He counted Sigmund Freud amongst his students and Freud expressed great admiration for his teacher in several letters.

Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is Brentano’s most important and brilliant work. It helped to establish psychology as a scientific discipline, but did so in a highly original and distinctive manner by arguing for a form of introspectionism.　 Brentano argued that consciousness is always unified and that the hallmark of the mind is that one’s thoughts are always directed towards something – his famous theory of ‘intentionality’ – arguments that have deep implications not just for philosophy but psychology, cognitive science and consciousness studies.

With a new foreword by Tim Crane.

Table of Contents

Foreword to the Routledge Classics Edition Preface to the English Edition Foreword to the 1911 Edition, Franz Brentano Foreword to the 1874 Edition, Franz Brentano Book One: Psychology as a Science 1. The Concept and Purpose of Psychology 2. Psychological Method with Special Reference to its Experiential Basis 3. Further Investigations Concerning Psychological Method. Induction of the Fundamental Laws of Psychology 4. Further Investigations Concerning Psychological Method. The Inexact Character of its Highest Laws. Deduction and Verification Book Two : Mental Phenomena in General 1. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena 2. Inner Consciousness 3. Further Consideration Regarding Inner Consciousness 4. On the Unity of Consciousness 5. A Survey of the Principal Attempts to Classify Mental Phenomena 6. Classification of Mental Activities into Presentations, Judgements and Phenomena of Love and Hate 7. Presentation and Judgement: Two Different Fundamental Classes 8. Feeling and Will United into a Single Fundamental Class 8. Comparison of the Three Basic Classes with the Threefold Phenomena of Inner Consciousness. Determination of Their Natural Order. Appendix to The Classification of Mental Phenomena Additional Essays from Brentano’s Nachlass Concerning Intuitions, Concepts and Objects of Reason Index