This book is a rigorous attempt to address the problem of corruption by using various methodologies and perspectives. Among other innovative mechanisms, Soreide proposes to extend responsibility to those who benefit indirectly from corruption. She also suggests extending the duties of private actors to help the government in addressing corruption. She discusses the nature of sanctions and she proposes empowering courts to debar suppliers for public contracts. Soreide's analysis is careful, attentive to the evidence, and provides practical solutions to some of the most difficult challenges facing contemporary societies. This book should be read and influence theorists, economists, lawyers, government officials and policymakers.' - Alon Harel, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IsraelCriminal law efficiency is a concept often referred to but seldom defined. Clarity, the author argues, is necessary for finding practical solutions to fundamental challenges in this area of law, especially with the criminal justice system itself at risk. Tina Soreide offers views in contrast to mainstream ideas on optimal criminal law responses to corruption, with emphasis on the fundamental role of the criminal justice system in the fight against corruption, and the effect this can have on other mechanisms in society. Her analysis explains the concept of criminal law efficiency through economic approaches and why many criminal law responses to corruption are at risk of becoming 'facade strategies' that may, in fact facilitate corruption. Corruption and Criminal Justice offers insights into the obstacles that policymakers and government advisors cannot ignore. It serves as an invaluable resource for advanced students and academics interested in law, economics, and large corporations.

Achieving effective enforcement in cases of complex, multi-layered, multi-jurisdictional acts of bribery that occur in utmost secrecy is a challenging area of corporate crime enforcement. This thought-provoking book examines the scope, benefits and challenges of negotiated settlements - a form of non-trial enforcement - as a mechanism, and demonstrates the need for a more harmonized and principled approach to deterring corporate bribery. Written by a global team of experts with backgrounds in legal practice, policy work and academia, this timely book offers a truly international perspective, considering negotiated settlements in view of a variety of different legal systems and traditions. Drawing on recent empirical research, the contributors' analyses of these settlements in the context of fundamental criminal law principles offer unique insight and functional solutions to the difficult problem of holding corporations liable for crime. The book's deep reflection on criminal law principles will be beneficial for scholars and students of economic crime, corruption and criminal law. Equally, its contributions to a policy area undergoing rapid development will be invaluable for policymakers, enforcement practitioners and government officials. Contributors include: J. Arlen, R. Berzero, L. Borlini, K.E. Davis, P.H. Dubois, B. Garrett, S. Hawley, C. King, D. Kos, S. Lonati, N. Lord, L.A. Low, A. Makinwa, S. Oded, K.M. Peters, M. Pieth, B. Prelogar, T. Soreide, K. Vagle, S. Williams-Elegbe

'Informative and refreshing, these short studies from around the world provide fertile ground for discussion, analysis and positive ways forward. In this book, corrupt practices from around the world are examined by experienced practitioners and researchers who shed light on various forms of corruption.' - Adam Graycar, Australian National UniversityAll societies develop their own norms about what is fair behavior and what is not. Violations of these norms, including acts of corruption, can collectively be described as forms of 'grabbing'. This unique volume addresses how grabbing hinders development at the sector level and in state administration. The contributors - researchers and practitioners who work on the ground in developing countries - present empirical data on the mechanisms at play and describe different types of unethical practices. The book's sixteen case studies explore why certain practices constitute forms of grabbing, what implications they have for the achievement of development goals, and how policy options should take the characteristics of grabbing into account. A broad range of sectors are covered, including extractive industries, construction, ports, utilities, finance, health, pharmaceuticals and education. The authors discuss political checks and balances, democratic elections and the law enforcement system, as well as the government s role in the allocation of land and as a development partner in other countries. The volume's original approach makes it a valuable resource for researchers and students interested in development, economics, governance and corruption. Development aid practitioners, as well as politicians and public officials in developing countries, will find it a useful aid in their work. Contributors: I. Amundsen, J. Andvig, T. Barasa, G. Bel, B. Chinsinga, L. Corkin, A. Estache, R. Foucart, S. Gloppen, S.-E. Helle, K. Hussman, E.G. Jansen, P. Le Billon, I. Lindkvist, J. F. Marteau, M. Poisson, G. Raballand, L. Rakner, J.C. Rivillas, I.A. Skage, A. Strand, A. Tostensen, J. Wells, L. Wren-Lewis

A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs.Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions. This cutting-edge work will be an unmatched resource for scholars and students of corruption, professionals in international aid and finance organizations, and scholars and professionals with more general interests in economic and political development. Contributors: T.S. Aidt, D.M. Aldrighi, E. Auriol, F. Boehm, E. Buscaglia, B. Clausen, S. Cole, A. Estache, B. Flyvbjerg, Y. Jeong, C. Kenny, A. Kraay, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, E. Molloy, P. Murrell, M. Musatova, L.V. Peisakhin, G. Piga, J.D. Potter, F. Recanatini, S. Rose-Ackerman, T. Soreide, S. Straub, M. Tavits, A. Tran, R. Truex, M. Vagliasindi, P.C. Vicente, R.J. Weiner, L. Wren-Lewis

All societies develop their own norms about what is fair behavior and what is not. Violations of these norms, including acts of corruption, can collectively be described as forms of 'grabbing'. This unique volume addresses how grabbing hinders development at the sector level and in state administration. The contributors - researchers and practitioners who work on the ground in developing countries - present empirical data on the mechanisms at play and describe different types of unethical practices.

The book's sixteen case studies explore why certain practices constitute forms of grabbing, what implications they have for the achievement of development goals, and how policy options should take the characteristics of grabbing into account. A broad range of sectors are covered, including extractive industries, construction, ports, utilities, finance, health, pharmaceuticals and education. The authors discuss political checks and balances, democratic elections and the law enforcement system, as well as the government s role in the allocation of land and as a development partner in other countries.

The volume's original approach makes it a valuable resource for researchers and students interested in development, economics, governance and corruption. Development aid practitioners, as well as politicians and public officials in developing countries, will find it a useful aid in their work.

A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs.Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions. This cutting-edge work will be an unmatched resource for scholars and students of corruption, professionals in international aid and finance organizations, and scholars and professionals with more general interests in economic and political development. Contributors: T.S. Aidt, D.M. Aldrighi, E. Auriol, F. Boehm, E. Buscaglia, B. Clausen, S. Cole, A. Estache, B. Flyvbjerg, Y. Jeong, C. Kenny, A. Kraay, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, E. Molloy, P. Murrell, M. Musatova, L.V. Peisakhin, G. Piga, J.D. Potter, F. Recanatini, S. Rose-Ackerman, T. Soreide, S. Straub, M. Tavits, A. Tran, R. Truex, M. Vagliasindi, P.C. Vicente, R.J. Weiner, L. Wren-Lewis