Recent military interventions in Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and elsewhere confirm the axiom that it is possible to win every battle and yet still manage to lose a war. Although the United States has developed a method of warfare that can produce stunning battlefield victories, those battlefield victories do not necessarily accomplish the strategic objectives for which the war was fought. Contemporary United States strategy requires the Army to do more than fight and win in the traditional sense; it requires a force that can intervene in failed, failing, or rogue states, stabilize those states, and facilitate their transformation into productive members of the international community. The United States Army has a fundamental, perhaps decisive role in ensuring that battlefield victories are translated into strategic success. The central research question is: What should the Army do to improve its ability to conduct intervention, stabilization, and transformation operations? To help answer this question, this thesis examines the essential nature of this new mission and deduces the Army's proper role. It further analyzes the Army's deficiencies in performing that role. Finally, recommendations are made to address these deficiencies.