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Modern liberalism asserts the transcendental, autonomous self's
'natural rights' against others' moralistic and political
preferences, and regards the economist's utilitarian social welfare
theory as instrumental to the achievement of 'social justice'.
Timothy Roth argues that the liberal enterprise ignores Kant's 'two
points of view', confuses Kantian autonomy with moral and political
license, mistakes utilitarian impersonality for impartiality, and
takes no account of the indeterminacy of social welfare theory's
fundamental theoretical constructs. In contrast, the author shows
that Kant's 'two points of view' inform the conservative's
constitutive political position and animate the
consequence-detached, explicitly normative work of the
conservative, constitutional political economist. He shows that,
unlike modern liberalism, conservatism is grounded in Kant's 'two
points of view', that utilitarian social welfare theory cannot be
instrumental to the achievement of social justice, and that
constitutional political economy is conservative economics.
Economists interested in political economy, methodological issues,
social welfare theory, public choice theory, or the moral
foundations of economics will find much of interest in this
thought-provoking volume. Political scientists interested in the
philosophical foundations of modern liberalism and conservatism
will also want to add this title to their library.
This important book presents a compelling case that traditional
received theory (Paretian-utilitarian) has followed a dangerous
path one not espoused by Adam Smith and Nobel Laureate James
Buchanan. The latter viewed value and preferences as mutable (not
'given') and believed that rights systems must underlie moral law
and impartial justice. Men must be 'taken as they are' in this
system. Adoption of the Smith-Buchanan paradigm, Professor Roth
brilliantly argues, leads to the kind of moral and political
philosophy that informs the science of statutes and legislators
that underpins our Founding Fathers' republican self-government
project.' - Bob Ekelund, Professor and Eminent Scholar in Economics
(Emeritus), Auburn University, USEconomists and the State shows how
modern economists have strayed far from Adam Smith's procedurally
based, consequence-detached political economy. Timothy P. Roth
argues that this wrong turn has left economists ill-equipped to
address an expanding federal enterprise and new threats to our
self-governing republic. He subsequently sets out to offer ways to
redress this. Making the case for a return to the moral and
political philosophy that informed Adam Smith's 'science of the
statesman or legislator,' this book argues that economists must
reject their relentlessly utilitarian, teleological theory of the
state and embrace Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan's constitutional
political economy project. The author outlines the specific
requirements of a non-teleological conception of the state - a
conception that is vital to the continuing development of a theory
of the state informed by a prior ethical commitment to the moral
equivalence of persons. This book will appeal to scholars and
students of political economy, political thought, public choice
economics and Austrian economics as well as to practitioners and
policy-makers interested in how economics should support those
serving the public. Contents: Preface 1. The Smithian Inheritance
2. Institutions Matter 3. What Economists Do 4. The Founders'
Republican Self-government Project Derailed 5. What Has Been
Wrought 6. What Went Wrong 7. What Should Economists Do? References
Index
The Founders of the American Republic set up a remarkable
experiment in self-government. Today, debates rage as to the
philosophical legacy of this ongoing experiment. In this
fascinating study, Timothy Roth offers a critical analysis of
modern liberalism and the economic theory to which it is conjoined
- social welfare theory. The author argues that social welfare
theory cannot be reconciled with the American Founders'
procedurally based, consequence-detached republican self-government
project. The book goes on to explore and expound the Founders'
desire to promote respect for the moral law, their appreciation of
the reciprocal relationship between morality and law, and their
commitment to the promotion of justice in the sense of impartial
institutions; ideas which find expression in contractarian,
constitutional political economy. Scholars and students in
economics, political science, law and philosophy will find this
marvelous treatise an engaging and thought-provoking read.
Because it is technically flawed and morally bankrupt, the author
argues, the economist's consequence-based, procedurally detached
theory of the state has contributed to the growth of government. As
part of the Kantian-Rawlsian contractarian project, this book seeks
to return economics to its foundations in moral philosophy. Given
the moral equivalence of persons, the greatest possible equal
participation must be promoted, persons must be impartially treated
and, because it is grounded in consequentialist social welfare
theory (SWT), the economist's theory of the state must be rejected.
Ad hoc deployment of SWT has facilitated discriminatory rent
seeking and contributed to larger government. In contrast, this
book argues that equal political participation and a constitutional
impartiality constraint minimize rent seeking, respect individual
perceptions of the 'public good' and underwrite the legitimacy of
government. Economists, moral philosophers and political scientists
will find this book a unique contribution to the literature.
The neoclassical theory of choice is an integral part of a large
and growing literature. Its elegance, simplicity and apparent
generality appear, increasingly, to influence the thinking of
psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. At the same
time, the theory is subject to robust attack. The theme of the book
is that the critics have it right. Account must be taken of the
endogeneity of preference and value structures, of decision makers'
cognitive limitations, of information asymmetries, of opportunistic
behavior, and of positive transaction and decision costs. Yet these
considerations militate against the specification of both the
efficiency frontier and the Social Welfare Function. This, in turn,
suggests that Social Welfare Theory is an inappropriate guide for
the formulation of distributional and other economic policies. A
corollary is that economists' (and others) attention should center
less on 'getting the prices right' and more on 'getting the
institutions right'.
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